2009 WI APP 33
court of appeals of
published opinion
Case No.: |
2008AP722 2008AP723 |
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Complete Title of Case: |
†Petition for Review |
Opinion Filed: |
February 10, 2009 |
Submitted on Briefs: |
January 6, 2009 |
Oral Argument: |
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JUDGES: |
Curley, P.J., Fine and Kessler, JJ. |
Concurred: |
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Dissented: |
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Appellant |
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ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the respondent-appellant and
intervenor-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Korey C. Lundin and Jessica
Roulette of Legal Action of
Wisconsin, Inc., |
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Respondent |
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ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the petitioner-respondent and
respondent-respondent, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Gregory A.
Kotsonis of von BRIESEN &
ROPER, S.C., |
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2009 WI App 33
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED February 10, 2009 David R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal Nos. |
2008AP723 |
2007PA1020 |
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STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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No. 2008AP722 In re the marriage of: Jennifer Hendrick, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Garry M. Hendrick, Respondent-Respondent, Christopher L. Skarzynski, Intervenor-Appellant. _____________________________________________________ No. 2008AP723 In re the Paternity of B.N.H.: State of Co-Petitioners-Respondents, v. Christopher L. Skarzynski, |
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APPEAL
from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Before Curley, P.J., Fine and Kessler, JJ.
¶1 FINE, J. We have consolidated the following
two cases on appeal: State
v. Skarzynski, 2008AP723, a paternity action instituted by the State of
I. Paternity Action.
¶2 Skarzynski appeals a judgment that directed him as the biological father of Mrs. Hendrick’s daughter to pay $64 per month in child support and one-half of the costs of genetic testing. Following receipt of the test results, which, according to the laboratory report, showed that “the probability” that Skarzynski was the girl’s father was “99.99%, as compared to an untested, unrelated man of the Caucasian population,” he admitted that he was her father. He contends, however, that he should be relieved of that acknowledgment and of the support order because the girl’s mother, Jennifer A. Hendrick, was married to Garry M. Hendrick when the girl was born. He asserts that he is entitled to this relief under the statutory presumption that a child born to a married couple is the husband’s biological child, and that the Hendricks are estopped to argue otherwise. The circuit court rejected this argument; so do we.
¶3 Skarzynski also contends that the circuit court should not have appointed the lawyer who was appointed in the divorce action as guardian ad litem for Mrs. Hendrick’s two children, as guardian ad litem for Mrs. Hendrick’s daughter in the paternity action. He contends that the guardian ad litem had a conflict. We agree with the circuit court that the appointment was proper.
¶4 The facts in this case are not disputed. Accordingly, our review is de novo. See Randy A.J. v. Norma I.J., 2004 WI
41, ¶¶12, 21, 270 Wis. 2d 384, 392–393, 399, 677 N.W.2d 630, 635, 638
(interpretation of paternity statutes is subject to de novo appellate review); Badger
¶5 Garry and Jennifer Hendrick were married in early September of 1999. Mrs. Hendrick’s daughter was born in late January of 2000. Before Mrs. Hendrick started her divorce action against Mr. Hendrick, appeal number ‑722, which, as we see below, is still pending, Mr. Hendrick had himself, the girl, and the couple’s other child tested to see if he was their biological father; he was not.[2] No one contends that Skarzynski is the father of the girl’s sibling.
¶6 The State started this paternity action and, as noted,
Skarzynski has admitted that he is the girl’s biological father, and he was so
adjudicated. He contends, however, that
the circuit court should not have ordered that he be tested genetically to see
if he was the girl’s father because of the presumption in Wis.
(1) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if any of the following applies:
(a) He and the child’s natural mother are or have been married to each other and the child is conceived or born after marriage and before the granting of a decree of legal separation, annulment or divorce between the parties.
….
(2) In a legal action or proceeding, a presumption under sub. (1) is rebutted by results of a genetic test, as defined in s. 767.001 (1m), that show that a man other than the man presumed to be the father under sub. (1) is not excluded as the father of the child and that the statistical probability of the man’s parentage is 99.0% or higher, even if the man presumed to be the father under sub. (1) is unavailable to submit to genetic tests, as defined in s. 767.001 (1m).
