COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED July 15, 2014 Diane M. Fremgen Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
Cir. Ct. No. 2010CF5110 |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT I |
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State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Johnny Maldonado, Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: RICHARD A. SANKOVITZ, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Fine, Kessler and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Johnny Maldonado appeals a judgment of conviction entered after a jury
found him guilty of one count of first-degree intentional homicide and one
count of attempted first-degree intentional homicide, both by use of a
dangerous weapon and as a party to a crime.
He contends that the circuit court erred by admitting evidence of other
acts under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)
(2011-12).[1] Because we conclude that the evidence was
relevant to prove motive, and because the evidence was not unfairly
prejudicial, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 According
to the criminal complaint, police found the body of Spencer Buckle on April 11,
2009, in an alley near the 1100 block of West Grant Street in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. The county medical examiner
determined that Buckle died of a gunshot wound to the head and deemed Buckle’s death
a homicide. The complaint further states
that police spoke to Sergio Vargas. He
described hearing gunshots as he walked in the alley with Buckle, Maldonado,
and Raymond L. Nieves. Vargas then saw Buckle
fall to the ground. Vargas said that he
also fell to the ground and that he “played dead” because he realized that his
companions, Maldonado and Nieves, were the shooters. Vargas went on to report that while he was on
the ground, he was shot in the hand. He
said that he could see Maldonado’s feet, and he could hear additional gunshots
as bullets went past his head. Vargas said
that he remained on the ground until he was certain that Maldonado and Nieves
had left the scene.
¶3 The
State filed an information charging Maldonado and Nieves with first-degree
intentional homicide and attempted first-degree intentional homicide by use of
a dangerous weapon and as a party to the crime.
Each man demanded a jury trial.
¶4 During
pretrial proceedings, the State moved to admit other acts evidence pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2). Specifically, the State sought to show that
Maldonado, Nieves, Buckle, and Vargas were members of a street gang called the
Maniac Latin Disciples. Further, the
State sought to show that in March 2009, a member of a rival street gang, the
Latin Kings, fired shots at Vargas, and that he, Maldonado, Nieves, and Buckle,
together with a fifth member of the Maniac Latin Disciples, retaliated by
killing a member of the Latin Kings in Waukegan, Illinois. Maldonado, Nieves, Buckle, and Vargas fled to
Wisconsin, but Maldonado and Nieves subsequently became concerned that one or
more of the other people who had participated in the Illinois homicide were
providing information about that crime to the police. The State argued that evidence about the
events and circumstances of the Illinois homicide, together with the concerns
of Maldonado and Nieves that some of those who participated in the Illinois
homicide might be cooperating with law enforcement, all established a motive
for Maldonado and Nieves to kill Buckle and attempt to kill Vargas.
¶5 Maldonado
objected to the State’s motion. He
contended that the proposed evidence had minimal relevance and was unduly
prejudicial to his defense. The circuit
court rejected these arguments and admitted the evidence. The circuit court instructed the jury,
however, that the “evidence was received only with respect to possible motive
to commit the crimes charged in the information and you may consider it only
for that purpose.” The circuit court further
instructed the jury that “you may not find the defendant guilty merely because
he was associated with a gang” and that “you may not find the defendant guilty
merely because he may have been involved in a crime that is not charged in the
information in this case.” The jury
found Maldonado guilty as charged, and he appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶6 A circuit court has “‘broad
discretion to admit or exclude evidence.’” State v. Nelis, 2007 WI 58, ¶26, 300
Wis. 2d 415, 733 N.W.2d 619 (citation omitted). We will not disturb a circuit court’s
evidentiary ruling if the circuit court “‘examined the relevant facts, applied
a proper standard of law, used a demonstrated rational process, and reached a
conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.’” State v. Abbott Labs., 2013 WI App
31, ¶31, 346 Wis. 2d 565, 829 N.W.2d 753 (citation omitted). Our standard of review is “‘highly
deferential.’” See State v. Shomberg,
2006 WI 9, ¶11, 288 Wis. 2d 1, 709 N.W.2d 370 (citation omitted).
¶7 Maldonado
complains that the circuit court improperly admitted evidence of his
participation in a homicide in Illinois and of the events and circumstances
surrounding that crime. “[E]vidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.” Wis.
Stat. § 904.04(2)(a).[2] The statute, however, “does not exclude the
evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Id.
“[S]ec[tion] 904.04(2), Stats, favors admissibility in the sense that it
mandates the exclusion of other crimes evidence in only one instance: when it is offered to prove the propensity of
the defendant to commit similar crimes.”
State v. Speer, 176 Wis. 2d 1101, 1115, 501 N.W.2d 429
(1993). The admission of evidence under
the statute is governed by a three-step analysis: (1) whether the evidence is offered for a
permissible purpose, as required by § 904.04(2)(a); (2) whether the evidence is relevant within the meaning
of Wis. Stat. § 904.01; and
(3) whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by
the concerns enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 904.03. See State
v. Sullivan, 216
Wis. 2d 768, 772-73, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998).[3]
¶8 The
first step of the Sullivan analysis requires only that the party offering the
other acts evidence propound an acceptable purpose for presenting the
evidence. See State v. Payano,
2009 WI 86, ¶63, 320 Wis. 2d 348, 768 N.W.2d 832. “[T]his ‘first step is hardly
demanding.’” Id. (citation and
emphasis omitted). Here, the State
identified motive as the purpose for admitting the evidence. Motive is “the reason [that] leads the mind
to desire the result of an act.” See State
v. Fishnik, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 260, 378 N.W.2d 372 (1985). Because Wis.
