COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED July 15, 2014 Diane M. Fremgen Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
Cir. Ct. No. 1999CF5150 |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT I |
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State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Lisimba Liteef Love, Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: JEAN A. Dimotto, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Curley, P.J., Kessler and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Lisimba Liteef Love appeals an order of the circuit court denying his
motion for a new trial in his criminal case.
He claims that he has newly discovered evidence warranting relief. The circuit court concluded that his evidence
was not credible. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 In
January 2000, a jury found Love guilty of armed robbery as a party to a crime
and as a habitual offender. The charges
arose when Glenn Robinson, a professional basketball player, reported to police
that, on
September 28, 1999, two men robbed him at gunpoint in the parking lot of a
Milwaukee tavern. Robinson identified
Love as one of the robbers. The State
charged Love and Effrim Moss with the crime.
The jury that convicted Love was unable to reach a verdict as to Moss,
and Moss was later acquitted in a second trial.
¶3 Love
pursued a direct appeal. We
affirmed. State v. Love, No.
2001AP0817-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App Dec. 11, 2001) (Love
I). Next, he pursued a
collateral attack on his conviction that eventually reached the supreme court. See State
v. Love, 2005 WI 116, 284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62 (Love
II). Underlying Love
II was Love’s claim to have newly discovered evidence that his cousin,
Floyd Lindell Smith, Jr., committed the armed robbery of Robinson. Id., ¶¶47-49. The supreme court concluded that Love was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the claim. Id., ¶51. In 2006, following remand, the circuit court
heard testimony from Love’s childhood friend, Christopher Hawley, who had filed
an affidavit stating that he spoke to Smith while the two men were incarcerated
at the same institution. According to
the affidavit, Smith admitted to Hawley that Smith committed the armed robbery of
Robinson and that Love was innocent. At
the hearing, however, Hawley viewed Smith in the courtroom and testified that
Smith was not the person who confessed to the armed robbery. Smith himself invoked his right against
self-incrimination. The circuit court
concluded that Hawley was not credible and denied Love any relief.[1] We affirmed.
See State v. Love, No.
2006AP2300-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App July 5, 2007) (Love III).
¶4 Love
filed another postconviction motion. He
alleged that he now had newly discovered evidence from Moss and Willie L.
Parchman inculpating Smith in the crime against Robinson. The circuit court conducted a hearing in 2010,
and both Moss and Parchman testified.
They described circumstances under which Smith told each of them that
he, not Love, committed the armed robbery.
The circuit court, however, identified significant inconsistencies and
anomalies in the testimonies of Moss and Parchman. The circuit court concluded that Moss and
Parchman were “not credible at all” and rejected Love’s claim.[2] We affirmed.
State v. Love, No. 2010AP853, unpublished slip op. (WI App May
17, 2011) (Love IV).
¶5 Underlying
the instant appeal is a 2013 postconviction motion in which Love again asserted
that he has newly discovered evidence that exonerates him and inculpates Smith
in the armed robbery. The circuit court
conducted another hearing, and this time, Smith himself testified. He told the circuit court that he committed
the armed robbery and that Love was not involved. The circuit court found that Smith was not a
credible witness. The circuit court also
took judicial notice that a predecessor circuit court found Moss and Parchman
incredible. The circuit court concluded
that Love’s claim for a new trial lacked any credible supporting evidence and
denied relief.[3] Love appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶6 A
defendant seeking a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence must
establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that: “‘(1) the evidence was discovered after
conviction, (2) the defendant was not negligent in seeking evidence; (3) the
evidence is material to an issue in the case, and (4) the evidence is not
merely cumulative.’” Love
II, 284 Wis. 2d 111, ¶43 (citation omitted). If the defendant satisfies these four
criteria, “‘the circuit court must determine whether a reasonable probability
exists that a different result would be reached in a trial.’” Id., ¶44 (citation omitted). This fifth criterion requires the defendant
to demonstrate “‘a reasonable probability that a jury, looking at both the [old
evidence] and the [new evidence], would have a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant’s guilt.’” Id.
