COURT OF APPEALS
DATED AND FILED
November 2, 2010
Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62.
STATE OF WISCONSIN
IN COURT OF
State of Wisconsin,
Patrick E. Hampton,
from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: carl
ashley, Judge. Affirmed.
Curley, P.J., Fine and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 BRENNAN, J. Patrick E. Hampton appeals
from a judgment entered after he pled guilty to first-degree reckless
homicide. He contends that the circuit
court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the statements he made to police
on July 20 and 21, 2008. Hampton claims that, at
the outset of the July 20 interview, he expressly invoked his right to
counsel and to remain silent and again expressly invoked his right to counsel
two hours and thirty-eight minutes into the interview. Additionally, he contends that he never
waived those rights. Because we conclude
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were not violated, we affirm the circuit
¶2 The background facts are those testified to by Detectives
Timothy Heier and Mark Peterson at the suppression hearing and those revealed
by the audio tapes of Hampton’s
interviews with detectives on July 20 and 21, 2008. The relevant facts do not appear to be in
¶3 On July 20, 2008, at approximately 2:40 p.m., Hampton was arrested,
processed, and placed in a private cell at the Milwaukee Police Department
until 7:20 p.m., when he was placed in an interview room. Beginning at 7:43 p.m., Detectives Heier and
Jeremiah Jacks began questioning Hampton about
the July 15, 2008 death of Carlton Stovall, Hampton’s roommate. The detectives were not carrying guns, and Hampton was not
¶4 Shortly after the interview began, Hampton interrupted Detective Heier,
stating: “Mark told me to talk to nobody
but him.” Detective Heier confirmed that Hampton was referring to Detective Peterson, whom Hampton knew from prior contacts. Detective Heier told Hampton that Detective Peterson’s shift had
ended and that he was gone for the day.
¶5 Detective Heier then resumed explaining the interview process
to Hampton, when Hampton interrupted again, stating: “I know how this stuff go. I know all about this.” Detective Heier confirmed that Hampton had prior
arrests. Hampton then continued:
He [Detective Peterson] told me to talk to nobody but
him.… I know how this stuff go, OK. I really don’t want to say nothing. I don’t have no lawyer. And understand, like I said, he told me to
say nothing.… I know how it go. Good cop, bad cop.… He told me to talk to him.
¶6 In response, Detective Heier told Hampton
that Detective Peterson had directed Detectives Heier and Jacks to talk to Hampton. Hampton
reiterated that Detective Peterson “told me to talk to nobody but him.” Nevertheless, Hampton proceeded to respond to background
questions posed by Detective Heier.
¶7 After Hampton answered basic
background questions, Detective Heier told Hampton
that he needed to inform Hampton
of his rights. Hampton replied that he had been given his
rights before. Regardless, Detective
Heier proceeded to read Hampton
off the standard Department of Justice card.
When asked if he understood his rights, Hampton answered, “yes, sir.”
¶8 Detective Heier then asked Hampton if he was willing to talk with the
detectives. The audio tape does not
reflect what, if anything, Hampton
said or did immediately after Detective Heier’s question. However, a few seconds later, Hampton stated: “I really don’t want to make no
statement. Do I got to talk to both of
you all? Or I can just talk to one of
you all? … I’m supposed to be talking to
Mark [Detective Peterson].”
¶9 Over the next few minutes, Detective Heier explained the
purpose of having two detectives in the interview room. Detective Heier then again asked Hampton: “Do you want to talk to us?” Hampton
replied: “I want to talk, but I don’t
want to talk to both” detectives.
Detective Heier testified that he understood Hampton to be waiving his rights. Over the next two hours, Detective Heier
questioned Hampton, and Hampton responded to the questions.
¶10 Two hours and thirty-eight minutes into the July 20 interview, Hampton interrupted
Detective Heier’s questions, and the following exchange occurred:
I’m not trying to be rude or nothing.
I just want to talk to a lawyer.
DETECTIVE HEIER: Any specific lawyer you want us to call?
No. I don’t know.
¶11 The next twenty seconds of the audio tape reflects sounds
suggesting that the detectives were packing up to leave, a suggestion confirmed
by the following exchange initiated by Hampton:
Are you guys gonna leave?