Thus, this presumption is rebuttable. In ordering the testing, the circuit court rejected Skarzynski’s argument that he should not be potentially responsible (he had not yet been tested) for Mrs. Hendrick’s daughter because the Hendricks were married when she was born, opining that the testing would be in the girl’s best interests. The circuit court ordered the results of the testing sealed, however, pending Skarzynski’s seeking leave to appeal the order. We denied leave, and, subsequently, the circuit court ordered the test results unsealed. Skarzynski then acknowledged his paternity.
¶7 As the circuit court recognized, the focus of a proceeding
seeking to determine a child’s paternity is whether the “best interests” of the
child would be served thereby. Cf. Racine
Family Court Comm’r v. M.E., 165
Except as provided in s. 767.863 (1m), at any time in an action to establish the paternity of a child, upon the motion of a party or guardian ad litem, the court or supplemental court commissioner under s. 757.675 (2) (g) may, with respect to a male, refuse to order genetic tests, if genetic tests have not yet been taken, and dismiss the action if the court or supplemental court commissioner determines that a judicial determination of whether the male is the father of the child is not in the best interest of the child.[3]
(Footnote added.)
¶8 In determining that it was in Mrs. Hendrick’s daughter’s best interests to order genetic testing, and, later to unseal the results, the circuit court accepted the uncontradicted assertions that Mr. Hendrick had essentially abandoned her and the other child, and that the girl knew that. The circuit court also observed that it was important for Mrs. Hendrick’s daughter to know who her father was, noting that she would for all practical purposes be “fatherless” unless a putative biological father was tested, the test results received, and someone’s paternity established. The circuit court also heard from the guardian ad litem, who further noted that it is important for children to know who their biological parents are “for medical reasons.”
¶9 Skarzynski argues that the circuit court erred in ordering
that he be tested and by ordering the test results unsealed. He points to Wis.
¶10 First, Skarzynski never requested an evidentiary hearing on the
girl’s best interests either before the circuit court ordered the testing or
before it ordered the test results unsealed.
See State v. Conway, 34
¶11 Second, Skarzynski’s reliance on Wis.
¶12 Third, under Wis.
If at the first appearance it appears from a sufficient petition or affidavit of the child’s mother … that there is probable cause to believe that any of the males named has had sexual intercourse with the mother during a possible time of the child’s conception, the court may, or upon the request of any party shall, order any of the named persons to submit to genetic tests.
(Emphasis added.)[4] We generally interpret the word “shall” in a statute as reflecting a mandatory legislative command, see Watton v. Hegerty, 2008 WI 74, ¶19 n.13, 311 Wis. 2d 52, 70 n.13, 751 N.W.2d 369, 378 n.13, and Skarzynski does not even address § 767.863(2), no less argue that “shall” means “may.” Here, the State’s petition attached an affidavit from Mrs. Hendrick asserting that she had sexual intercourse only with Skarzynski and Mr. Hendrick during the relevant conceptive period.
¶13 Despite all of this, Skarzynski argues that the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars this action, contending that Mr. and Mrs. Hendrick held themselves out as the girl’s biological parents and that, accordingly, he was deprived of a chance to establish a relationship with the child. The latter contention is at odds, of course, with his efforts to avoid establishing a relationship with her now, but, more important, it misconstrues the doctrine.
¶14 “Equitable estoppel requires proof of three elements: (1) an action or an inaction that
induces; (2) reliance by another; and (3) to his or her detriment.” Randy A.J., 2004 WI 41, ¶26, 270
¶15 Skarzynski also contends that the circuit court erred in
appointing the guardian ad litem who
represents both of Mrs. Hendrick’s children in the divorce as the guardian ad litem for the girl in the paternity
action. See Wis.
¶16 Riemer concerned a guardian ad litem who was appointed for two children who had adverse interests:
It is the interest of the older to be found the child of the parties so that his support and inheritance from the parties would be firmly established. It is also his interest that he be, if at all possible, the sole heir of the parties. These interests are in conflict with the interests of the younger child where a question is raised as to the paternity of the younger. If such paternity issue is decided against paternity, the younger child would be disinherited. There being a patent conflict in the interests of the two minor children here involved, the guardian Ad litem appointed to represent one of them could not represent both.
¶17 We affirm the judgment entered in case number -723.
