2008 wi app 119
court of appeals of
published opinion
Case No.: |
2007AP2433 |
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Complete Title of Case: |
†Petition For Review Filed |
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Itself and on behalf of its Members, and Philip Sliwinski, Petitioners-Appellants, v. City of Respondent-Respondent.† |
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Opinion Filed: |
June 17, 2008 |
Submitted on Briefs: |
June 2, 2008 |
Oral Argument: |
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JUDGES: |
Wedemeyer, Fine and Kessler, JJ. |
Concurred: |
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Dissented: |
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Appellant |
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ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the petitioners-appellants, the cause was
submitted on the briefs of Jonathan Cermele and Rachel L. Pings of |
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Respondent |
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ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the respondent-respondent, the cause was
submitted on the brief of Grant F. Langley, city attorney and Jan A. Smokowicz, assistant city attorney
of |
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2008 WI App 119
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED June 17, 2008 David R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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Itself and on behalf of its Members, and Philip Sliwinski, Petitioners-Appellants, v. City of Respondent-Respondent. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for
Before Wedemeyer, Fine and Kessler, JJ.
¶1 FINE, J. The Milwaukee Police Association
and Philip Sliwinski appeal the judgment quashing their petition for a writ of
mandamus that sought an order reinstating Sliwinski to his position as a City
of
I.
¶2 This appeal is a sequel to Sliwinski v. Board of Fire &
Police Commissioners of Milwaukee, 2006 WI App 27, 289 Wis. 2d 422, 711
N.W.2d 271. Sliwinski was a
II.
¶3 Mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy, available only to parties that can show that the writ is based on a “clear, specific legal right which is free from substantial doubt.” A party seeking mandamus must also show that the duty sought to be enforced is positive and plain; that substantial damage will result if the duty is not performed; and that no other adequate remedy at law exists.
Lake Bluff Housing Partners v.
City of
¶4 The extent of Sliwinski’s rights following his discharge by
the then
¶5 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50(18) (2005–06), as applicable to Sliwinski, provided:
Salary during suspension.… No member of the police force may be suspended or discharged under sub. (11) or (13) without pay or benefits until the matter that is the subject of the suspension or discharge is disposed of by the board or the time for appeal under sub. (13) passes without an appeal being made.[2]
(Footnote added.) The City argues that because the Board
“disposed of” Sliwinski’s appeal, § 62.50(18) justifies its refusal to
give Sliwinski his “pay” and “benefits.”
As we explained in Sliwinski, however, police officers
who are discharged have a right to a trial before the Board that comports with
due process.
¶6 The City argues, and the circuit court ruled, that whatever
the effect of Wis. Stat. §
62.50(18), Sliwinski has an “adequate remedy at law” so that mandamus is not
the appropriate mechanism to enforce his right to continued “pay” and
“benefits” until he receives the due-process-compliant trial to which he is
entitled because he can: (1) file a
wage-claim action under Wis. Stat.
§ 109.09 (which he has already done in a case pending in the circuit court);
and (2) sue the City in tort. The
Board’s decision in the due-process-deficient proceeding was issued on
¶7 In sum, we conclude on our de novo review of the legal issues presented by this appeal that Sliwinski has under Wis. Stat. § 62.50(18) a “‘clear, specific legal right which is free from substantial doubt,’” Lake Bluff Housing Partners, 197 Wis. 2d at 170, 540 N.W.2d at 194 (citation omitted), that the City’s obligation under that section is “positive and plain,” ibid., that because Sliwinski is not receiving his “pay” and “benefits” as § 62.50(18) requires, he is suffering “substantial damage,” Lake Bluff Housing Partners, 197 Wis. 2d at 170, 540 N.W.2d at 194, and that he and the Police Association have no “adequate remedy at law,” ibid. Thus, the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in quashing the petition for a writ of mandamus. Accordingly, we reverse and direct the circuit court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the City to conduct forthwith the due-process-compliant trial we directed in Sliwinski. Until it does, Sliwinski is entitled to his pay and benefits under § 62.50(18).[5]
By the Court.—Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions.
[1] The petition asserts that the Milwaukee Police Association “has … suffered, and continues to suffer, substantial damage due to [the City of Milwaukee]’s refusal to reinstate and make Sliwinski whole, given that its members can no longer expect that the City will adhere to its statutory duties and obligations under § 62.50, STATS.” The City does not argue on appeal that the Police Association does not have standing, and, without deciding the matter, we accordingly assume that it does. See Reiman Assocs., Inc. v. R/A Adver., Inc., 102 Wis. 2d 305, 306 n.1, 306 N.W.2d 292, 294 n.1 (Ct. App. 1981) (matters not briefed are waived); see also Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee County, 2001 WI 65, ¶38, 244 Wis. 2d 333, 352, 627 N.W.2d 866, 876 (Union has standing because it “has a tangible interest in knowing what the law is and what rights its members have, so that it can do its duty” to “give its members sound advice” and “represent them well.”).
[2]
Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50(18) was
amended by 2007
[3] Sliwinski argues that he is entitled to full reinstatement under Wis. Stat. § 62.50(22), which provides, as material: “If the decision of the board is reversed, the discharged or suspended member shall forthwith be reinstated in his or her former position in the department and shall be entitled to pay the same as if not discharged or suspended.” He contends that Sliwinski reversed the Board’s decision adverse to him. We did not. Rather, we reversed the circuit-court order and remanded the matter to the Board with specific directions that it hold a due-process-compliant trial:
Sliwinski
is entitled to a fair hearing, and
that means access to witnesses and evidence that could support his
defense. As Umhoefer [v.
Police & Fire Commission of
Sliwinski v. Board of Fire & Police Comm’rs of Milwaukee, 2006 WI App 27, ¶16, 289 Wis. 2d 422, 438, 711 N.W.2d 271, 279 (emphasis by Sliwinski; citation and footnote omitted).
[4]
Contrary to Sliwinski’s contention, the definition of “wages” under Wis. Stat. § 109.01(3) is broad:
“Wage” or “wages” mean remuneration payable to an employee for personal services, including salaries, commissions, holiday and vacation pay, overtime pay, severance pay or dismissal pay, supplemental unemployment benefit plan payments when required under a binding collective bargaining agreement, bonuses and any other similar advantages agreed upon between the employer and the employee or provided by the employer to the employees as an established policy.
[5]
The City also argues that the petition for a writ of mandamus runs afoul of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b), which
requires a notice of claim before an “action may be brought or maintained
against any … political corporation [or] governmental subdivision,” and that
“the claim [be] disallowed.” “Failure of
the appropriate body to disallow a claim within 120 days after presentation of
the written notice of the claim is a disallowance.” Sec. 893.80(1g). Although we question whether
§ 893.80(1)(b) would apply to the kind of dispute presented by this
appeal, see Oak Creek Citizen’s Action Comm. v. City of Oak Creek, 2007 WI
App 196, ¶¶6–7, 13, 304 Wis. 2d 702, 707–708, 712, 738 N.W.2d 168, 170–171,
173 (section 893.80(1)(b) did not
apply to mandamus action seeking to compel city to comply with direct-legislation
statute), a matter that we do not decide, the Record here indicates that
Sliwinski did seek from the City
after our decision in Sliwinski his pay and benefits and
that the City refused to restore them pending a due-process-compliant trial
before the Board. Thus, at the very
least, Sliwinski substantially complied with § 893.80(1)(b), which is all
that is required.