|
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED July 14, 2015 Diane M. Fremgen Clerk of Court of Appeals |
|
NOTICE |
|
|
|
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
|
APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: daniel a. noonan, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Curley, P.J., Kessler and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Michael L. Robinson, pro se,
appeals orders dismissing his medical malpractice suit. Because his suit is barred by the statute of
limitations as to one respondent and by the doctrine of judicial estoppel as to
the other respondents, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 On August 22, 2013, Robinson filed suit
against Aurora St. Luke’s Medical Center and several physicians (the Aurora
parties). He alleged medical malpractice
three years earlier during his treatment on August 24, 2010. In December 2013, he sought to add as an
additional respondent the Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund (the Fund).[1]
¶3 The
circuit court dismissed the Fund from the lawsuit, holding that Robinson sued
the Fund after the three-year statute of limitations had expired. A few weeks later, the circuit court
dismissed the case in its entirety, concluding that the doctrine of judicial
estoppel barred Robinson from pursuing his claims against the remaining parties. Robinson, the court explained, petitioned for
federal bankruptcy protection in May 2013, and in his petition he denied owning
“any contingent and unliquidated claims of every nature.” On August 19, 2013, the federal bankruptcy
court granted him a discharge of his debts and, a few days later, Robinson
filed his medical malpractice suit. The
circuit court held that Robinson’s failure to disclose his potential
malpractice claim in the successful bankruptcy proceeding judicially estopped
him from his later pursuit of that malpractice claim. Robinson appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶4 We first address whether the circuit
court properly dismissed the Fund from this lawsuit. Robinson’s medical malpractice suit is
governed by a three-year statute of limitations. See
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a). The three-year deadline applies to any claim
Robinson may have against the Fund. See Wis.
Stat. § 655.27(5)(a)1. (stating that “[a] person filing a claim may
recover from the [F]und only if ... the action against the [F]und is commenced
within the same time limitation within which the action against the health care
provider or employee of the health care provider must be commenced”). Accordingly, the deadline for Robinson to
commence his lawsuit against the Fund fell on August 24, 2013. Robinson first filed a claim against the Fund
in December 2013. He therefore did not
meet the applicable deadline.
¶5 Robinson’s
appellate briefs fail to include any argument that the circuit court erred when
it dismissed the Fund from this case based on the expiration of the statute of
limitations. To the extent that such an argument
may lurk within the pages of Robinson’s appellate submissions, we must conclude
that it is wholly undeveloped. We do not
address arguments that are inadequately briefed.[2] See
State
v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).
¶6 Robinson
also fails to show that the circuit court improperly applied judicial estoppel
to dismiss his claims against the Aurora parties.
Judicial estoppel is intended “to protect against a litigant playing ‘fast and loose with the courts’ by asserting inconsistent positions” in different legal proceedings. “The doctrine precludes a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding and then subsequently asserting an inconsistent position.” “[J]udicial estoppel is not directed to the relationship between the parties, but is intended to protect the judiciary as an institution from the perversion of judicial machinery.”
For judicial estoppel to be available, three elements must be satisfied: (1) the later position must be clearly inconsistent with the earlier position; (2) the facts at issue should be the same in both cases; and (3) the party to be estopped must have convinced the first court to adopt its position.
State v. Ryan,
2012 WI 16, ¶¶32-33, 338 Wis. 2d 695, 809 N.W.2d 37 (citations omitted;
brackets in Ryan). If the elements
of judicial estoppel are satisfied, the decision to apply the doctrine rests in
the sound discretion of the circuit court.
Id., ¶30.
¶7 In
this case, the Aurora parties supported their judicial estoppel defense by
pointing to Robinson’s bankruptcy filing in May 2013, a filing in which Robinson
denied ownership of “contingent and unliquidated claims of every nature.” The Aurora parties argued that this denial in
Robinson’s bankruptcy litigation was inconsistent with his later pursuit of a medical
malpractice claim based on events that arose before Robinson sought bankruptcy
protection. In response, Robinson filed
a document denying any inconsistency and advising the circuit court that, inter alia: (1) he had spoken to a “reputable medical
malpractice attorney” in February 2013, who told him that “there was not enough
sufficient evidence to file a lawsuit”; (2) he “didn’t have any idea that he
could file a medical malpractice law suit without a medical malpractice
attorney”; and (3) he learned only after his bankruptcy discharge “that he
could file a medical malpractice complaint without a medical malpractice
attorney.”
¶8 The
circuit court conducted a hearing at which Robinson provided further
information on the record about the actions he took in regard to his medical
malpractice claim before filing for bankruptcy.
He told the circuit court: (1) he
met with approximately eight lawyers to discuss his potential claim before his
consultation with a ninth lawyer in February 2013; (2) after the February 2013 consultation
he “was so broken hearted that they had got away, but [he] hadn’t gave up [sic]
hope for finding out what could be done”; and (3) two days after his bankruptcy
discharge on August 19, 2013, he talked to “an assistant person.... [Robinson] just shared the misfortune that [he]
had and [the person] told [Robinson] that it’s not too late. [Robinson] said the statute of limitations is
three or four days away. [The person]
said, well, it will only take a few days to write up [a] complaint.”
