COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED September 1, 2010 A.
John Voelker Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT II |
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Chicago Title Insurance Company,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Patrice Voss,
Defendant-Respondent. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for
Before
Brown, C.J., Neubauer, P.J., and
¶1 NEUBAUER, P.J. Chicago
Title Insurance Company appeals from a declaratory judgment awarding attorney
fees and costs to its insured under Wis.
Stat. § 806.04(8) and (10) (2007-08).[1]
Patrice Voss requested attorney fees and
costs after Chicago Title unsuccessfully challenged the damages owing her under
its title insurance policy. The primary
issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to
an insured under § 806.04(8) when there was no breach of a duty to defend. We conclude that it did. The supreme court’s decision in Reid
v. Benz, 2001 WI 106, 245
BACKGROUND
¶2 In spring 2003, Voss purchased a residential lot located on
¶3 After several exchanges, Chicago Title filed suit against Voss on June 28, 2007, seeking a declaratory judgment. Chicago Title claimed that $14,000 was the proper amount covered by the title insurance policy for “the total loss and damages due to the gas pipeline running along the rear lot of the subject as of the effective date of [the discovery of the defect].” Voss’s answer alleged that the appraisal procedure and value were wrong and asked the court to declare the dollar amount owed against the policy to be $33,210. Voss did not plead a counterclaim or allege bad faith.
¶4 After a court trial, the court granted judgment in favor of
Voss, granting her $62,500 in damages under the title insurance policy. The court then held a hearing on January 27,
2009, on Voss’s posttrial claim for attorney fees and costs. The court awarded Voss attorney fees based on
the equities of the case pursuant to Wis.
Stat. § 806.04(8),
finding that the “spirit” of Elliott v. Donahue, 169
¶5 In reaching its decision, the court found that Chicago Title “lowballed” Voss and criticized Chicago Title’s appraiser for her lack of independence—commenting that the absence of independence was “much closer to the end of bad faith.” However, the court also stated that it found no inappropriate conduct on behalf of either party at trial, stating that it “was a hard fought battle for both sides of the aisle.” Ultimately, the court determined that when the insured has to “take on [the insurance carrier] to get what you should have coming [to] you for their error … the court is going to award attorney fees.”
¶6 On February 9, 2009, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Voss and denied Chicago Title’s motion for declaratory judgment. The court awarded Voss $24,412.50 in attorney fees and $8382.00 for costs. Chicago Title appeals both the award of attorney fees under Wis. Stat. § 806.04(8) and the award of costs under § 806.04(10).
DISCUSSION
Attorney
Fees under Wis. Stat. § 806.04(8)
¶7
¶8 Voss contends that an award of attorney fees is consistent with the precedent in Elliott and proper under Wis. Stat. § 806.04(8), which permits a trial court to award “supplemental relief” in a declaratory judgment.[2]
¶9 The attorney fees issue in Elliott arose when an
automobile insurance carrier breached its contractual duty to defend its
insured against a third-party suit. Elliott,
169
¶10 The Elliott court found that the insurer had failed to comply with
the requirement set forth in Mowry v. Badger State Mutual Casualty Co.,
129
Wis. 2d 496, 385 N.W.2d 171 (1986), that an insurer not only request a
bifurcated trial on the issues of coverage and liability, but that it also move
to stay any proceedings on liability until the issue of coverage is resolved. Elliott, 169
¶11 The Elliott court held that, in such a situation, supplemental
relief under Wis. Stat. §
806.04(8) “permit[ted] a recovery of attorney fees ... under the principles of
equity.” Elliott, 169
¶12 Elliott’s holding has been limited by the supreme court in
subsequent case law, most decisively in Reid v. Benz, 2001 WI 106, 245 Wis.
2d 658, 629 N.W.2d 262. The question
presented in Reid is precisely the question presented in this case, “whether
Elliott
permits recovery of attorney fees expended solely in establishing coverage,
where there has been no breach of the duty to defend.” Reid, 245
¶13 In Reid, the insurer followed the procedure established in Mowry,
seeking a declaration of coverage while staying liability. Reid, 245
¶14 The court’s conclusion in Reid leaves little doubt that the rationale
of Elliott
does not apply in this case. Both prior
to and since
Wis. 2d 658, ¶28 (declining to extend Elliott beyond its particular facts
and circumstances); see also Gorton
v. Hostak, Henzl & Bichler, S.C., 217 Wis. 2d 493, 512, 577 N.W.2d
617 (1998)[6]
(recognizing that courts have declined to extend Elliott beyond its
particular facts and circumstances and citing DeChant v. Monarch Life Ins. Co.,
200 Wis. 2d 559, 569, 547 N.W.2d 592 (1996)); see also Riccobono
v. Seven Star, Inc., 2000 WI App 74, ¶24, 234 Wis. 2d 374, 610 N.W.2d
501; Ledman
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 230
¶15 In an effort to illustrate the proper application of Elliott, the Reid court contrasted two of the court of appeals’ post-Elliott rulings. Reid, 245
¶16 We conclude that Elliott and its progeny do not
authorize an award of attorney fees under Wis.
