COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
January 13, 2000
Marilyn L. Graves
Clerk, Court of Appeals
of Wisconsin
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports.
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62.
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
State
of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Ronald
J. Anderson,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Dane County: steven d. ebert, Judge. Reversed.
¶1 EICH, J.[1] Ronald J. Anderson appeals from a judgment convicting him of
operating a boat while intoxicated. The
dispositive issue is whether, on the observed facts, the arresting officer had
a reasonable basis to suspect that Anderson was intoxicated so as to justify
detaining him for further investigation.
We think not and reverse the judgment.
¶2 The facts
are not in dispute. Michael Cross, a
Department of Natural Resources conservation warden saw Anderson operating a
boat towing a water skier at approximately 8:45 p.m. on a May evening. He observed nothing unusual or illegal in
Anderson’s operation of the boat.
Because, however, there is a boating regulation prohibiting water-skiing
after sunset (and because a DNR pamphlet listed the “official” sunset time for
that date as 8:27 p.m.[2]), Cross decided to stop Anderson. Responding to Cross’s signal, Anderson stopped his boat in the
water and, at Cross’s request, brought the skier on board—all without
incident. When Cross asked Anderson for
his drivers license, Anderson handed him a University of Wisconsin student ID
card.[3] According to Cross,
he again asked to see Anderson’s drivers license and Anderson held out his open
wallet with the license visible through a transparent pane. Cross asked him to remove the license from
the wallet and hand it to him, which Anderson did, again without incident.[4] At this point,
Cross noted a “mild” or “moderate” odor of intoxicants about Anderson’s person
and, when asked, Anderson told Cross he had consumed about one and one-half
beers.
¶3 Then, while
both men were still standing in their boats, Cross asked Anderson whether he
would agree to submit to some field sobriety tests, and he said he would.[5] Anderson recited
the alphabet without incident (although, according to Cross, his speech was
somewhat slurred), and completed the “finger-count” test in similar fashion
(although Cross said he had to remind Anderson to pay attention to his
instructions). Cross agreed that
Anderson “passed” both tests. Cross
testified, however, that Anderson failed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN)
test because his eyes did not “smooth[ly] pursu[e] the officer’s moving
penlight.” He then arrested Anderson
for operating a boat while intoxicated.
¶4 Anderson
moved to suppress all evidence of his encounter with Cross other than the
skiing-after-sunset stop on grounds that Cross lacked reasonable suspicion to
detain him for sobriety testing.
Alternatively, he argued that—even after the sobriety tests—Cross lacked
probable cause to arrest him for intoxicated operation of a boat. The trial court denied the motion and, on
stipulated facts (as we have recounted them above), found Anderson guilty of
the violation. Because, as indicated,
we conclude that Cross had no grounds to detain Anderson for any purpose other
than possible violation of post-sunset water-skiing regulations, we need not
consider his probable-cause arguments.
¶5 Review of a
circuit court’s ruling that an officer did, or did not, have reasonable grounds
to detain a suspect is a question of law which we review de novo. State v. Betow, 226
Wis. 2d 90, 93, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999). There is no dispute that Cross could properly stop Anderson
for towing a skier after sunset.
However, whether he could detain him to investigate other potential
offenses—such as the intoxicated operation of a boat—depends on whether, after
the initial stop, Cross became aware of “additional suspicious factors which
are sufficient to give rise to an articulable suspicion that [Anderson] has
committed or is committing an offense … separate and distinct from the acts
that prompted [Cross]’s intervention in the first place.” Id.
And while “reasonable
suspicion” is a lesser standard than probable cause to arrest, there must still
be “specific and articulable facts [available to the officer] which, together
with the rational inferences from those facts, would reasonably warrant th[e]
intrusion.” State v. Allen,
226 Wis. 2d 66, 71, 593 N.W.2d 504 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoted source
omitted).
¶6 In this
case the State attempts to justify Cross’s detention of Anderson on the
following facts: (i) Anderson “did not follow Cross’s instructions to
produce his drivers license” when first asked for identification;
(ii) when specifically asked to produce the license, Cross didn’t remove
it from the wallet, but extended the wallet to Cross (with the license visible
behind a plastic pane); (iii) the mild or moderate odor of intoxicants
about Anderson’s person (and Anderson’s related one-and-one-half beers
admission); and (iv) Cross’s observation that Anderson’s speed was
“slurred” and “deliberate” when reciting the alphabet.
¶7 To begin
with, we agree with Anderson that the last assertion—slurred or deliberate
speech—is not properly a part of the reasonable-suspicion-to-detain analysis,
for whatever Cross may have observed in this respect, that observation came
after the detention had been effected and during the field tests being
administered in furtherance of the claimed alcohol violation.
¶8 The
question is, then, whether, in the context of all facts observed by Cross that
evening, “an officer of reasonable caution” would be warranted in suspecting
that Anderson was intoxicated. Cross
observed nothing unusual or untoward about (a) Anderson’s operation of the
boat while towing the skier, or (b) his responsiveness or physical
dexterity in bringing the boat to a stop and bringing the skier on board when
Cross activated his lights, or (c) his ability to retrieve his wallet and
remove his drivers license (or to locate and produce the boat’s life
preservers) when requested to do so. In
other words, up to the point Cross decided to detain him, there was nothing in
Anderson’s appearance, speech, coordination, dexterity or boat-operating
ability, that would in any way peak a reasonable officer’s interest. All Cross observed that could even be
considered suspect was the fact that, in response to a somewhat ambiguous
request for identification, Anderson produced a student ID rather than his
drivers license (and, when asked for the license, handed Cross his wallet,
opened to the license, rather than physically extracting the license from the
wallet)—responses that do not seem to us to be at all unreasonable under the
circumstances—and that there was a faint or moderate odor of alcohol on his
person.[6]
¶9 Given the
fact that it is not illegal per se to operate a boat after drinking
beer—but only to operate a boat while impaired by intoxication—and given the
further fact that Anderson’s acknowledgment of having one and one-half beers
prior to his contact with Cross is the only real suggestion of intoxication in
the record, we don’t think there were reasonable grounds for Cross to detain
Anderson on suspicion of operating a boat while intoxicated. We therefore reverse the conviction.
By the Court.—Judgment
reversed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4 (1997-98).
[1] This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. stats. § 752.31(2)(f) (1997-98).
[2] Warden Cross agreed that this “official” sunset time would not necessarily be apparent to a boater without consulting the pamphlet.
[3] Both the skier and another passenger in Anderson’s boat testified that they heard Cross ask Anderson for “some identification” and that he used the words “drivers license” or “photo ID.”
[4] Cross also testified at the suppression hearing that when he asked to see the boat’s registration slip, Anderson was unable to locate it and seemed “uncertain” as to whether it was on the boat at all. It also appears that Anderson promptly produced the boat’s life preservers in response to Cross’s question whether the required number of preservers was on board. Cross didn’t see either event as eventful or unusual, and the State does not mention them in its argument.
[5] According to Cross, he decided to request the tests because Anderson was towing a skier after sunset, smelled (mildly or “moderately”) of intoxicants, didn’t have the registration card on board, and didn’t immediately follow his (Cross’s) instruction to produce his drivers license.
[6] As indicated, when asked, Anderson stated that he had consumed one and one-half beers.