DETECTIVE HEIER: Yeah.
If you wanna talk to a lawyer, we’re not going to talk to you.... You’re in charge.… If you want a lawyer, I respect that and I’ll
¶12 Detective Heier then told Hampton
that a police officer was going to come in to photograph the cuts on Hampton’s hands. Hampton
responded: “I just don’t want you guys
to leave right now.” Detective Heier
explained to Hampton that because Hampton had requested a
lawyer, the detectives could not talk to him.
Detective Heier told Hampton
that he could retain a public defender if he could not afford to hire an
attorney. Detective Heier also offered
to reread Hampton
¶13 After taking a few minutes to consider his options, Hampton stated: “I really
do want to talk to you guys … I just need some time.” Hampton
requested thirty to forty minutes alone to read the Bible, pray, and talk to
God before he continued to talk to detectives.
Detective Heier granted Hampton’s
request, and then told Hampton: “If you want to talk to us again, we’ll talk
to you again,” and Hampton
replied: “I do. I do.
I really do. I just need some
time.” Detective Heier thereupon stopped
the interview at 10:32 p.m., gave Hampton a
Bible, and left Hampton
¶14 The interview resumed an hour later at 11:32 p.m. when
Detective Heier alone met with Hampton in the
interview room and reread Hampton
rights. When asked if he understood
those rights, Hampton
responded, “yes, sir.” The following
exchange then occurred:
I don’t want to say the wrong thing.
I don’t want to say the wrong thing.
DETECTIVE HEIER: … Do you want to talk to me?
I guess I’ll talk about some things.
¶15 The interview then continued for another hour, until Hampton announced to
Detective Heier: “I just don’t want to
talk right now.” Shortly thereafter, Hampton added: “I want to talk to you again.” But at that point, at 12:42 a.m., five hours
after the interview began, Detective Heier ended the interview and Hampton was returned to
his private cell. Hampton made no incriminating statements
during the July 20 interview.
¶16 At 2:47 p.m. on July 21, fourteen hours after the first
interview had ended, Detective Peterson, who Hampton
had requested to speak with at the first interview, accompanied by Detective
Billy Ball, interviewed Hampton
about Stovall’s death. Detective
Peterson read Hampton
rights at the outset of the interview. Hampton indicated that he
understood his rights and answered, “yes, sir,” when asked if he agreed to
waive his rights and to speak to the detectives about the homicide.
¶17 The July 21 interview took place in an interview room at the
police station. According to Detective
Peterson’s testimony, Hampton
was not handcuffed, and never asked for counsel or to remain silent. The interview lasted two hours and twelve
minutes, during which time Hampton
admitted to killing Stovall while high on drugs.
¶18 Consequently, on July 23, 2008, the State filed a criminal
complaint charging Hampton
with one count of first-degree reckless homicide. Hampton filed
a pretrial motion, seeking to suppress the statements he made to Milwaukee police
detectives on July 20 and 21, and any evidence derived therefrom. He argued that during the July 20 interview
he never affirmatively waived his rights and he was questioned even after
asking for an attorney, requiring that any statements he made to detectives
that day be suppressed. He further
argued that his statements to detectives on July 21 were not sufficiently
attenuated from the July 20 violations and should be suppressed as well.
¶19 Following a hearing on the motion, at which both Detectives
Heier and Peterson testified, and following the circuit court’s review of the
audio tapes of the interviews, the circuit court denied Hampton’s motion. The circuit court concluded that Hampton never unequivocally invoked his right to counsel
at the start of the July 20 interview, and later, after Detective Heier read Hampton his Miranda rights, Hampton voluntarily waived those rights. The court also concluded that although
Hampton invoked his right to counsel two hours and thirty-eight minutes into
the July 20 interview when he said, “I just want to talk to a lawyer,” Hampton
thereafter initiated a discussion about the case when he told detectives he did
not want them to leave. The court found
was again read his Miranda rights and waived them after invoking his right to
¶20 With respect to the July 21 interview, the circuit court found
was given his Miranda rights at the outset of the interview and waived
them. The circuit court also concluded
that even if Hampton
had invoked his right to an attorney during the July 20 interview, there was a
sufficient break between interviews so as not to taint the July 21 interview.