II. Divorce Action.
¶18 The circuit court denied Skarzynski’s motion to intervene in the Hendricks’ divorce action, and Skarzynski contends that this was error. We disagree.
¶19 Skarzynski sought to intervene in the divorce action to prevent
receipt in the divorce action of the test results showing that Mr. Hendrick was
not the father of Mrs. Hendrick’s daughter.
He relies on Wis.
(1) Except as provided in s. 20.931, upon timely motion anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action when the movant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the movant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect that interest, unless the movant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(2) Except as provided in s. 20.931, upon timely motion anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action when a movant’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order or rule administered by a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, rule, requirement or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely motion may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
He argues that the circuit court should have either permitted mandatory intervention under Rule 803.09(1), a matter of law that we review de novo, see Armada Broadcasting, Inc. v. Stirn, 183 Wis. 2d 463, 470, 516 N.W.2d 357, 359 (1994), or permissive intervention under Rule 803.09(2), a matter that is within the circuit court’s discretion, see Helgeland v. Wisconsin Municipalities, 2008 WI 9, ¶120, 307 Wis. 2d 1, 58, 745 N.W.2d 1, 29.
¶20 Subsection (1) requires that the person seeking to intervene in an action have “an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the movant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect that interest.” Subsection (2) similarly requires a nexus between the dispute and the interest of the proposed intervening party. These requirements are not met here.
¶21 As we have seen, Skarzynski has been adjudicated in the
paternity action as the biological father of Mrs. Hendrick’s daughter, and
under Wis.
is rebutted by results of a genetic test … that show that a man other than the [husband] is not excluded as the father of the child and that the statistical probability of the man’s parentage is 99.0% or higher, even if the [husband] is unavailable to submit to genetic tests, as defined in s. 767.001 (1m).
(Emphasis added.) The statute governing the determination of paternity therefore does not depend on whether the husband of the child’s mother has or has not been genetically determined to be the child’s father. Accordingly, it is immaterial to Skarzynski’s interests whether the results of Mr. Hendrick’s genetic tests are or are not received in the divorce action. As the circuit court observed, the paternity action is where Skarzynski’s battle had to be fought; it was and Skarzynski lost.
¶22 We also agree with the circuit court’s observation that under public policy—absent extraordinary circumstances that we cannot envision and that are not present here—the proper parties to a divorce action are the husband, wife, and the children of the marriage. Generally, third persons should not be able to interject themselves into a divorce to advance their own parochial interests.[5] This is precisely what Skarzynski sought to do—intervene to, as his lawyer told the circuit court, “continue on with his life as he has the last eight years.” The circuit court properly rejected his attempt to avoid the obligations of fatherhood by muddying the waters of the Hendricks’ divorce action.
¶23 We also affirm the order entered in case number -722.
By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.
[1] The paternity and divorce actions were previously consolidated by the circuit court.
[2] The other child is not part of the appeal in the paternity case because no one contends that either Skarzynski or Mr. Hendrick is that child’s biological father.
[3] Wisconsin Stat. § 767.863(1m) reads:
In an action to establish the paternity of a child who was born to a woman while she was married, if a male other than the woman’s husband alleges that he, not the husband, is the child’s father, a party may allege that a judicial determination that a male other than the husband is the father is not in the best interest of the child. If the court or a supplemental court commissioner under s. 757.675 (2) (g) determines that a judicial determination of whether a male other than the husband is the father is not in the best interest of the child, no genetic tests may be ordered and the action shall be dismissed.
[4] Wisconsin
If at the first appearance it appears from a sufficient petition or affidavit of the child’s mother or an alleged father or from sworn testimony of the child’s mother or an alleged father that there is probable cause to believe that any of the males named has had sexual intercourse with the mother during a possible time of the child’s conception, the court may, or upon the request of any party shall, order any of the named persons to submit to genetic tests. The tests shall be conducted in accordance with s. 767.84. The court is not required to order a person who has undergone a genetic test under s. 49.225 to submit to another genetic test under this subsection unless a party requests additional tests under s. 767.84 (2).
[5] For example, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63–73 (2000) (plurality opinion), discusses the constitutional protections parents have in determining with whom and when their children may associate, and identifies significant hurdles a third party must overcome to interject him- or herself into an existing parental relationship.
In