Stat. § 904.04(2)(a) includes “motive” as an acceptable purpose for
admitting other acts evidence, the State plainly satisfied the first step of
the Sullivan
analysis. Maldonado does not
suggest otherwise.
¶9 Sullivan
also requires that the proposed evidence be relevant. Id., 216 Wis. 2d at 772. Thus, the proponent must show that the
evidence is offered to support a proposition of consequence to the determination
of the action and that the evidence has probative value when offered for the
purpose advanced. See Payano, 320 Wis. 2d 348, ¶68. Here the State contended that evidence of
motive was relevant to support the State’s theory that Maldonado and Nieves
wanted Buckle and Vargas dead to prevent Buckle and Vargas from telling police
about a gang-related murder that the four men committed in Illinois. On appeal, Maldonado contends that the State
“misle[]d the [circuit] court judge into believing that the State needed to
establish motive.” We reject Maldonado’s
suggestion that the facts of this case rendered motive irrelevant.
¶10 “Motive
is not an element of any crime.” State
v. Berby, 81 Wis. 2d 677, 686, 260 N.W.2d 798 (1978). Wisconsin law, however, defines relevant
evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less
probable.” Wis. Stat. § 904.01.
Therefore, such “evidence need not, as the defendant asserts, bear
directly upon one of the elements of the crime.
It may, as here, bear on motive ... or it may bear upon any one of
countless other factors which are of consequence to the determination of the
action.” Holmes v. State, 76
Wis. 2d 259, 268, 251 N.W.2d 56 (1977).
¶11 Holmes
is instructive here. In that case, the supreme
court considered whether evidence that a defendant committed an armed robbery
was relevant in the defendant’s trial for attempted murder of a police officer.
See
id.
at 267. The Holmes court concluded
that evidence of the armed robbery was relevant to prove motive because, as the
supreme court explained, “[t]he reason that the defendant shot at the police
officer was to attempt to thwart his apprehension for the armed robbery.” Id.
Similarly, here, evidence of the Illinois murder, the gang affiliations
underlying it, and Maldonado’s and Nieves’s fear of detection explained why
Maldonado committed homicide and attempted homicide in Wisconsin. Therefore, the evidence was relevant.
¶12 Turning
to the last step in the Sullivan analysis, Maldonado claims the
circuit court erred when it found that the probative value of the disputed evidence
here is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See id.,
216 Wis. 2d at 772-73. We disagree.
¶13 Wisconsin
courts have long recognized that “the standard for unfair prejudice is not
whether the evidence harms the opposing party’s case, but rather whether the
evidence tends to influence the outcome of the case by ‘improper means.’” See State
v. Johnson, 184 Wis. 2d 324, 340, 516 N.W.2d 463 (Ct. App. 1994),
citing Christensen v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 77 Wis. 2d 50,
61, 252 N.W.2d 81 (1977). In the context
of a Sullivan
analysis, “[t]he specific danger of unfair prejudice ... ‘is the potential harm
in a jury’s concluding that because an actor committed one bad act, he
necessarily committed the crime with which he is now charged.’” Payano, 320 Wis. 2d 348, ¶89
(citations omitted). Therefore, “[t]he
situation in which unfair prejudice is most likely to occur is when one party
attempts to put into evidence other acts allegedly committed by the opposing
party that are similar to the act at issue in the current case.” See id.,
¶90.
¶14 A
number of factors reduce the risk of undue prejudice here. First, as Maldonado candidly and explicitly
acknowledges, the other acts evidence at issue was “vastly dissimilar” from the
crime for which he was on trial. Thus,
the evidence, while undoubtedly helpful to the State and adverse to Maldonado,
was not the kind of evidence inherently most likely to persuade a jury that,
merely “because an actor committed one bad act, he necessarily committed the
crime with which he is now charged.” See id.,
¶89.
¶15 Second,
the danger of unfair prejudice is not as great when the other acts evidence is
offered to prove a state of mind as when the evidence is offered to prove
identity. See id., ¶94. Where, as here, the evidence is offered to
prove motive, any risk of unfair prejudice is diminished. See id.
¶16 Third,
the circuit court in this case carefully and thoroughly instructed the jury
that it was permitted to consider the evidence of Maldonado’s gang affiliation
and of the homicide in Illinois solely in regard to the possible motive for
committing the crimes in this case and not for any other purpose. When evidence poses a danger of undue
prejudice, cautionary jury instructions serve to limit such danger. See
id.,
¶99. Indeed, “‘[i]f an admonitory
instruction is properly given by the [circuit] court, prejudice to a defendant is
presumed erased from the jury’s mind.’” Id.,
¶99 n.20 (citation omitted).
¶17 In
sum, we cannot conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion by admitting the disputed evidence in this case. The State offered the evidence for a
permissible purpose, the evidence had substantial probative value for that
purpose, and the evidence posed little danger of leading jurors to draw
improper inferences given the nature of the evidence and the reasons for
presenting it. To the extent that the
evidence posed any risk of unfair prejudice, the circuit court took the steps
necessary to avoid such a risk. No error
is shown. We affirm.
By
the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.
[1] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-12 version unless otherwise noted.
[2] The legislature recently amended Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2). See 2013 Wis. Act 362, §§ 20-22, 38. The amendments do not affect our analysis.
[3] The State suggests that the circuit court’s decision to admit the evidence challenged in this case may be upheld using an analysis other than that described in State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998). Because we uphold admission of the evidence using a Sullivan analysis, we need not consider whether another analysis might also lead to the same result. See State v. Zien, 2008 WI App 153, ¶3, 314 Wis. 2d 340, 761 N.W.2d 15 (we decide cases on narrowest possible grounds).