2009 WI App 38
court of appeals of
published opinion
Case No.: |
2008AP1681 |
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Complete Title of Case: |
† Petition for Review filed |
Opinion Filed: |
February 10, 2009 |
Submitted on Briefs: |
January 13, 2009 |
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JUDGES: |
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Appellant |
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ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants, the cause was
submitted on the briefs of Ralph J. Tease, Jr. and Rhonda J. Lanford of Habush, |
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Respondent |
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ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the defendant-respondent, the cause was
submitted on the brief of Kevin A. Christensen of Leib & Katt, LLC of |
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2009 WI App 38
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED February 10, 2009 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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Lee J. Kuehl, Kelly J. Kuehl and Grace M. Kuehl, by her Guardian ad Litem, Ralph J. Tease,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Sentry Select Insurance Company,
Defendant-Respondent, ABC Insurance Company, Defendant. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for
Before
¶1
BACKGROUND
¶2 Kuehl, a service manager at Broadway Automotive, was injured when a customer’s panel van that was in for repair of a fuel leak fell off a vehicle hoist. Andrew DeMerritt, a mechanic at Broadway, had driven the van into the service bay and between the two hoist posts, placed it in park, turned off the ignition, and exited the vehicle. He then swung the four hoist arms beneath the van, positioned the arms’ support pads, and raised the vehicle off the ground. Because it was unstable, he lowered the van and repositioned the rear hoist arms and pads. DeMerritt then raised the vehicle to a position about three feet off the ground and left the service bay to get Kuehl. The two men returned within a matter of minutes. As they were looking under the vehicle, the back end tipped off the hoist and struck Kuehl.
¶3 Kuehl retained an engineer, Dennis Skogen, who reconstructed the accident. Skogen opined DeMerritt did not drive the vehicle far enough ahead to be able to properly position the hoist arms beneath it relative to its center of gravity. Skogen also concluded DeMerritt improperly positioned the rear hoist arms’ support pads beneath the vehicle’s leaf springs rather than the frame. However, Skogen concluded the rear support pads could have been placed against the frame even with the vehicle resting where DeMerritt parked it.
¶4 Kuehl brought a direct action suit against Sentry Select Insurance Company, which insured DeMerritt under Broadway’s commercial liability policies. The circuit court granted Sentry’s motion for summary judgment, holding the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Compensation Act barred Kuehl’s claim.[2]
DISCUSSION
¶5 This court independently analyzes summary judgment motions, applying the same methodology as
the circuit court. Strozinsky v. School Dist. of
Brown Deer, 2000 WI 97, ¶32, 237 Wis. 2d 19, 614 N.W.2d 443. Summary judgment is appropriate when there
are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).[3] A statute’s application to a particular set of
facts is a question of law. Maxey
v. Redevelopment Auth. of Racine, 120
¶6 The exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Compensation Act states:
Where [the conditions under subsec. (1)] exist the right to the recovery of compensation under this chapter shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer, any other employee of the same employer and the worker’s compensation insurance carrier. This section does not limit the right of an employee to bring action against … a coemployee for negligent operation of a motor vehicle not owned or leased by the employer ….
Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2).
¶7 Kuehl contends DeMerritt negligently operated the vehicle within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) when he drove it into the service bay and negligently positioned it between the lift posts. He asserts the statute does not require the negligent operation to occur simultaneously with an injury. Rather, Kuehl argues the operation of the vehicle need only be a substantial factor causing the injury.
¶8 The negligent operation of a motor vehicle exception in Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) has been
addressed in two prior cases. In the
first, this court concluded a coemployee’s act of closing a van door on a
person’s hand did not constitute “operation of a motor vehicle.” Hake v. Zimmerlee, 178
¶9 The Worker’s Compensation Act is intended to “‘allocate the
cost of employment injuries to the industry or business in which they occur
and, ultimately, to the consuming public as part of the price for the goods or
services offered.’”
¶10 Our supreme court then addressed the negligent operation of a
motor vehicle exception in McNeil v. Hansen, 2007 WI 56, 300
Wis. 2d 358, 731 N.W.2d 273. There, two
service station employees were performing routine maintenance on a
vehicle.