(citation omitted, brackets in Love II). The defendant must satisfy all five of the
criteria to earn a new trial on the ground that he or she has newly discovered
evidence. See State v. Kaster, 148
Wis. 2d 789, 801, 436 N.W.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1989).
¶7 We
review a circuit court’s decision granting or denying a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence by considering whether the circuit court erroneously
exercised its discretion. See State v. Plude, 2008 WI 58, ¶31, 310
Wis. 2d 28, 750 N.W.2d 42. A court
erroneously exercises its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard or
making a decision not reasonably supported by the facts of record. See Johnson
v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 2012 WI 31, ¶22, 339 Wis. 2d 493, 811
N.W.2d 756. “‘Because the exercise of
discretion is so essential to the [circuit] court’s functioning, we generally
look for reasons to sustain discretionary decisions.’” Burkes v. Hales, 165 Wis. 2d 585,
591, 478 N.W.2d 37 (Ct. App. 1991) (citation and one set of brackets omitted).
¶8 Love
first asserts that the circuit court erred by finding he relied on the
testimony of a witness who was incredible.
In pursuing such a challenge, Love assumes a heavy burden. We defer to the credibility assessments of a
circuit court “because of its superior opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and to gauge the persuasiveness of their testimony.” State v. Carnemolla, 229 Wis. 2d
648, 661, 600 N.W.2d 236 (Ct. App. 1999).
Therefore, we will not disturb a circuit court’s credibility assessments
unless they are clearly erroneous. See State
v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶23, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305. Love nonetheless contends that deference to
the circuit court’s credibility assessment is improper here because, he says,
the circuit court committed legal error by assessing credibility at all. In his view, a circuit court considering a
claim of newly discovered evidence “is not supposed to determine
credibility.” He is wrong.
¶9 A
circuit court certainly may conduct a credibility assessment when considering a
claim for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. See Carnemolla, 229
Wis. 2d at 656, 660-61. If, upon
conducting that assessment, the circuit court deems the newly discovered
evidence credible, the court next determines whether a jury, after hearing all
of the evidence, would have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. State v. Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶18, 308 Wis. 2d
374, 746 N.W.2d 590. When called upon to
make such a determination, the circuit court does not weigh the credible
evidence. See id. If, however, the circuit court concludes that
the newly discovered evidence lacks any credibility, that conclusion “is the
equivalent of finding that there is no reasonable probability of a different
outcome on retrial.” See Carnemolla, 229 Wis. 2d at 661. Thus, the circuit court does not err by
determining whether newly discovered evidence is credible. Rather, the circuit court performs its duty.
¶10 In
this case, the circuit court assessed Smith’s testimony and concluded that it
was not credible. The circuit court
first observed that Smith described himself as “a man of many hustles” and that
he had a long history of “crimes of dishonesty.” Further, the circuit court considered Smith’s demeanor
and found that he was “slick” and “belligerent to the State, as well as to the
court.” The circuit court also determined
that Smith’s testimony seemed “coached” and that the coaching appeared to
account for “some of the discrepancies on the stand.” Indeed, as the State pointed out in opposing
the motion for a new trial, Smith appeared unfamiliar with the fundamental
facts and circumstances of the robbery: he did not know the location of the tavern
where the robbery occurred, the time of the robbery, or details about the items
stolen from Robinson. Finally, the
circuit court took into account both that Smith had a motive to lie because he
is Love’s cousin and that Smith faced minimal risk from incriminating himself
because the statute of limitations for the armed robbery offense has
expired. The circuit court found that
“the total effect was that he was an incredible witness.”
¶11 We
are satisfied that the circuit court considered highly relevant factors in
determining whether to credit Smith’s testimony. Our standard of review dictates that we
sustain the circuit court’s decision. See Thiel,
264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶23.