¶9 “The
application of judicial estoppel in this state is consistent with the majority
of the federal circuits recognizing the doctrine.” State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337,
350, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996). Accordingly,
the circuit court here appropriately considered the Aurora parties’ judicial
estoppel defense in light of a Seventh Circuit case, Cannon-Stokes v. Potter,
453 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2006). There, a
litigant sued her employer after she had discharged her debts in a bankruptcy
proceeding that included the litigant’s denial that she had any “‘contingent
and unliquidated claims.’” See id.
at 447. The employer responded to the
suit by asserting that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred the claim. Id.
The Cannon-Stokes court concluded that the facts satisfied the
requirements of the doctrine, noting that “all six appellate courts that have
considered this question hold that a debtor in bankruptcy who denies owning an
asset, including a chose in action or other legal claim, cannot realize on that
concealed asset after the bankruptcy ends.”
Id. at 447-48 (citing cases from the First, Third, Fifth, Eighth,
Ninth, and Eleventh federal circuits.)
¶10 As
the circuit court in the instant case observed, the facts here are markedly
similar to those in Cannon-Stokes. Robinson,
like the debtor in Cannon-Stokes, filed a bankruptcy petition representing that he
had no claim against anyone, and the representation afforded him a discharge of
his debts. See id. at 447. Now, also like the debtor in Cannon-Stokes,
he offers the inconsistent assertion that he does have a valuable claim “in
order to win a second time.” See id.
As did the court in Cannon-Stokes, the circuit court concluded
that these facts establish judicial estoppel.
¶11 Robinson
argues that his assertions in the bankruptcy proceeding were not inconsistent
with his current claim. This is so, he
says, because, at the time of the bankruptcy filing, he lacked knowledge of his
claim in light of the discouraging advice he received from the ninth lawyer he
consulted. The circuit court rejected
this self-serving contention. Robinson
admitted to the circuit court that he “hadn’t gave up [sic] hope,” and he also
admitted knowing at the time of the bankruptcy discharge that the statute of
limitations governing the claim had not yet expired. The circuit court explained that “it is very
clear from this record and Mr. Robinson’s submissions that he knew full well
about the possibility of a claim.... The
knowledge of a claim was certainly there.”
¶12 We
defer to a circuit court’s factual findings unless they have no support in the
record. See Royster-Clark, Inc. v.
Olsen’s Mill, Inc., 2006 WI 46, ¶11, 290 Wis. 2d 264, 714 N.W.2d
530. The record here clearly permits the
circuit court both to find that Robinson knew about his malpractice claim when
he filed for bankruptcy and to reject his contrary assertions. Moreover, as the Cannon-Stokes court
explained in response to protestations similar to Robinson’s:
if [the debtor] were really making an honest attempt to pay [the] debts, then as soon as [the debtor] realized that [the claim] had been omitted, [the debtor] would have filed amended schedules and moved to reopen the bankruptcy, so that the creditors could benefit from any records. [The debtor] never did that; [the debtor] wants every penny of the judgment for herself.
Id., 453 F.3d at
448.
¶13 Because
the elements of judicial estoppel are met in this case, the application of the
doctrine rests in the circuit court’s discretion. See Ryan, 338 Wis. 2d 695, ¶30. We apply a deferential standard when we
review a circuit court’s exercise of discretion. State v. Velez, 224 Wis. 2d 1,
19, 589 N.W.2d 9 (1999). We will uphold
an exercise of discretion if the circuit court examined relevant facts, applied
a proper legal standard, and reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could
reach. Management Computer Svcs., Inc.
v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 224 Wis. 2d 312, 330, 592
N.W.2d 279 (Ct. App. 1998). The circuit
court here considered the legal authority of Ryan and Cannon-Stokes
and assessed Robinson’s contentions in light of the record, including the
undisputed fact that Robinson represented in the bankruptcy proceeding that he
had no unrealized or contingent claims of any sort. The circuit court then exercised its
discretion to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
¶14 Robinson
nonetheless contends that the circuit court should not have applied judicial
estoppel, asserting that the equities favor him. Our inquiry, however, is whether the circuit
court exercised discretion, not whether the circuit court might have exercised
discretion differently. See State
v. Prineas, 2009 WI App 28, ¶34,
316 Wis. 2d 414, 766 N.W.2d 206.
Robinson’s arguments do not bring him close to the high bar imposed by
our deferential standard of review. We
affirm.
By
the Court.—Orders affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.
[1] Robinson named the Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund as a respondent in this action. The entity is properly known as the Wisconsin injured patients and families compensation fund. See Wis. Stat. § 655.27(1) (2013-14). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2013-14 version unless otherwise noted.
[2] Robinson reminds us at the outset of his opening brief that he is a pro se litigant, and he asks us to hold him to a less rigorous standard than we apply to licensed attorneys. We, of course, liberally construe mislabeled pleadings from pro se litigants. See bin-Rilla v. Israel, 113 Wis. 2d 514, 521, 335 N.W.2d 384 (1983). We do not, however, abandon our neutrality to adopt and develop arguments on a party’s behalf. See Industrial Risk Insurers v. American Eng’g Testing, Inc., 2009 WI App 62, ¶25, 318 Wis. 2d 148, 769 N.W.2d 82. We will not make an exception to that rule here.