COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED November 2, 2010 A.
John Voelker Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT I |
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Linda Heinrich, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Wisconsin Department of Health Services, Respondent-Respondent. |
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APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for
Before Curley, P.J., Fine and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 CURLEY, P.J. Linda Heinrich appeals an order affirming a decision
of an administrative law judge (ALJ) for the Division of Hearings and Appeals
that denied her request to have
I. Background.
¶2 Heinrich is a
sixty-two-year-old woman who receives benefits through enrollment in the Managed
Care Organization, a Medicaid waiver program designed to provide appropriate
long‑term care services in the community for adults who are elderly and
disabled. She currently receives
benefits such as home care and physical therapy because her conditions—which
include anxiety, arrhythmia, arthritis, carpal tunnel syndrome, chronic pain,
coronary artery disease, diabetes, hyperlipidemia, hypertension, obesity,
spinal cord fusion, osteomyelitis, neuropathy, and Charcot’s joint (in this
case disintegration of the right ankle)—have largely confined her to a
wheelchair and rendered her unable to walk more than ten feet at a time.
¶3 In November 2007
and again in early 2008, Heinrich requested that the Managed Care Organization
purchase a power stair lift and install it in her home. She wanted the lift so that she could more
easily access her basement, which houses her washer and dryer, her circuit
breaker box, hobby materials, and extra food storage, as well as numerous items
from her deceased parents that she would like to sort out. After a nurse and a case manager from the
Managed Care Organization interviewed Heinrich and assessed her home,
Heinrich’s requests were denied based on safety concerns and on the basis that
more cost-effective alternatives were available to meet her needs.
¶4 Heinrich then
filed an appeal with the Division of Hearings and Appeals, and a hearing was
held on July 9, 2008. At the hearing,
the nurse and the case manager who interviewed Heinrich and assessed her home
reiterated their concerns about the extensive mold in Heinrich’s basement,[1] her
ability to safely use a stair lift and make transfers given her physical
conditions, including her foot deformity and propensity to fall, and the
possibilities of flooding, electrocution and being stranded alone in her
basement should an accident occur. They
also explained that the program offered Heinrich several options that they found
to be safer and more cost-effective than a stair lift, including Managed Care
Organization funded Supportive Home Care to assist with her laundry, financial
assistance in moving the washer and dryer to the main level of her home, using
a Laundromat with assistance from a Managed Care Organization provided
volunteer, assistance in moving her hobby materials to unused rooms on her
first floor, and sliding on her buttocks to the basement.[2]
¶5 In response,
Heinrich presented a letter from her treating physician stating that she had no
respiratory or allergic conditions as a result of the mold in the
basement. She testified that she had
water abatement work done in the basement to reduce the mold and had the mold
cleaned. Heinrich also submitted a
letter from her physician stating that her foot condition was not a safety
hazard in the basement, rather it made the stair lift a medical necessity. She further testified that she already
inquired about the possibility of losing electricity and was informed by a
medical equipment provider that most stair lifts have a battery back‑up
in case of power failure. Heinrich also
presented estimates showing that the cost of a stair lift would be less than the
renovations necessary to construct a laundry room on the main floor.
¶6 The ALJ affirmed
the denial of Heinrich’s request. The
ALJ found the “alternative services and supports offered by the Family Care
Program to the Petitioner are effective to meet her needs and less expensive
than the requested power stair lift,” concluding that it would be “patently
unsafe for an extremely ambulation-challenged elderly person weighing 290 lbs.,
… with degenerative foot deformities and multiple serious physical conditions,
to be taking a stair lift down to a basement area where flooding may be
present, and where power may be lost.”
The ALJ was not persuaded by Heinrich’s cost estimates, which were
presented after the program twice denied the lift, and which were estimated by
contractors Heinrich selected for modifications that she personally delineated.
¶7 Heinrich then
appealed to the trial court, arguing that the finding by the ALJ was not
supported by substantial evidence in the record. The trial court affirmed the ALJ’s decision,
and Heinrich now appeals.
II. Analysis.
¶8 Heinrich’s
primary basis for appeal is that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by
substantial evidence. Specifically,
Heinrich takes issue with the ALJ’s factual finding that, “[t]he alternative
services and supports offered by the Family Care Program to the petitioner are
effective to meet her needs and less expensive than the requested power stair
lift.”
¶9 Under Wis. Stat. § 227.57(6) (2007-08),[3] we
uphold any action based on an administrative body’s findings of fact if it is
based on substantial evidence.
