2009 WI App 122
court of appeals of
published opinion
Case No.: |
2008AP1744 |
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Complete Title of Case: |
†Petition for review filed. |
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Linda L. Olson,
Plaintiff-Appellant, Lands' End, Inc.,
Subrogated-Plaintiff, v. Darlington Mutual Insurance Company, Catherine J. Weber and Dennis Weber,
Defendants-Respondents. † |
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Opinion Filed: |
July 23, 2009 |
Submitted on Briefs: |
March 6, 2009 |
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JUDGES: |
Higginbotham, P.J., Dykman and Vergeront, JJ. |
Concurred: |
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Dissented: |
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Appellant |
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ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Tyler T. Kieler of Kopp, McKichan, Geyer, Skemp & Stombaugh, LLP, Platteville. |
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Respondent |
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ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the defendant-respondent, Darlington Mutual Insurance Company, the cause was submitted on the brief of Arnold P. Anderson of Mohr & Anderson, LLC, Madison. |
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2009 WI App 122
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED July 23, 2009 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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Linda L. Olson,
Plaintiff-Appellant, Lands’ End, Inc.,
Subrogated-Plaintiff, v. Darlington Mutual Insurance Company, Catherine J. Weber and Dennis Weber,
Defendants-Respondents. |
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APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for
Before Higginbotham, P.J., Dykman and Vergeront, JJ.
¶1 DYKMAN, J. Linda Olson appeals from an
order granting Darlington Mutual Insurance Company’s request for a jury
instruction stating that Olson has suffered less than $75,000 in damages. Olson argues that the proposed instruction is
unnecessary, would invade the province of the jury and prevent her from
obtaining a fair trial, and would impermissibly inform the jury of the effect of
its verdict.
Background
¶2 This case is before us on interlocutory appeal for the second
time. In Olson v. Darlington Mutual
Insurance Co., 2006 WI App 204, 296 Wis. 2d 716, 723 N.W.2d 713,
we reversed the trial court’s order directing Olson to disclose to
¶3 Following remand, the trial court held a pre-trial conference
to address
¶4 The trial court granted
Standard of
Review
¶5 Trial courts have discretion whether to treat statements as
judicial admissions. See Fletcher v.
Discussion
¶6 Olson argues that disclosing to the jury that she may not
recover an amount equal to or exceeding $75,000 would invade the province of
the jury and prevent her from receiving a fair trial, because it would mislead
the jury into thinking that it should start with a $75,000 maximum for damages
and then work down from there. She also
argues that disclosing her maximum recoverable damages to the jury would
improperly inform the jury of the effect of its verdict as to damages. See
McGowan
v. Story, 70
¶7
¶8 While both parties speculate as to the effect of the proposed jury instruction on the jury, our review of the facts reveals no basis for a jury instruction as to the amount demanded in Olson’s complaint. It is undisputed that Olson is limited to a recovery of less than $75,000. This remains true whether or not the jury is informed of that limit. Because a jury instruction that Olson’s recovery is ultimately limited to less than $75,000 would serve no purpose, we conclude that the facts of this case do not warrant that instruction.
¶9 Next, Darlington argues that Olson’s complaint is a judicial admission that she has suffered less than $75,000 worth of damages, rather than a limit on the amount she can recover. It argues that the judicial admission issue was not before us on the previous appeal and therefore was not addressed in the majority or concurring opinions.
¶10 Olson replies that she never stated she suffered less than $75,000 in damages, only that she has limited her recovery to less than $75,000. Therefore, she asserts, there has been no “judicial admission” as to the amount of her damages.
¶11 A judicial admission is “[a]n express waiver made in court or
preparatory to trial by the party or his [or her] attorney conceding for the
purposes of the trial the truth of some alleged fact,” and “has the effect of a
confessory pleading, in that the fact is thereafter to be taken for granted; so
that the one party need offer no evidence to prove it and the other is not
allowed to disprove it.”[3] Fletcher, 156
¶12 We review a trial court’s decision to treat a statement as a
judicial admission for an erroneous exercise of discretion.
¶13 Darlington argues that a demand for an amount of damages less
than the threshold for federal jurisdiction is an admission that the
plaintiff’s damages are actually limited to that amount, citing Jones
v. Allstate Insurance Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.S.C. 2003), and Arnold
v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 277 F.3d 772 (5th Cir.
2001). We do not find either case
persuasive on the facts before us, and both are from federal courts to which we
owe no deference. See Hills Bros. Coffee, Inc. v. Dairyland Transp., Inc.,
157
¶14 In
The district court fortified [its] ruling with reliance on post-removal affidavits by [the plaintiffs] that limit their joint claims to less than $75,000. We agree with the judge’s view that the affidavits preclude [the plaintiffs] from seeking damages in excess of that amount in state courts either as a judicial admission, judicial estoppel or a matter of preclusion.
¶15 In Jones, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to remand to state court based on lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs’ complaint stated:
The total amount in controversy as to each Plaintiff[] and each individual member of the Class does not exceed seventy-four thousand dollars ($74,000) each, exclusive of interests and costs. Plaintiffs therefore disclaim any damages, injunctive relief and/or restitution greater than seventy-four thousand [dollars] ($74,000) per Plaintiff[] or individual Class Member.
Jones, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 426-27. The court said:
As a general rule, the sum
claimed by a plaintiff in his complaint determines the jurisdictional amount,
and a plaintiff may plead less than the jurisdictional amount to avoid federal
jurisdiction. See
¶16 We focus on the actual language in Olson’s complaint. The complaint clearly states Olson is seeking less than $75,000 in damages, not that she has, in fact, suffered less than $75,000 in damages. Olson’s complaint reads:
That as a … result of the incident and injury, Plaintiff, Linda L. Olson, has sustained substantial past and future pain, past and future suffering, past and future disability, past and future loss of income, and past and future loss of earning capacity and disfigurement, and has incurred substantial expenses for medical expenses.
That
the amount of damages sought and in controversy is less than the amount
required for removal to the United States District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin under diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 USC
1332(a).
Wherefore, the Plaintiff, Linda L. Olson, demands judgment against Defendants Darlington Mutual Insurance Company, Catherine J. Weber, Dennis Weber, Robbins & Myers, Inc., and ABC Insurance Company as follows:
a. Awarding compensatory damages according to law but in no event equal to or greater than the sum required for removal to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) ….
¶17 We cannot read the complaint’s assertion that the “amount of
damages sought and in controversy” is less than $75,000 as a statement that
Olson has suffered less than $75,000 in damages, particularly in light of the
preceding paragraph detailing Olson’s extensive damages. We agree with Olson that the only assertion
in her complaint is that she is seeking less than $75,000 in damages. Moreover, this conclusion was foreshadowed in
the concurrence to our previous decision in this case. See
Olson,
296
By the Court.—Order reversed.
[1] This appeal arises from the court’s order authorizing a jury instruction stating that “the total damages sustained by Linda Olson as a consequence of the subject accident do not exceed $75,000.” However, on appeal, Olson identifies two issues: “Should the jury empanelled in this case be informed of the jurisdictionally self-imposed cap on damages?”; and “Should the jury be instructed that the total damages sustained by Linda Olson as a consequence of the subject accident do not exceed $75,000.00?” In their briefs, the parties dispute the appropriateness of a jury instruction as to the amount of damages demanded in Olson’s complaint, or as to the amount of damages Olson has actually suffered. To avoid confusion, we address both issues.
[2] For a full statement of the facts leading to the litigation in this case, see Olson v. Darlington Mutual Insurance Co., 2006 WI App 204, ¶2, 296 Wis. 2d 716, 723 N.W.2d 713.
[3]