¶21 Subsequently, pursuant to a plea agreement, Hampton pled guilty to the original charge of
first-degree reckless homicide, and the State agreed to recommend “substantial
confinement.” The circuit court accepted
Hampton’s guilty plea and later sentenced Hampton to twenty-five
years of initial confinement to be followed by fifteen years of extended
appeals the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶23 Ordinarily, a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects
and defenses. See County of Racine v.
Smith, 122 Wis.
2d 431, 434, 362 N.W.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1984).
A narrowly crafted exception to this rule exists in Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10) (2007-08),
which permits appellate review of an order denying a motion to suppress
evidence, not withstanding a guilty plea.
Smith, 122 Wis.
2d at 434-35. We review the denial of a
motion to suppress under a two-part standard of review, upholding the circuit
court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous but reviewing de novo whether those facts warrant
suppression. See State v. Drew, 2007 WI App 213, ¶11, 305 Wis. 2d 641, 740 N.W.2d 404.
seeks to overturn the circuit court’s decision, denying his motion to suppress
statements he made to detectives during the July 20 interview, at which he said
nothing incriminating, and during the July 21 interview, at which he confessed
to Stovall’s murder. With respect to the
July 20 interview, Hampton
argues the following:
(1) that at the outset of the July 20 interview he
invoked his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, as well as his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent, when he told police:
He [Detective Peterson] told
me to talk to nobody but him.… I know
how this stuff go, OK. I really don’t
want to say nothing. I don’t have no
lawyer. And understand, like I said, he
told me to say nothing.… I know how it
go. Good cop, bad cop.… He told me to talk to him;
(2) that after Detective Heier read the Miranda
rights to Hampton twenty‑six minutes into the first interview, Hampton
never waived those rights; and
(3) that two hours and thirty-eight minutes into
the July 20 interview, Hampton
invoked his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel when he told
detectives: “I’m not trying to be rude or
nothing. I just want to talk to a
Hampton then goes on to argue that the
alleged violations from the July 20 interview tainted statements he made
to detectives during the July 21 interview.
We disagree and affirm.
Amendment Right to Counsel
¶25 As an initial matter, we conclude that Hampton’s Sixth Amendment rights were not
implicated during the interviews. The
Sixth Amendment provides the right to counsel at all crucial stages of a
criminal prosecution. McNeil v. Wisconsin,
171, 175 (1991). However, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is “offense specific.” Id. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel in Wisconsin does not
attach until after “the filing of a criminal complaint or the issuance of an
arrest warrant.” State v. Dagnall, 2000 WI
82, ¶30, 236 Wis. 2d 339, 612 N.W.2d 680, overruled
on other grounds by Montejo v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___,
129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009); see also State
v. Forbush, 2010 WI App 11, ¶2, 323 Wis. 2d 258, 779 N.W.2d 476.
¶26 The State argues that because “[a]t the time of the [July 20
and 21] interviews, no complaint had been filed and no arrest warrant had been
Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached to the first-degree reckless
homicide charge. Hampton did not contest these facts in his
reply brief. And while the record does
not reveal the basis for his arrest, Hampton
has also not challenged the arrest. Nor
refuted the State’s argument that the Sixth Amendment is therefore not
implicated. Consequently, we conclude
Amendment claims are without merit. See Charolais
Breeding Ranches, Ltd. v. FPC Sec. Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 97, 108-09, 279 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App.
1979) (arguments not refuted are deemed admitted).
Amendment Right to Counsel
¶27 Next, Hampton contends that his Fifth Amendment right to
counsel was violated during the July 20 interview because: (1) at the outset of the July 20
interview, he invoked his right to counsel; (2) he never orally agreed to waive
rights after they were read to him twenty minutes after the interview began;
and (3) two hours and thirty-eight minutes into the interview, he again invoked
his right to counsel. We disagree and
¶28 “In Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)],
the United States Supreme Court held that law enforcement officers conducting a
custodial interrogation must employ procedural safeguards sufficient to protect
a defendant’s Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination.” State
v. Armstrong, 223 Wis.
