COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
October 28, 1999
Marilyn L. Graves
Clerk, Court of Appeals
of Wisconsin
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports.
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62, Stats.
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
Bruce
Martindale,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Bruce A. Ripp, City of Beloit, Pekin Insurance
Company, and Cities and Villages Mutual
Insurance Company,
Defendants-Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Rock County: Edwin C. Dahlberg, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Dykman, P.J., Eich and Roggensack, JJ.
¶1 EICH, J. Bruce
Martindale sued the City of Beloit, seeking damages for personal injuries
sustained when the car he was driving was rear-ended by a City garbage
truck. The jury found that the truck driver’s
negligence was not a cause of Martindale’s injuries, and Martindale appeals
from a judgment, entered on the jury’s verdict, dismissing his action. He argues that he is entitled to a new trial
because of the trial court’s erroneous evidentiary rulings. Specifically, he claims the court improperly
excluded the testimony of his expert medical witness regarding the “mechanism”
by which his jaw was injured in the accident, and that of the medical witness
and Martindale himself concerning the risks of possible future corrective
surgery. We conclude that the court did
not erroneously exercise its discretion in excluding the evidence, and we
therefore affirm the judgment.
¶2 Martindale,
stopped at a red light, was struck from the rear by the City’s fully-loaded
garbage truck. The truck driver’s
negligence was conceded, and the central issue at trial was whether that
negligence, and the resulting accident, caused the injury to the
temporomandibular joint in Martindale’s jaw.
Martindale’s key witness was Dr. Doran E. Ryan, an oral and
maxillofacial surgeon who was prepared to testify, by videotaped deposition,
that, in his opinion, Martindale suffered a whiplash injury to his jaw as a
result of being thrown around in his car following the impact. Prior to trial, the court granted the City’s
motion in limine to exclude Ryan’s testimony about the “mechanism” by
which Martindale’s jaw became injured—the “whiplash”—on grounds that, while he
was qualified as a medical expert, Ryan knew nothing about the “mechanics” of
the accident itself. Thus, while the
court permitted the jury to hear Ryan testify regarding his examinations of
Martindale and explain the nature of his injury, Ryan was not allowed to
testify that the accident was a cause of Martindale’s injury. In the
court’s words: “There is no foundation on the witness’s qualifications to give
his expert opinion as to how the accident occurred ….”[1]
¶3 As
indicated, the jury answered the causation question in the negative, and the
court entered judgment dismissing the action.
Other facts will be discussed below.
Standard of Review
¶4 Admission or rejection of evidence is left to the
discretion of the circuit court. State
v. Keith, 216 Wis.2d 61, 68, 573 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Ct. App. 1997). We review the court’s decision under the
well recognized erroneous-exercise-of-discretion standard, keeping in mind that
the court’s broad discretion “is subject to the essential demands of
fairness.” State v. Koch,
144 Wis.2d 838, 847, 426 N.W.2d 586, 590 (1988). Our review of discretionary
rulings is highly deferential: We do no more than examine the record to gauge
whether the circuit court reached a reasonable conclusion based on the proper
legal standard and a logical interpretation of the facts. State
v. Salentine, 206
Wis.2d 419,
429-30,
557
N.W.2d 439,
443 (Ct. App. 1996). Indeed, we generally look for reasons to
sustain discretionary decisions. Burkes
v. Hales, 165
Wis.2d 585, 590, 478 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Ct. App.
1991). And
while expert opinion evidence is generally admissible if it will assist the
jury in the resolution of difficult or little-understood factual issues, State v. Blair, 164
Wis.2d 64, 74-75, 473 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Ct. App. 1991), the trial court may, in
its discretion, require the offering party to lay a foundation for admission of
opinion evidence if it feels the jury might otherwise be mislead or
confused. Rabata v. Dohner,
45 Wis.2d 111, 134-35, 172 N.W.2d 409, 420-21 (1969).
Discussion
¶5 Contrary to
Martindale’s assertions, the trial court never concluded that Ryan was not
competent to testify regarding the injury to his jaw. No one questioned Ryan’s professional qualifications. Indeed, he was permitted to testify, among
other things, that he is an expert in treating diseases and abnormalities of
the oral cavity and jaw,[2] and that his examination of Martindale led him to conclude
that the discs in Martindale’s left and right temporomandibular joints had been
displaced and that the damage was permanent.
