2009 WI App 112
court of appeals of
published opinion
Case No.: |
2007AP2109 |
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Complete Title of Case: |
†Petition for review filed |
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Ecker Brothers,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
Defendant-Respondent.† |
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Opinion Filed: |
July 15, 2009 |
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Oral Argument: |
June 1, 2009 |
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JUDGES: |
Brown, C.J., |
Concurred: |
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Dissented: |
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Appellant |
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ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, the cause was
submitted on the briefs of and oral argument by Joseph R. Cincotta of |
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Respondent |
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ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the defendant-respondent, the cause was
submitted on the brief of Andrew A. Jones and Eric J. Meier of Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek S.C. of |
Nonparty ATTORNEYS: |
A nonparty brief was filed by Andrew T. Phillips and Gina
M. Ozelie of Centofanti Phillips,
S.C, of |
2009 WI App 112
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED July 15, 2009 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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Ecker Brothers, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Defendant-Respondent. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for
Before Brown, C.J.,
¶1 BROWN, C.J. We read
the
BACKGROUND
¶2 The relevant facts are undisputed. The Ecker Brothers are farmers with one wind
turbine on their farm. They wanted to
build more wind turbines on their property to generate energy to sell back to
the power company. So, they began
seeking funding to do so. Part of the
funding they needed was in the form of a grant, and that grant required an
acknowledgement letter from
¶3 Both parties moved for summary judgment. The County argued that the Ecker Brothers’
claim was barred by Wis. Stat. § 893.80
because they failed to serve the County with the proper written notice of
circumstances and claim. The circuit
court agreed with the County and dismissed the case. The Ecker Brothers appealed.
DISCUSSION
¶4 This appeal requires us to interpret and apply Wis. Stat. § 893.80, the notice of
claims statute, and Wis. Stat. §§ 66.0401
and 66.0403, the statutes governing wind energy systems. These are questions of law we review de
novo. Nischke v. Aetna Health Plans,
2008 WI App 190, ¶4, 314
Application of Wis. Stat. § 893.80,
the notice of claims statute
¶5 As a preliminary matter, because Calumet County raises it and
the circuit court used it as one basis for its decision, we will address
whether Wis. Stat. § 893.80,
the notice of claims statute, applies here.
The notice of claims statute requires parties bringing or maintaining an
action against any “political corporation, governmental subdivision or agency
thereof” to provide written notice of the circumstances of the claim within 120
days after the happening of the event giving rise to the claim. Sec. 893.80(1)(a). In DNR v. City of
¶6 We recognize that courts have since created exceptions to the
all actions language of City of
¶7 However, Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a)
expressly provides that “[f]ailure to give the requisite
notice shall not bar action on the claim if the … [political] subdivision … had
actual notice of the claim and the
claimant shows to the satisfaction of the court that the … failure to give the
requisite notice has not been prejudicial to the … [political]
subdivision.” (Emphasis added.)
¶8 Here, the
Ecker Brothers had been in contact with the County multiple times in 2004 and
2005. The County had received letters
from the Ecker Brothers prior to it enacting the ordinance, which requested a
letter stating that the Ecker Brothers did not need a permit. The County also received letters from the
Ecker Brothers afterwards, which stated that the Ecker Brothers thought the
wind ordinance was unlawful based on Wis.
Stat. § 66.0401 and the ordinance’s restrictions would make wind
projects impossible. At that point, the
Ecker Brothers had already installed a test turbine, completed percolation
tests, and requested permission to dig test holes. This constitutes actual notice. The County has not been prejudiced here,
since it had notice of the Ecker Brothers’ dispute well before they filed their
lawsuit and, more to the point, even before they enacted the ordinance.
¶9 We are
cognizant of the fact that, to fall under the actual notice exception, the
claimant must also meet the requirements in Wis.