2d 331, 351, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). Police are required to read
those procedural safeguards, commonly known as the Miranda warnings, to
suspects in custody and under interrogation.
351-52. Once the Miranda
warnings are properly given, the suspect must then “knowingly and voluntarily
waive the [Miranda] rights” to permit an ensuing statement from the
suspect to be used in the prosecution’s case-in-chief at trial. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). A suspect’s right to counsel and
right to remain silent are two of the rights protected by these procedural
guidelines. State v. Ross, 203 Wis. 2d 66, 73, 552
N.W.2d 428 (Ct. App. 1996).
order to invoke the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, a suspect is required to
“‘articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement
to be a request for an attorney.’” State
v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶30, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142 (quoting Davis
v. United States, 512 U.S.
452, 459 (1994)). Such a request must be
“unambiguous.” Davis, 512 U.S.
at 459. A mere reference to an attorney
is not sufficient to invoke the right. See Jennings,
252 Wis. 2d
228, ¶31. For instance, statements such
as, “‘[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer,’ [are] not … clear and unequivocal
request[s] for counsel.” Id. (quoting
Davis, 512 U.S. at 462). “‘Unless [a] suspect actually requests an attorney, questioning may continue.’” Id. (quoting
at 461; emphasis added).
did not unambiguously invoke his right to counsel at the
outset of the July 20 interview.
alleges that detectives ignored him and continued to inappropriately question
him five minutes into the July 20 interview, when he stated: “I really don’t want to say nothing. I don’t have no lawyer. And understand, like I said, he [Detective
Peterson] told me to say nothing.” Here, simply stated, Hampton did not unambiguously request
counsel. Instead, he merely stated a
fact: that he did not have an
attorney. At best, the statement
suggests that Hampton
might want counsel, but that is not
enough to invoke his right to one under the Fifth Amendment. See id.
was required to do more and detectives did not err in continuing to question
waived his Miranda rights after they
were read to him
during the July 20 interview.
¶31 Next, we address Hampton’s
claim that he did not orally waive his Miranda rights when they were read
to him by Detective Heier. He bases his
argument entirely on the fact that his response when Detective Heier asked him
if he was willing to talk is indistinct on the audio tape of the interview. Because an express waiver of Miranda
is not required, and the State has otherwise demonstrated that Hampton knowingly and intelligently waived
his rights, we affirm the circuit court.
¶32 “The main purpose of [reading an accused the] Miranda
[rights] is to ensure that an accused is advised of and understands the right
to remain silent and the right to counsel.”
Berghuis v. Thompkins, ___ U.S.
___, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2261 (2010). It is the State’s burden to demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that the accused knowingly and intelligently
waived his or her Miranda rights. Id. at
2261. But the State “does not need to
show that a waiver of Miranda rights was express.” Id. Rather, “[a]n ‘implicit waiver’ of the ‘right
to remain silent’ is sufficient to admit a suspect’s statement into
evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). The State establishes an “implicit
waiver” when it demonstrates that “a Miranda warning was given and that
it was understood by the accused” and that the accused then went on to make an
uncoerced statement. Id. at 2262.
¶33 Here, the audio tape demonstrates that after Detective Heier
read Hampton the Miranda rights Hampton answered “yes,
sir” when asked if he understood those rights.
Moreover, the record shows that Hampton had been read his Miranda
rights on previous occasions and was familiar with those rights prior to when
they were read to him by Detective Heier.
In short, there is ample evidence that Hampton was read his rights and understood
¶34 Additionally, Hampton’s
statements to Detective Heier were not coerced.
Nor does Hampton
argue that they were. While the audio
tape does not demonstrate, what, if anything, Hampton
said immediately after Detective Heier asked him if he wanted to talk to the
subsequent statements demonstrate a willingness to talk. Throughout the interrogation, Detective Heier
repeatedly told Hampton that Hampton
was “in charge” and that Hampton
could stop the questioning whenever he wanted to, “pick and chose” the
questions he wished to answer, or talk to a lawyer. Hampton’s
decision to continue answering questions, knowing his rights, amounts to an
implicit waiver of his Miranda rights.
