2009 WI App 88
court of appeals of
published opinion
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2008AP001753 |
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†Petition for Review filed. |
2009 WI App
88
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED May 27, 2009 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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Estate of by Attorney Donal M. Demet, Personal Representative, David Edison, and Nicole J. Jones, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Terence J. Smith, Telisa C. Hopgood, Tvette Huddleston, Duane Gladney, Shontina Gladney, Come & Grow Learning Arts Center, Inc., and Wee World Day Care, Inc., Defendants, Capitol Indemnity Corporation, Defendant-Respondent. |
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APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for
Before Curley, P.J., Fine and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 BRENNAN, J. The Estate of Asia D.
Jones appeals from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Capitol Indemnity
Corporation, the general commercial general liability (“CGL”) insurer for Come
& Grow Learning Arts Center, Inc., and Wee World Day Care, Inc. (the
Background
¶2 The facts asserted in the complaint pertinent to the coverage
issue in this case are as follows: On
June 9, 2005, Ronald Turkvan, a van driver for the Day Care Center, picked up
two-year-old Asia from her home and brought her to the Day Care Center. She was on the schedule to be at the Day Care
Center that day. When Turkvan arrived at
the Day Care Center, however, he did not unbuckle
Discussion
I. Standard of Review
¶3 This case comes to us following the granting of summary
judgment. We review orders for summary judgments independently, employing the
same methodology as the trial court. See Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136
II. Pertinent
Policy Provisions
¶4 The CGL policy involved here includes general liability language:
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury,” “property damage,” “personal injury” or “advertising injury” to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking those damages.
The Estate argues that the coverage grant extends to the Day Care Center’s employees’ negligent acts, provided those acts are within the scope of their employment or done while performing duties related to the conducting of the business. Capitol does not dispute this assertion. Instead, it contends that the auto exclusion within the CGL policy relieves it from providing coverage in this case. The exclusion provides that the CGL will not afford coverage for: “Bodily injury” or “property damage” arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any aircraft, “auto” or watercraft owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any insured. Use includes operation and “loading and unloading.”
III. Independent
Concurrent Cause
¶5 The issue in this case is whether the independent concurrent
cause rule applies under the facts and circumstances of this case. The Estate argues that it does and Capitol
argues that it does not. The independent
concurrent cause rule operates to extend coverage “‘to a loss caused by the
insured risk even though the excluded risk is a contributory cause, [w]here a
policy expressly insures against loss caused by one risk but excludes loss
caused by another risk.’” Smith,
192
¶6 Here, the Estate alleges that the Day Care Center’s
employees’ negligence of failing to notice that Asia was not at the Day Care
Center on a day she was expected and failing to look for her or make some
inquiry into where she was constituted an “insured risk” under the CGL
policy. They argue that this negligence
provides an independent basis for a cause of action from the negligence of the
van driver who left
¶7 In order to determine whether the acts alleged here are
independent concurrent causes, we are guided by the analysis set forth in Lawver
v. Boling, 71 Wis. 2d 408, 238 N.W.2d 514 (1976). In that case, Lawver was injured while
helping Clarence E. Boling, his father-in-law, put some boards on the side of
the barn on Boling’s farm.
¶8 The Homestead CGL policy had an automobile exclusion and
¶9 In applying this analysis to our case, we reach the same
result as did the supreme court in Lawver. The case before us presents two separate
assertions of negligence:
(1) Turkvan’s negligence for failing to remove Asia from the van
(the excluded risk), and (2) the negligence of the staff at the Day Care
Center for not looking for Asia or inquiring as to why she was not present on a
day she was expected (the covered risk).
Turkvan’s negligence, although it preceded the negligence of the staff,
did not contribute to the staff’s alleged negligence. Their duty was separate and independent of
Turkvan’s actions. The staff has a duty
to make sure that all the children who are expected to be at the
¶10 Capitol contends that this is not a case of independent
concurrent causes because if Turkvan had not left
¶11 It can be difficult to ascertain coverage issues in cases
involving both an allegation of an auto-related cause and a non-auto related
cause. When there is an auto-related
cause of an injury, a CGL insurer will argue there is no coverage under the CGL
policy based on the auto exclusion in its policy. That is exactly what happened here. However, when the facts in a case assert that
an accident was caused jointly by a non-auto related cause and an auto-related
cause, the CGL’s auto exclusion does not automatically control. Rather, the crucial question is whether the
injuries resulted from negligence, if any, arising out of the use of the auto
(the excluded risk) or from the negligence of the staff in failing in its duty
to make sure all children expected on any given day are accounted for (the
covered risk), or both. See Lawver,
71
¶12 Here, it has been alleged, but not yet determined, that Asia’s
death was caused jointly by two separate and independent instances of negligence: (1) Turkvan’s failure to remove Asia
from the van; and (2) the staff’s negligence in failing to look for Asia
whom they were expecting to be at the center on the day in question. Each act of negligence could stand
alone. Each is covered by a separate
insurance policy. Turkvan’s act of
negligence was covered under Progressive’s automobile policy. The staff’s negligence is covered by
Capitol’s CGL policy. Until it has been
determined that the staff’s alleged negligence was not a cause in
¶13 Capitol cites Smith and Bankert v. Threshermen’s Mutual
Insurance Co., 110
¶14 In Smith, we held that the independent concurrent cause rule did
not apply because the driver of a snowmobile’s acts of intoxication and failure
to put a helmet on his passenger could not form an independent cause of action
from the crashing of the snowmobile itself.
¶15 Likewise, in Bankert, our supreme court held that
the independent concurrent cause rule did not apply for the act of parents’
negligent entrustment or supervision of their minor child who took a motorcycle
off the property and crashed into a parked car.
¶16 Both Smith and Bankert are distinguishable from the instant case. As noted above, the use of the motor vehicle is not required in order to trigger the duty and responsibility of the staff of the Day Care Center to make sure that those children expected on that day were actually present. The negligence of the staff could form the basis of a stand alone claim, without requiring the operation of a motor vehicle. Thus, based on our analysis above, we conclude that the facts alleged in the complaint triggered coverage under the CGL policy pursuant to the independent concurrent cause rule. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Capitol. We reverse the trial court’s ruling and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
By the Court.—Order reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings.