COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED JANUARY
22, 1997 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1292-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KENNETH
W. RAUSH,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Walworth County: JOHN R. RACE, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded with
directions.
ANDERSON,
J. Kenneth W. Raush contends that the circuit
court erred by concluding that his prior convictions for operating while
intoxicated (OWI) in Illinois and Iowa justify penalty enhancement under §
346.65(2)(b), Stats.,
1993-94. He argues that because the
State failed to prove that on the date of convictions Illinois and Iowa had
statutes with terms substantially the same as Wisconsin’s, the trial court was
precluded from counting the Illinois and Iowa convictions as prior convictions
for sentencing purposes in Wisconsin.
We reverse and remand because we conclude that the State failed to
establish the prior offenses in Illinois and Iowa for the imposition of the
enhanced penalties.
Raush’s
challenge to his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of an intoxicant, third offense, §§ 346.63(1)(a) and 346.65(2)(b), Stats., 1993-94, is limited to the trial
court’s finding that this was his third conviction within five years. He offers two criticisms. First, he contends
that the State failed to prove he was twice convicted of drunk driving in the
past five years; and, second, he maintains that the State failed to prove that
his prior convictions in Illinois and Iowa were under statutes that prohibit
the use of a motor vehicle while intoxicated or had substantially similar
terms.
Raush
originally sought to have the criminal traffic charges against him dismissed on
the grounds that the complaint failed to establish probable cause to believe
that he was properly charged with a crime.
Raush contended that there was no information in the complaint that the
Illinois and Iowa statutes incorporated by reference into the complaint were
valid at the time of his alleged convictions in those two states. The trial court denied the motion. The trial court held that the State
presented adequate proof that at the time of Raush's convictions for drunk
driving in Iowa and Illinois, both jurisdictions had statutes substantially
similar to Wisconsin’s.
After
a series of motions were denied, Raush entered a no contest plea to the charge
of third offense drunk driving. Raush
was sentenced and the nine-month jail sentence was stayed pending this appeal.[1]
Raush’s
first challenge is to the State’s failure to properly prove his prior
convictions for drunk driving in Iowa and Illinois. He relies upon a number of recent court of appeals decisions
which have discussed the proof requirements of the statute covering habitual
criminality, § 973.12, Stats. Raush contends that the State failed to meet
its burden by relying upon the amended criminal complaint’s allegations
concerning his convictions in Iowa and Illinois and failing to present
certified copies of his prior convictions.[2]
The
facts of record in this case are undisputed.
Whether the record satisfies the statutory requirement necessary to
enhance the penalties provided by chs. 343 and 346, Stats., presents a question of law which this court resolves
without deference to the trial court's determination. See State v. Keith, 175 Wis.2d 75, 78, 498 N.W.2d
865, 866 (Ct. App. 1993).
The
supreme court has made it clear that “[i]f the accused or defense counsel
challenges the existence or applicability of a prior offense, or asserts a lack
of information or remains silent about a prior offense, the State must
establish the prior offenses for the imposition of the enhanced penalties ¼.” See State v. Wideman, No.
95-0852-CR, slip op. at 3-4 (Wis. Dec. 20, 1996). The State must be ready at sentencing to establish a defendant’s
prior convictions by appropriate official records or other competent proof.
There
is now no longer any question that the State does not have to fulfill the
formal requirements for establishing prior offenses set forth in the habitual
criminality statute. See id.,
slip op. at 3; and State v. Spaeth, No. 95-1827-CR, slip op. at
10 (Wis. Dec. 20, 1996). However, the
State is obligated to establish the prior offenses by presenting a certified
copy of the judgment of conviction or other competent proof, see Wideman,
slip op. at 3-4, 16, that could include (1) a teletype of the defendant’s
Department of Transportation driving record; (2) an admission by the defendant;
or (3) an admission by the defendant’s attorney. See Spaeth, slip op. at 11.
Following
the example of the supreme court in Wideman and Spaeth,
we will review the record in this case to determine if it is sufficient to
establish competent proof of the prior offenses.
The
complaint does advise Raush that the State is seeking enhanced penalties
because this is his third drunk driving offense. Despite the complaint’s recitation of the facts of the prior
convictions, it was not accompanied by a teletype of Raush’s Department of
Transportation driving record or certified copies of the convictions from Iowa
and Illinois.[3] Therefore, the complaint is not documentary
evidence of Raush’s driving record and is of no help in our review of the
record.
We
cannot hold that either defendant or counsel made any admissions or concessions
that would constitute competent evidence of Raush’s two prior convictions. It is obvious that Raush has vigorously
contested the State’s allegations that he had two prior drunk driving
convictions. At the plea and sentencing
hearing, defense counsel made it abundantly apparent that Raush was continuing
his objection to the use of the Iowa and Illinois convictions to enhance the
penalty. A defendant’s entry of a plea
and defense counsel’s argument for the minimum sentence for a third offense
cannot be construed to be an admission of the prior offenses. Nor can it be construed as a waiver of the
procedure suggested in Wideman that the State establish the prior
offenses whenever the defendant or defense counsel challenges the existence or
validity of the alleged prior offenses.
See Wideman, slip op. at 17.
It
would be unfair to hold that a defendant who has vigorously challenged the
State’s representation that he or she has prior drunk driving convictions has
admitted those prior convictions by the entry of a plea. It would be unjust to establish a rule that
arguing at sentencing for the minimum sentence for the crime a defendant was
convicted of constitutes an admission of prior convictions.