¶12 Because
the circuit court concluded that Love failed to present any credible evidence,
the circuit court necessarily determined “that there is no reasonable
probability of a different outcome on retrial.”
See Carnemolla, 229
Wis. 2d at 661. The circuit court
therefore concluded that Love failed to satisfy the necessary criteria to
support his claim. See id.
¶13 Love
asserts, however, that the circuit court erred by considering only the evidence
presented at the 2013 motion hearing. Specifically,
Love claims that the circuit court should have determined whether he has newly
discovered evidence by examining not only the testimony Smith gave in 2013 but
also the testimony that Moss and Parchman gave in 2010.
¶14 The
doctrine of issue preclusion bars the relitigation of previously litigated
issues unless the party seeking relitigation prevails in a multifaceted
test. See State v. Sorenson, 2001 WI App 251, ¶¶11, 13-14, 248
Wis. 2d 237, 635 N.W.2d 787, aff’d
as modified, 2002 WI 78, 254 Wis. 2d 54, 646 N.W.2d 354. Love argues that the circuit court
erroneously relied on the doctrine of issue preclusion here to discount Moss’s
and Parchman’s testimonies because, Love says, the doctrine “does not apply to
a motion for newly discovered evidence.”
In support, he relies on this court’s opinion in Sorenson.
¶15 As the State accurately explains, Love has misread our Sorenson opinion. In that case, we concluded that the circuit court failed to complete the analysis required for application of the doctrine of issue preclusion, not that the doctrine is inapplicable to claims of newly discovered evidence.[4] See Sorenson, 248 Wis. 2d 237, ¶¶4, 32-33.
¶16 Love next argues that
the circuit court erred by taking judicial notice of the predecessor circuit
court’s conclusion that Moss and Parchman were not credible witnesses. In support, Love again advances the theory
that a circuit court cannot assess credibility in the context of resolving a
newly discovered evidence claim. As we
have already explained, this position is incorrect, so Love’s contention must
fail.
¶17 Last,
Love asserts that we should exercise our discretionary power of reversal and
grant him a new trial pursuant to Wis.
Stat. § 752.35 (2011-12).[5] He claims that the real controversy has not
been fully tried because a jury has not heard Smith’s confession or testimony
from Moss and Parchman corroborating that confession. To establish that the real controversy has
not been fully tried, Love “must convince us that the jury was precluded from
considering ‘important testimony that bore on an important issue.’” See State v. Darcy N.K., 218 Wis. 2d
640, 667, 581 N.W.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted). Here, however, Love seeks a new trial so that
he may call witnesses that circuit courts have uniformly found incredible. Love fails to persuade us that testimony from
such witnesses is “important,” or that the real controversy has not been fully
tried until a jury hears from witnesses who cannot be believed. For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.
[1] The Honorable Timothy G. Dugan presided over and resolved the 2006 circuit court proceedings.
[2] The Honorable Daniel A. Konkol presided over and resolved the 2010 circuit court proceedings.
[3] The Honorable Jean A. DiMotto presided over and resolved the 2013 circuit court proceedings.
[4] In the reply brief, Love abandons his argument that issue preclusion is inapplicable to a motion for newly discovered evidence, offering nothing to refute the State’s reading of our opinion in State v. Sorenson, 2001 WI App 251, 248 Wis. 2d 237, 635 N.W.2d 787, aff’d as modified, 2002 WI 78, 254 Wis. 2d 54, 646 N.W.2d 354. Instead, he argues for the first time that proper application of the doctrine of issue preclusion supports relitigating his claim that testimony from Moss and Parchman is newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial. We normally do not address arguments offered by an appellant for the first time in a reply brief because the respondent has no opportunity to address the points made. See State v. Lock, 2013 WI App 80, ¶38 n.6, 348 Wis. 2d 334, 833 N.W.2d 189. We follow our normal practice here.
[5] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-12 version unless otherwise noted.