COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
August 1, 2000
Cornelia G. Clark
Clerk, Court of Appeals
of Wisconsin
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports.
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62.
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I
State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
David C. Haubrich,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: carl ashley, Judge. Affirmed.
¶1 FINE, J. David C. Haubrich appeals from a judgment entered on guilty pleas
convicting him of unlawfully possessing cocaine, see Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(c), and
unlawfully possessing drug paraphernalia, see Wis. Stat. § 961.573(1). He claims that the trial court erred in not granting his motion
to suppress evidence.[1] We
affirm.
I.
¶2 The
facts relevant to this appeal are essentially not disputed. At 3:45 a.m. on a Friday morning, a
police officer employed by the City of Franklin saw a car pull into a closed
and dark business on West Loomis Road in Franklin. Haubrich was the
driver. The officer testified at the
suppression hearing that he “thought it was suspicious because obviously [the
business] was closed.” The officer also
told the trial court that the business’s parking lot was set back from the
roadway, was “very secluded,” and that “[o]nce you pull into the lot, you can’t
really see any autos or subjects from the roadway.” The officer said that he then turned his squad car around so he
could “return to the business to check on what the occupants of the vehicle
might be up to.” After what the officer
estimated to be between fifteen and twenty seconds, during which he could not
see the car, he saw the car pull out of the parking lot and go westbound on
Loomis Road. He stopped the car. The officer explained to the trial court
that he wanted to question the people in the car “just in case there was any
damage that occurred at the business.”
There was no one in the car other than Haubrich, who claims that the
stop was unlawful.
II.
¶3 Whether
an investigatory stop is lawful is a legal matter that we decide de novo. See State v. Krier, 165
Wis. 2d 673, 676, 478 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Ct. App. 1991). The seminal case in this area is Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), which recognized that “a police officer may in appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of
investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause
to make an arrest.” Id.,
392 U.S. at 22. It is not necessary,
however, that the officer suspect that the unlawful activity is a crime
in the technical sense of that word; it is enough that the officer have “a
reasonable suspicion that something unlawful might well be afoot.” State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d
51, 58, 556 N.W.2d 681, 685 (1996).
Here, as the trial court cogently pointed out, the officer would have
been remiss if he did not question the driver of the car to see why he entered
a parking lot of a dark, closed business at 3:45 in the morning, especially
when the lot is, as the officer testified without contradiction, essentially
not visible from the road. The officer
lawfully stopped Haubrich. The trial
court did not err in denying Haubrich’s suppression motion.
By
the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4.
[1] A defendant may appeal from an order denying a motion to suppress evidence even though the judgment of conviction rests on a guilty plea. Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10).