He explained the structural makeup, positioning and purpose of the
joints (which permit the proper functioning of the jaw), and noted that
Martindale’s earlier dental examinations did not indicate any problems in that
area before the accident.
¶6 In the
portion of the deposition excluded by the court, Ryan gave his opinion as to
the manner in which Martindale’s jaw was injured in the accident, stating at
one point: “My impression would be that the accident is what caused the
displacement of [Martindale’s] discs in his joint.” Ryan also offered a drawing of a head in three different
positions which, in his opinion, was “an accurate representation of the
mechanism of whiplash-related internal disc injury.” He then testified that the illustration
would
depict what could happen in a whiplash injury and I have no other reason
to believe that [Martindale] had an injury to his jaw other than the whiplash
injury in this accident. And since I’ve
already testified that I think the accident caused this problem, this is the
mechanism of – I believe – cause[d] internal joint derangement (emphasis
added).[3]
¶7 The trial court, believing that there was no evidence that Ryan had any knowledge as to what happened to Martindale in the collision—no knowledge of the “mechanics” of the accident or his actual injury, or that the impact in fact caused a “whiplash”—ruled this testimony inadmissible.[4]
¶8 We see no
misuse of discretion in the ruling. All
Ryan knew about the accident was that Martindale was driving a car with a
headrest too low for his head, and the car was struck from behind by a garbage
truck. Apparently he never inspected
Martindale’s car (or a similar model) and knew nothing about Martindale’s movements
or what happened to him or the car at and after the moment of impact. Finally, we note that, despite the fact that
Martindale knew well before trial that Ryan’s opinion as to how the injury
occurred—his testimony on the causal relationship between the accident and the
injury—would be excluded, he never sought out another expert. Nor did he call Ryan as a witness at trial
in order to attempt to lay the missing foundation. He opted instead to proceed with the videotaped deposition, with
Ryan’s causal testimony excluded.
¶9 Martindale
has not persuaded us that the trial court’s exclusion of Ryan’s testimony was
either unreasonable or inconsistent with applicable law. We are, therefore, constrained to sustain
that decision—even if it is not one we ourselves would have made in the same
circumstances. Burkes, 165 Wis.2d at 590, 478 N.W.2d at 39 (citations omitted).
¶10 Martindale
next argues that the court improperly excluded (a) Ryan’s testimony
regarding possible complications that could result from future corrective
surgery, and (b) Martindale’s own testimony regarding specific risks of
that surgery as explained to him by Ryan, another physician, and his
father—together with information about the temporomandibular joint he obtained
on the Internet. He offered this
evidence in support of his claim for future damages.
¶11 The court
allowed Ryan to testify that the chances of successful corrective surgery for
Martindale were 85% on the right side of his jaw and 75% on the left side. However, the court barred him from
testifying about possible complications which could arise from the such
surgery.
¶12 In the
portion of Ryan’s (videotaped) testimony excluded by the court, he discussed
the following “complications” which he said might occur should Martindale elect
to undergo corrective surgery, including: a change in his bite pattern;
possible continued pain and decreased range of motion; bleeding, infection and
nerve injury; and an ear infection.
Ryan acknowledged, however: that there was only a 10% chance of any
change in bite pattern; that if Martindale underwent physical therapy,
continued pain and decreased range of motion “probably would not happen”; and
that there was less than a 1% chance of bleeding, nerve injury or
infection. According to Ryan, the
“highest” risk faced by Martindale was a 15% to 25% chance that his condition
would be unchanged by the surgery.