Stat. § 806.04(8) under
the facts and circumstances presented here, where there has been no breach of
the duty to defend.[7] Despite the fact that Voss had to expend
money to establish coverage that fell within the ambit of the insurance policy,
“the basis for the attorney fees award in Elliott is absent here.” See Reid, 245
¶17 Voss additionally argues that she was contractually entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees under the terms of her title policy. However, the policy language upon which she relies provides for attorney fees incurred in defense of the title, not in a first-party indemnification dispute between Voss and Chicago Title over the scope of coverage.[8]
Costs under Wis. Stat. § 806.04(10)
¶18 Chicago Title next argues that the trial court erred in
awarding costs to Voss under Wis. Stat. § 806.04(10). Section
806.04(10) provides that, in a declaratory judgment proceeding, a court “may
make such award of costs as may seem equitable and just.” The decision to award equitable and just
costs under
§ 806.04(10) is left to the trial court’s discretion. See
Kremers-Urban
Co., 119
¶19 In support of its contention, Chicago Title discusses the litigation history at length, laying out the conduct of the parties in litigation and the efforts made by Chicago Title in adhering to court rules and deadlines, despite difficulties in dealing with Voss’s attorney. The trial court, which had presided over the case from start to finish, acknowledged these difficulties and noted that Chicago Title’s attorney had conducted himself “extremely well.” However, the court also noted its finding of excusable neglect on the part of Voss’s attorney and a valid reason for delay on the part of Voss’s appraiser. The trial court ultimately determined that the “bottom line” was that Chicago Title had “lowballed” Voss with its appraisal of $14,000, thereby forcing her to prove her claim and litigate to recover the diminution in value for her property. We can infer that the court’s finding as to Chicago Title’s appraisal was based on its assessment that Voss’s appraiser, who valued the diminution at $62,500, was “more clear[,] satisfactory and convincing as to the diminution of value of [Voss’s] property.”
¶20 We will uphold the trial court’s exercise of discretion if it
examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law and, using a
demonstrated rational process, arrived at a conclusion a reasonable judge could
reach. Dickman v. Vollmer, 2007
WI App 141, ¶27, 303
CONCLUSION
¶21 We conclude that the trial court erred in its award of attorney
fees to Voss. The limited awarding of
attorney fees in Elliott under the
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Not recommended for publication in the official reports.
[1] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.
[2]
Supplemental Relief. Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the application be deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment or decree, to show cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith.
We note that Voss additionally
cites to § 806.04(10) in support of the trial court’s award of attorney
fees. However, Elliott v. Donahue, 169
[3] The
question certified to the supreme court in Reid v. Benz, 2001 WI 106, ¶1, 245
Wis. 2d 658, 629 N.W.2d 262, was whether “the supreme court’s award of attorney
fees to an insured in Elliott [was] premised upon the
insurer’s contractual breach of the duty to provide coverage or the duty to
defend or both?” (Citation omitted.)
[4]
From this court’s count, the Reid court confirmed five times that the award of attorney fees in Elliott
was based on the breach of the duty to defend. Reid, 245
[5] While
the Reid
court also noted that there was no argument that the insurer’s challenge to
indemnity was “unfair or unreasonable, or in bad faith,” Reid, 245 Wis. 2d 658, ¶35,
we do not read the single reference to “unfair” as addressing anything other
than the fact that the parties did not so contend. In the context of the entire opinion, the
court was not suggesting a new basis for recovery of attorney fees. Rather, after thoroughly considering the
potential inequities associated with requiring the insured to establish
indemnity coverage, including unequal resources, the court made clear that the
inequity in Elliott was squarely based on the breach of the duty to defend.
Reid, 245
[6] The
supreme court in Gorton v. Hostak,
[7] We note that, while the trial court referenced “bad faith” in its decision, Voss did not make a claim based on the tort of bad faith, and the trial court did not make a finding of bad faith. Further, neither party raises the issue of bad faith on appeal or argues that attorney fees were awarded as damages under DeChant v. Monarch Life Insurance Co., 200 Wis. 2d 559, 547 N.W.2d 592 (1996). Voss did not pursue and attorney fees were not awarded as a sanction pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.05.
[8] The policy’s provision, entitled Company’s Duty to Defend Against Court Cases, states:
We will defend your title in any court case as to that part of the case that is based on a Covered Title Risk insured against by this Policy. We will pay the costs, attorneys’ fees, and expenses we incur in that defense.