¶35 Furthermore, Hampton expressly waived his Miranda rights minutes
after being asked by Detective Heier whether he wanted to talk, when Hampton
stated: “I want to talk.” His express waiver came after he acknowledged
understanding his rights, and after he asked and received clarification about
those rights, asking: “Do I got to talk
to both of you all? Or can I just talk
to one of you all? … I’m supposed to be
talking to Mark [Detective Peterson].”
After Detective Heier explained that he and his partner would both be
questioning Hampton, and that Detective Peterson
would not be present, Hampton,
knowing his rights, decided to continue talking to the detectives, telling
detectives: “I want to talk.”
¶36 Consequently, we conclude that Hampton did waive his Miranda rights during the
July 20 interview.
C. While Hampton
unambiguously invoked his right to counsel two
hours and thirty-eight minutes into the July 20 interview, he then immediately
initiated further communication with the detectives and then waived his right
¶37 Finally, Hampton contends that detectives violated his Fifth
Amendment right to counsel when, two hours and thirty-eight minutes into the
July 20 interview, he requested counsel and Detective Heier purportedly
continued his interrogation. Hampton argues that after he requested to speak with
counsel Detective Heier failed to immediately terminate questioning, and
instead, asked Hampton
if there was “[a]ny specific lawyer you want us to call?” Hampton
further contends that he did not initiate communication with the detectives
after asserting his right to counsel. We
¶38 Indeed, Hampton
did unambiguously request an attorney two hours and thirty-eight minutes into
the first interview, stating, “I’m not trying to be rude or nothing. I just want to talk to a lawyer.” Once an accused invokes his right to counsel
under the Fifth Amendment, “the accused ‘is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him [or her].’” State v. Lagar, 190 Wis. 2d 423, 431, 526
N.W.2d 836 (Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted).
However, that does not mean that all questioning
must end. Id.
“[O]nce the accused clearly invokes the right to counsel,
interrogation must cease; however, the police can ask simple questions with the
goal of insuring that the accused is provided with counsel.” Id.
at 432. Detective Heier’s question,
“[a]ny specific lawyer you want us to call?,” falls squarely within the rule
set forth in Lagar because it was meant to ensure that the detectives could
effectively execute Hampton’s right to talk to an attorney.
¶39 After Hampton informed Detective Heier that he did not have a
particular attorney in mind, Detectives Heier and Jacks immediately ended the
interview and began collecting their things to leave. As the circuit court noted: “And then there’s another pause of several
seconds [on the audio tape] and then there’s a sound of [a] chair scraping and
papers being collected, and I believe you hear a door open and it seems quite
clear that the officers kind of abruptly get up and leave.” Because Hampton
does not challenge that finding and because it appears to comport with the
noises on the audio tape, we uphold that finding as true and therefore conclude
that immediately following Hampton’s
request for counsel, the detectives appropriately terminated their
¶40 Our analysis, however, does not end there. “Even after a suspect in custody asks to
speak with a lawyer, thereby requiring that ‘all interrogation must cease until
a lawyer is present,’ a suspect may waive his or her Fifth Amendment Miranda
right to counsel.” State v. Hambly, 2008 WI
10, ¶67, 307 Wis.
2d 98, 745 N.W.2d 48 (footnotes and citations omitted). However, the burden is on the State to
demonstrate that: (1) the suspect
“‘initiate[d] further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
police’”; and (2) the suspect’s subsequent waiver was made “‘voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently.’” Id.,
¶¶68-70 (brackets in Hambly; footnotes and citations
omitted). Hampton argues that he did not initiate
further communication with detectives after asking for counsel.
¶41 The Supreme Court, in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039
(1983), set forth two different tests for determining whether a suspect has
initiated a discussion or conversation with law enforcement officers. First, the four-justice Bradshaw plurality
concluded that a suspect initiates communication when he or she asks questions
or makes statements “that under the totality of the circumstances ‘evince a
willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the
investigation.’” Hambly, 307 Wis. 2d 98, ¶73 (citing Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at
1045-46). Second, the four-justice Bradshaw
dissent argued that the suspect must instigate “‘dialogue about the subject
matter of the criminal investigation.’” Hambly,
307 Wis. 2d 98, ¶74 (citing Bradshaw,
at 1053 (Marshall, J., dissenting)) (emphasis omitted).