¶13 It is true, as Martindale points out, that the supreme
court said in Brantner v. Jenson, 121 Wis.2d 658, 360 N.W.2d 529
(1985), that a physician, and the plaintiff himself or herself, could testify
about concerns over future corrective surgery in support of a claim for mental
distress relating to the surgery—but it was well established in that case that
the plaintiff faced a “realistic possibility of … surgery” which would involve
a long recovery and extreme pain. Id.
at 667-68, 360 N.W.2d at 534. The Brantner
court stated that, while “[a] doctor’s realistic prediction as to the possibility
of future surgery, illness or disability may give rise to reasonable
[compensable] fear and anxiety in the [plaintiff],” that is not the case where
“[a physician] describes to the victim … remotely
conceivable complications which may develop from the physical injury caused by
the defendant’s negligence.” Id. at 666-67, 360 N.W.2d at
534. “Anxiety about a … highly unlikely
consequence is not a recoverable element,” said the court, because “[l]iability
[must] cease[] at a point dictated by public policy and common sense.” Id. at 667, 360 N.W.2d at 534.
¶14 Applying Brantner, the trial court stated
in this case:
Well, I am not going to permit speculation as to what may or may not occur if surgery is had. If he has got a fear of surgery then, and the jury buys that, they can award him damages based upon that fear. But they certainly can’t award him damages on the basis of complications that might result from the surgery that he doesn’t have.
….
[Y]ou will get [the possibility of successful surgery] in,
and you can get in testimony that he apparently has a fear of having
surgery. But we won’t get into what
complications might occur if surgery were there.[5]
According to the court, the
“fatal flaw” in Martindale’s case was his failure to establish a reasonable
possibility that the remote complications of possible future surgery will
occur.
¶15 The court
also noted that Ryan could not recall any specific discussions with Martindale
about future surgery. All he could say
was that he had “probably” discussed the subject with him at some time. Indeed, Martindale acknowledged that he had
no plans to have the surgery, stating: “I simply haven’t arrived at the point
where my quality of life has been impinged to the degree where I want to take
the risk of surgery.” Finally, Ryan
testified that he didn’t know whether Martindale would ever progress to the
point where he would seek corrective surgery.
¶16 Here, too,
we are satisfied that the trial court applied the applicable law to the facts
with respect to Ryan’s and Martindale’s proffered testimony and, in doing so,
reached a reasonable result—and that is all that is required for a sustainable
exercise of discretion.
By the
Court.—Judgment affirmed.
Not recommended for publication in the official reports.
[1] The court also excluded an illustration depicting the manner in which Ryan believed Martindale’s injury occurred.
[2] A copy of Ryan’s curriculum vitae listing his extensive credentials and experience in the area was an exhibit at trial.
[3] In Ryan’s opinion, Martindale sustained a whiplash-type injury due to hyperextension caused by the movement of his car at impact. He explained that “the jaw is swung forward and it moves out of where it normally is and it’s slung forward and it’s done so rapidly so that you get a separation of the disc from the lower jaw bone.” This, he said, is what happened to Martindale as a result of the collision. According to Ryan, the impact, and the resulting whiplash, also caused hyperflexion on Martindale’s left side, which, in turn, caused a stretching or tearing of the ligament and displacement of the disc.
[4] The court stated:
There is no foundation on the witness’s qualifications to give his expert opinion as to how the accident occurred and the testimony that’s in the deposition. The witness is not giving his opinion to a standard of reasonable probability – what you are trying to do is to tie the defendant’s injury to some whiplash problem, but – and it may well be that a whiplash-type of thing caused it – but the testimony, in the judgment of the Court, doesn’t meet the standard necessary in order to allow it.
[5] Moreover, the court correctly excluded Martindale’s testimony about what Dr. Ryan explained to him about the risks and possible complications of surgery. The court stated:
[I]nsofar as the possibility of surgery resulting into consequences that are unfavorable, I can’t see how you can get that in without the testimony of the doctor to a reasonable possibility. We have had that in the exhibit. That was the ruling of the Court at the time. I am satisfied that is the correct ruling so that won’t come in.
… You have had the testimony of Dr. Ryan. He had been examined and cross-examined. And that’s what we have got, so we will have to rely on that…. It won’t come in from [Martindale]. What comes in will have to come from the doctor….