COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED March 12, 2009 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT IV |
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State of
Petitioner-Appellant, v. Timothy Lundquist,
Respondent-Respondent. |
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APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for
Before Higginbotham, P.J., Dykman and Vergeront, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Kenyatta
Clincy appeals an order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In his petition Clincy contended that after
his parole revocation, the Department of Corrections miscalculated the time he
had left for reincarceration. We reject
his arguments on appeal and affirm.
¶2 Clincy
commenced serving three prison terms in 1996, a ten-year term, and two
concurrent five year terms, consecutive to the ten-year term. He was released on parole in August
2005. At the time his mandatory release
date for all three sentences was March 11, 2007. Clincy’s paroles were revoked in February
2006 after he waived his final revocation hearing. At the same time, he waived his right to a
reincarceration hearing. The DOC had
previously calculated the time available for reincarceration on the ten-year
term at three years, two months, and calculated the time on each of the five-year
terms at three years, three months and two days. The DOC did not impose a maximum
reincarceration on Clincy, instead requiring him to serve one reincarceration
term of eleven months and twelve days, and two reincarceration terms of eleven
months and twenty-one days. Those terms
were imposed consecutively, taking him past his former mandatory release
date.
¶3 Clincy
complained to officials about the calculation of the time available for
reincarceration, but did not seek formal, administrative review of that calculation. Instead, he commenced this action for habeas
corpus review of the reincarceration calculation. In the trial court he contended that he could
not be sentenced beyond his March 11, 2007 mandatory release date, and that the
DOC violated his due process rights by not providing him with a reincarceration
hearing, and a written revocation decision.
He renews those arguments on appeal.
¶4 The respondent
contends that we should affirm because Clincy’s remedy for challenging the
reincarceration calculation was by certiorari review, and Clincy did not file a
timely certiorari petition. However, the
respondent fails to identify the administrative decision that would have
triggered Clincy’s right to a judicial review by certiorari.[1] Because the respondent has not established
that certiorari review was available to Clincy, we decline to hold that review
by habeas is unavailable to him, and we therefore address his arguments on
appeal.
¶5 Clincy first
contends that the absence of a written explanation of the parole revocation
decision violates his due process rights.
However, Clincy has not challenged his revocation in this or any other
proceeding. The only decision he has
challenged is the calculation of his maximum reincarceration time and,
according to the record, the DOC made that calculation months before revoking
his parole. Consequently, any procedural
error in failing to adequately explain the revocation decision could have had
no conceivable effect on the reincarceration calculation, and any such error
was therefore harmless in this proceeding.[2]
¶6 Clincy next
contends that he was compelled to waive his right to a reincarceration hearing
when he waived his revocation hearing.
However, the record contains no evidence that Clincy’s waiver was
compelled. And even if it were, any
error in depriving him of a hearing on reincarceration is harmless because, as
we explain below, there is no merit to his argument that the DOC erred as a
matter of law in calculating his maximum reincarceration time.
¶7 Clincy contends
that, because he was paroled discretionarily, he must receive credit for the
time he spent on parole, and could not lawfully be incarcerated past his
mandatory release date as calculated before he was paroled. As noted, his
argument has no merit.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.
[1] The respondent points to record document 1:33 as a reviewable decision of the Division of Hearings and Appeals. That document is, in fact, entitled “Notification of Sentence Data,” and was issued by the DOC. The record shows that the DHA did not participate in the revocation or reincarceration decisions, due to Clincy’s waivers.
[2] An administrative rule of the DOC requires a written explanation of the revocation decision, even where the revocation hearing is waived. Wis. Adm. Code § DOC 331.06(4). Arguably, the decision to revoke does not adequately explain the decision.
[3] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.
[4] Regulations of the DOC also plainly refute Clincy’s arguments. For those indeterminately sentenced for a crime committed after June 1, 1984, Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 302.25(2) expressly erases any distinction between a discretionary parole violator or a mandatory release parole violator for the purposes of revocation and reincarceration. In each case the parole violator may be reincarcerated up to a period of time consisting of the entire sentence less time served in custody prior to parole. See Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 302.25(5).