¶42 Here, after Hampton
requested to speak with an attorney, the detectives scrupulously respected that
request and began to leave. Hampton then asked the
detectives if they were leaving.
Detective Heier answered appropriately, explaining to Hampton that he had a right to speak with
counsel and because he invoked that right the detectives were going to end
their questioning, stating: “Yeah. If you wanna talk to a lawyer, we’re not
going to talk to you.... You’re in
charge.… If you want a lawyer, I respect
that and I’ll honor that.” Hampton later told the
detectives, “I really do want to talk to you guys.… I just need some time.”
¶43 Under either test set forth in Bradshaw, the culmination
statements with detectives from “I just don’t want you guys to leave right now”
and ending with “I really do want to talk to you guys,” demonstrates an
initiation of communication with the detectives. It is reasonable to conclude that Hampton wished to continue
talking about the circumstances surrounding Stovall’s death, as that had been
the focus of his conversation with the detectives for several hours. Detectives honored Hampton’s
request for a thirty to forty minute break to read the Bible and pray before
continuing to speak with detectives, and Detective Heier reread Hampton his Miranda
rights before continuing to interrogate him an hour later. At that time, Hampton acknowledged that he understood his
rights and expressly waived them before talking with the detectives.
¶44 Therefore, although Hampton did
ask to speak with a lawyer, we conclude that detectives honored that request
until Hampton initiated further communication
with the detectives and Hampton
again waived his Miranda rights.
Amendment Right to Remain Silent
¶45 Finally, we address Hampton’s
argument that the detectives violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent when they failed to end the July 20 interview after Hampton purportedly asserted his right to
remain silent at the outset of the interview.
suspect’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent includes two separate
protections: (1) the right, prior to
questioning, to remain silent unless the suspect chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his or her own will, see
384 U.S. at 460; and (2) the right to cut off questioning, Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96, 103 (1975). “Through the
exercise of [a suspect’s] option to terminate questioning he [or she] can
control the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the
duration of the interrogation.” Id. at
103-04. Like the right to
counsel, a suspect is required to unambiguously invoke his or her right to
remain silent. See Ross, 203 Wis. 2d at 70. This means:
A suspect must, by either an oral or written assertion
or non-verbal conduct that is intended by the suspect as an assertion and is
reasonably perceived by the police as such, inform the police that he or she
wishes to remain silent….
Further, given an equivocal or
ambiguous request to remain silent, the police need not ask the suspect
clarifying questions on that request.
Id. at 78 (citations and footnote
¶47 Hampton contends that he asserted his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent when he made the following statement during the first five
minutes of the July 20 interrogation:
He [Detective Peterson] told me to talk to nobody but
him.… I know how this stuff go, OK. I really don’t want to say nothing.… And understand, like I said, he told me to
say nothing.… I know how it go. Good cop, bad cop.… He told me to talk to him.
This statement did not
sufficiently invoke Hampton’s
right to remain silent.
¶48 Reviewing his statement in context, “‘a reasonable [detective]
in the circumstances would understand the statement to be’” a desire to speak
only to Detective Peterson and not a desire to end questioning all
together. Id. (citation omitted). Hampton’s
desire to speak to a specific detective is not an invocation of the right to
remain silent. See State v. Owen, 202 Wis. 2d 620, 641, 551
N.W.2d 50 (Ct. App. 1996) (“The declaration that [the suspect] did not wish to
speak to a specific officer is not the invocation of his right to remain
silent.”). And detectives were not
obligated to ask Hampton
for clarification. See Ross, 203 Wis. 2d
¶49 Consequently, because Hampton
did not invoke his right to remain silent, and because (as we concluded
waived his Miranda rights, we affirm the circuit court.
¶50 In conclusion, because we conclude that Hampton’s Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights were not violated during the July 20 interview, and
because Hampton concedes that he was properly read his Miranda rights and waived
them before confessing to killing Stovall on July 21, we need not address
whether the July 21 interview was sufficiently attenuated from the July 20
interview. All of the statements were
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.