Stat. § 893.80(1)(b). To
satisfy § 893.80(1)(b), the claim must have (1) identified the claimant’s
address, (2) itemized the relief sought, (3) been submitted to the proper
County representative, and (4) been disallowed by the County. See
also City of Waukesha, 184
Scope of political subdivisions’ authority to regulate wind energy systems
¶10 Now we can get to the substantive issue, which concerns the
scope of the State’s delegation of authority to its political subdivisions to
restrict wind energy systems.[2]
(1) Authority to restrict systems limited. No county, city, town, or village may place any restriction, either directly or in effect, on the installation or use of a … wind energy system, as defined in s. 66.0403 (1) (m), unless the restriction satisfies one of the following conditions:
(a) Serves to preserve or protect the public health or safety.
(b) Does not significantly increase the cost of the system or significantly decrease its efficiency.
(c) Allows for an alternative system of comparable cost and efficiency.
Thus, a political subdivision’s
consideration of a wind energy system must be in light of the conditions placed
on local regulation by this section. Numrich,
242
¶11 The statutory scheme also allows political subdivisions to
issue “wind access permits,” though they cannot require owners to apply for a
wind access permit. Wis. Stat. § 66.0403; see also Numrich,
242
¶12 In this case,
If you’re going to put up a tower that is going to
create this much noise, [the County] is saying you can’t go above this
line. And, if you do, it doesn’t
necessarily matter whether you’re out in a cornfield or whether you’re closer into
town. That’s too much…. [For setbacks,] if you’re going to build a
tower that’s this tall, [the County doesn’t] really care whether its in a
cornfield near a farmhouse or whether it’s closer into town near a school. It can’t be so close to a particular building
that [the County] laid out in the ordinance.
¶13 We need not go into the exact restrictions since the Ecker Brother’s objection is a facial objection to the type of regulation the County used, not the substance of the regulations. The Ecker Brothers contend that the local restrictions cannot be the same for all systems and cannot be created before the fact without knowledge of the facts of an individual project. Instead, the Ecker Brothers assert that the statutory scheme allows political subdivisions to restrict systems only on a case-by-case basis through conditional use permits. Thus, this argument boils down to the proper method for restricting wind energy systems: (1) a conditional use permit procedure that restricts systems as needed on a case-by-case basis, or (2) an ordinance creating a permit system with across-the-board regulations based on legislative policy-making.
¶14 Conditional use permits provide political subdivisions the
flexibility to cope with certain land uses that may create special problems and
hazards if located in particular places.
State ex rel. Skelly Oil Co. v. Common Council, City of
[C]onditional use permits are appropriate for “certain uses, considered by the local legislative body to be essential or desirable for the welfare of the community …, but not at every or any location … or without conditions being imposed ….” Thus, those uses subject to a conditional use permit are necessary to the community, but because they often represent uses that may be problematic, their development is best governed more closely rather than as of right. (Citation omitted.)
¶15 In contrast, across-the-board restrictions, as the name
indicates, apply to all uses of a particular type, regardless of the particular
location or the specifics of the project.
These restrictions therefore require the governing body to make a policy
decision that the regulations are necessary for every system. Legislative and administrative bodies
generally make these policy decisions by relying on legislative facts found
through the legislative process.
¶16 At oral argument,
¶17 The County asserts that Wis. Stat. § 66.0401 permits this approach because the legislature delegated the authority to political subdivisions to make policy decisions within the three conditions. And, it contends, so long as the policy decision is related to those conditions, the legislature does not dictate the processes political subdivisions may use to restrict wind energy systems. Taking the County’s argument to its fullest, we interpret this argument as saying that the County may as a matter of local policy disfavor wind energy systems, even severely restrict them, so long as the policy is tied to one of the three conditions in § 66.0401(1). This argument requires us to read the statutes to say that the legislature actually authorized localities to make their own policy regarding alternative energy systems.
¶18 We do not buy this argument.
Counties have no inherent power to govern.
¶19 Here, the legislature already made the policy decision that it favors wind energy systems. It created a scheme wherein owners of the systems can apply for permits that protect their ability to harness wind. See Wis. Stat. § 66.0403. And, it restricted the political subdivisions’ ability to contravene this policy. See Wis. Stat. § 66.0401(1). However, the legislature did allow political subdivisions to place restrictions on a wind energy system if, and only if, the restriction “[s]erves to preserve or protect the public health or safety,” or it “[d]oes not significantly increase the cost of the system or significantly decrease its efficiency,” or it “[a]llows for an alternative system of comparable cost and efficiency.” Sec. 66.0401(1)(a)-(c).
¶20 We are unconvinced that just because the legislature provided for three conditions under which political subdivisions can restrict a wind energy system, that it granted political subdivisions the authority to determine as a matter of legislative fact a “cart before the horse” method of local control. Instead, the language of Wis. Stat. § 66.0401(1) indicates that political subdivisions must rely on the facts of an individual situation to make case-by-case restrictions. We initially point out that § 66.0401(1) refers to local restrictions placed on a wind energy system. The statute’s limit on local control does not refer to any wind energy system nor to wind energy systems.
¶21 The focus on the term “a system” is also evident from the character of the three conditions, which, though stated in qualitative terms, require political subdivisions to make quantitative determinations. What is needed to protect public health depends on the facts of a particular situation, just as whether a restriction will increase costs, decrease efficiency, or prevent an alternative system from being constructed. When a political subdivision creates restrictions without sufficiently developed facts about a particular wind energy system, it is impossible for it to determine if its ordinance is in conflict with the statute. We therefore conclude that Wis. Stat. § 66.0401(1) requires a case-by-case approach, such as a conditional use permit procedure, and does not allow political subdivisions to find legislative facts or make policy. The conditions listed in § 66.0401(1)(a)-(c) are the standards circumscribing the power of political subdivisions, not openings for them to make policy that is contrary to the State’s expressed policy.
¶22 We find further support for our conclusion in the legislative
history of the State’s statutory scheme, which Numrich explained. The Numrich court explained that “[w]hen
enacting the original versions of [Wis.
Stat. §§ 66.0401 and 66.0403], the legislature expressed concern
about the diminishing supplies of nonrenewable energy resources, and it
observed that renewable energy systems could address this concern.” Numrich, 242
¶23 These strategies indicate that the legislature determined it
appropriate to give political subdivisions the power to assist in the creation
of renewable energy systems and thus become an integral and effective factor in
the State’s renewable energy goal. But,
this history does not indicate that the State intended to delegate the power of
policymaking. Instead, the evidence is that the State
delegated the authority to execute and
administer its established policy of
favoring wind energy systems, and the statutory scheme was intended to create
avenues for political subdivisions to assist the State. If the County and other similarly situated
localities believe that localities should be able to decide for themselves
whether and to what extent wind systems are welcome in their geographical area,
their argument is best made to the legislature.
¶24 Because the legislature did not delegate legislative powers to localities, the County cannot make findings of legislative fact. The County thus exceeded its authority under Wis. Stat. § 66.0401 when it created its wind energy ordinance. We therefore hold the ordinance to be ultra vires. We reverse and remand with directions that the circuit court reconsider the Ecker Brothers’ declaratory judgment action given that the ordinance is ultra vires.
By the Court.—Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions
[1] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.
[2] A “wind energy system” is “equipment that converts and then stores or transfers energy from the wind into usable forms of energy.” Wis. Stat. § 66.0403(1)(m).
[3] State
ex rel. Numrich v. City of Mequon Board of Zoning Appeals, 2001 WI App
88, ¶17, 242 Wis. 2d 677, 626 N.W.2d 366, refers to Wis. Stat. §§ 66.031 and 66.032. The legislature renumbered §§ 66.031 and 66.032 to Wis. Stat. §§ 66.0401 and 66.0403,
respectively, in 1999