¶11 The court agreed with the conclusion in Hake that the phrase
“operation of a motor vehicle” in Wis.
Stat. § 102.03(2) is ambiguous, McNeil, 300
Injuries to workers caused by negligent coemployees while performing maintenance or repairs on a motor vehicle that could not then be driven on a public roadway are common occurrences for those workers in the vehicle maintenance and repair industry. They are directly related to their employment. Therefore, the costs of these injuries should be passed on to the industry and ultimately the consuming public; they should not be born by the worker.
¶12 With the principles set forth in McNeil and Hake in mind, we conclude DeMerritt’s placement of the vehicle on the hoist did not constitute negligent operation of a motor vehicle under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2). We disagree with Kuehl’s assertion that the question is whether the operation of the vehicle was causal. The real issue is whether DeMerritt’s actions constituted negligent “operation” under the statute.
¶13 Kuehl stresses DeMerritt was operating the vehicle when he
positioned it between the hoist posts.
There is a distinction, however, between operating a vehicle and placing
a vehicle on a hoist for repairs. The
alleged negligence here was the way the vehicle was positioned on the hoist;
that negligence is independent of how
the vehicle was operated. See McNeil,
300
¶14 As the court stated in McNeil, there is “a common sense
understanding that there is an inherent difference between repairing a vehicle
and operating or using it.”
¶15 Because we specifically conclude DeMerritt did not negligently
operate the vehicle under any definition, it is unnecessary to address the
second, “could not then be driven,” condition discussed in McNeil.[6]
However, because the issue is likely to
arise in future cases, we briefly discuss it.
This case is plainly different from McNeil and Hake because, in each of
those cases, there was a distinct action leading to an immediate injury. That is not the case here, because Kuehl
focuses on the action of driving the vehicle into the service bay and parking
it between the hoist supports. Given
this difference, it is not immediately apparent how to apply the “could not
then be driven on a public roadway” condition.
McNeil, 300
¶16 McNeil restates the “could not then be driven” or “while it could not be driven” condition numerous times in various contexts. See id., ¶¶2, 23, 28, 29. Considering the purposes of the statute, we interpret McNeil such that “then” refers to the time the tort claim accrued.[8] Given this interpretation, the condition existed here. The vehicle could not then be operated on a public roadway because it was raised three feet off the ground on a hoist when the injury occurred.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
[1] Kelly and Grace Kuehl are also parties to the lawsuit and this appeal.
[2] However, because the first-level liability policy waived the exclusive remedy provision, Sentry tendered the $500,000 policy limit to Kuehl. The summary judgment motion at issue here dealt only with the umbrella policy.
[3] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.
[4] A concurring opinion stated:
The court’s decision does not provide the answer to other fact situations because the court, like the statute, does not define specifically or generally what “operation of a motor vehicle” means under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2). ….
Today’s opinion decides this case. Different conduct will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis—not on a standard set forth in the instant case.
McNeil v. Hansen, 2007 WI
56, ¶¶31, 33, 300
[5] The
broadest definition of “operation” recognized in McNeil was that in a
snowmobile safety statute, which defines operate as “the exercise of physical
control over the speed or direction of a [vehicle] or the physical manipulation
or activation of any of the controls of a [vehicle] necessary to put it in
motion.” Wis. Stat. § 350.01(9r); McNeil, 300
[6] It
may be unnecessary to address the “could not then be driven” condition
regardless of our resolution of this
case. The McNeil decision does not
specifically state it is creating a new standard to apply in future cases, as
opposed to merely emphasizing the facts present in that case. McNeil, 300
[7] Additionally,
McNeil
does not discuss what qualifies as a vehicle that “could not then be driven on
a public roadway.” McNeil, 300
[8] Since,
as alleged here, there may be numerous negligent, causal actions, this
interpretation appears the most reasonable.
Indeed, in McNeil, the court only discussed the definition of “operation,”
independent of the modifying term “negligent.”
McNeil, 300