Raush
also asserts that the State failed to prove that the Illinois and Iowa statutes
were substantially similar to Wisconsin’s drunk driving law. The issue of
whether the Illinois and Iowa convictions may be considered for sentencing
purposes involves the application of statutes to undisputed facts, a question
of law that we review independently of the trial court's determinations. State v. White, 177 Wis.2d
121, 124, 501 N.W.2d 463, 464 (Ct. App. 1993).
Wisconsin’s
legislative scheme for enhancing drunk driving penalties because of prior
conduct is contained in § 343.307, Stats.;
part of that scheme permits the consideration of convictions from foreign
jurisdictions:
343.307
Prior convictions, suspensions or revocations to be counted as offenses. (1) The court shall count the following to determine the
length of a revocation or suspension under s. 343.30 (1q) (b) and to determine
the penalty under s. 346.65 (2):
¼.
(d)
Convictions under the law of another jurisdiction that prohibits ¼ use of a motor
vehicle while intoxicated ¼ as those or substantially similar terms are used in
that jurisdiction's laws.
Raush
does not dispute that the Iowa and Illinois statutes prohibit the use of a
motor vehicle while intoxicated and can be counted for the purpose of imposing
penalty enhancements, see White, 177 Wis.2d at 126, 501
N.W.2d at 464; rather, he maintains that the State must also prove that the
statutes from Illinois and Iowa were in existence on the date he was convicted. The State’s
response is somewhat enigmatic; it argues that once it has “proven to the
satisfaction of the judge the existence of prior convictions, the burden is on
the defendant to mitigate the weight of those factors.”
The
State’s argument is wide of the mark because it assumes that it has proven the
existence of the prior convictions. As
we have previously held, the State failed to meet even the minimal standards
suggested by Wideman and Spaeth. In addition to those elements of proof, the
State has additional elements when it relies upon out-of-state drunk driving
convictions: the State must prove that
statutes from other states meet the requirements of § 343.307, Stats., and were in existence on the
date of the defendant’s conviction.
Contrary to the State’s argument, it is not Raush’s burden to disprove
that the statutes submitted by the State were in existence on the dates of his
conviction.
In
this case the State alleges in the complaint that Raush was convicted in
Illinois on June 22, 1989, and in Iowa on July 26, 1990. The copies of the Illinois and Iowa statutes
submitted by the State fail to prove that on the date of conviction the
statutes had terms substantially similar to Wisconsin’s drunk driving law. It is not enough that the State submit
copies of statutes with the same numbering as that alleged in the
complaint. The easiest method of proof
would be a certified copy of the other jurisdiction’s statute under which Raush
was convicted; as an alternative, the legislative history of the statute could
be submitted. Either method of proof
must satisfy the circuit court that on the day of conviction the other
jurisdiction’s statute prohibited the operation of a motor vehicle while
intoxicated.
Accordingly,
we conclude that the State failed to establish the existence of any prior
convictions and the circuit court erred in imposing an enhanced penalty after
Raush’s plea and conviction.
Because
the State failed to prove the existence of Raush’s two prior drunk driving
convictions, the record before us supports only a sentence for a first
offense. Therefore, we reverse and
remand to the circuit court, commuting Raush’s sentence to the maximum
permitted by law. On remand, the
circuit court is directed to enter an amended judgment of conviction consistent
with this opinion. See Spaeth,
slip op. at 19-20.
By
the Court.—Judgment reversed and
cause remanded with directions.
This
opinion will not be published. See
Rule 809.23 (1)(b)4, Stats.
[1] This appeal has been on hold pending the release of the supreme court’s decision in State v. Wideman, No. 95-0852-CR (Wis. Dec. 20, 1996). That decision has now been released and provides the key answers to Raush’s first issue.
[2] The State maintains that by entering a no
contest plea to the charge, Raush has admitted all of the elements of the
charge, including the prior convictions in Illinois and Iowa, and has waived
all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses.
The State’s argument is without any support in the law. It is well settled that a prior violation is
not an element of the crime of drunk driving; it does not alter the nature of
the substantive conduct. State v.
McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 538, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982). The existence of a prior conviction relates
solely to the question of punishment.
In addition, Raush made it clear throughout these proceedings that he
was contesting the prior convictions and preserved his right to appeal when he
pursued a motion to dismiss.
[3] It is not enough that there is a statement in the complaint that an officer has reviewed a teletype of the defendant’s driving record. A copy of that teletype from the Department of Transportation must be attached. In Wideman, the supreme court held that the complaint, when coupled with the record of the sentencing hearing, was sufficient to fulfill the State’s burden of proving the prior convictions. See Wideman, slip op. at 18. There is a tangible difference between the complaint in Wideman and the complaint in this case. In Wideman, the complaint alleged that the officer “inspected a teletype of the defendant’s driving record received from the State of Wisconsin, Department of Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicles ¼” giving an indication that there did exist the type of competent evidence needed to prove the prior convictions. Id., slip op. at 4. In this case, the complaint alleged that all that was inspected was a “teletyped report of the defendant’s driving record, received from the T.I.M.E. inter-police agency reporting system.” There is no indication of whether this report constituted an official teletype from the Department of Transportation; consequently, we cannot conclude that it was competent evidence of Raush’s prior convictions.