¶10 First, substantial
evidence supports the finding that the alternative services offered by the
Managed Care Organization are effective to meet Heinrich’s needs. As described by the nurse and case manager
who explained these alternatives in detail, the proffered alternatives would
allow Heinrich to do her laundry, engage in her hobbies, and would provide her
with reasonable access to her basement for other purposes. This evidence is more than adequate to
support the ALJ’s factual finding.
Indeed, as pointed out in the ALJ’s decision, no evidence was offered—at
the hearing or otherwise—to show that options such as having Managed Care
Organization support staff move Heinrich’s belongings to the main level of her
house and/or having Managed Care Organization staff or volunteers assist
Heinrich with her laundry would not effectively meet Heinrich’s needs. See
Hamilton,
94
¶11 Moreover,
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that installing a stair lift
would be “patently unsafe.” As the ALJ
explained, Heinrich’s numerous health conditions, her age, her weight, and the
fact that her basement was in disrepair and subject to flooding and power
loss—all of which were amply documented in the record—support the conclusion
that a stair lift in Heinrich’s particular circumstances would be
dangerous. Contrary to Heinrich’s
assertions, there is no evidence that her physician—who stated in a
two-sentence letter that a lift was necessary—had knowledge of or considered
several of these factors. Even her own
occupational therapist, on whom Heinrich relies to prove that the stair lift
would be an effective option, stated that a lift is merely an “option to
consider.” Therefore, the ALJ’s
conclusion that the stair lift would be unsafe and the finding that other
alternatives would be not only effective but also safer are both supported by
substantial evidence. See id.
¶12 Second, the ALJ’s
finding that the Managed Care Organization’s proposed alternatives would be
less expensive than installing a power stair lift is supported by substantial
evidence. See id. Heinrich already
receives home care from the program in the form of bi-weekly cleaning, lawn
mowing, and snow removal services. At
least one of the program’s proposed alternatives to the stair lift simply adds
to the care that she already receives.
For example, the Managed Care Organization suggested that home care
staff help with laundry and move hobby items to the main level of Heinrich’s
house. As the nurse and case manager
determined using the “resource allocation decision” method, these alternatives
would be less expensive than installing a stair lift. Additionally, one of the options, having a
volunteer assist with laundry, would have been effectively free of charge. Indeed, we also observe that unlike an
apparently expensive stair lift—which would remain a permanent fixture in
Heinrich’s house—the proposed alternatives would cease should Heinrich no
longer need them.
¶13 As for Heinrich’s estimates comparing the cost of installing
the stair lift with the cost of installing a washer and dryer on her main
floor, we conclude that the ALJ did not reject
them solely on the basis of timeliness, although they were submitted months
after the Managed Care Organization initially denied the lift. Rather, the ALJ found that the estimates
lacked credibility based on the fact that they were estimated by contractors
that Heinrich selected for modifications that she delineated. See Knight, 220
¶14 The ALJ accepted Heinrich’s estimates at the administrative hearing without objection, and at no point during the hearing was their timeliness at issue. Additionally, the estimates at issue comprise the only evidence in the record of what a stair lift would cost. Given that the ALJ expressly found other alternatives to be less expensive than the lift, the ALJ did not ignore Heinrich’s estimates, incredible as they were found to be.[4]
¶15 Moreover, when the estimates were first mentioned in the ALJ’s opinion, it was their substance, not their timeliness, that was directly attacked:
[Heinrich] and her representative presented copies of two estimates … the point being made was that these home modifications, as estimated by contractors [Heinrich] selected for modifications that she delineated were more expensive than the stair lift, so that the stair lift is the least expensive plan.
¶16 Similarly, when these estimates were discussed at a later point in the ALJ’s opinion, it was done primarily in the context of Heinrich’s obstinacy and refusal to accept any of the Managed Care Organization’s proffered alternatives:
[Heinrich] offers that she must agree to the proposed alternative, and she clearly does not.
While it is correct to say that the … [Managed Care Organization] … should assist[] the enrollee to be as self-reliant and autonomous “as possible and desired” by the enrollee, it is also the long-standing position of the Department, as affirmed in many fair hearing decisions, that the Family Care participant does not have ‘unfettered choice’ in deciding what supports Family Care provides that will serve her, what living arrangements will be provided by Family Care, and exactly how the care plan is to be configured.
Likewise, the petitioner does not get to frame the decision with after-acquired estimates of what a new laundry room would cost based upon estimates she procures for modifications she decides are necessary, and then compare them to after-acquired estimates she has likewise obtained… See, Exhibits #5, & # 8.
(Emphasis added to bolded text.)
¶17 Furthermore, even
if Heinrich would have somehow shown that the stair lift was in fact the most
cost-effective option, the ALJ’s finding in its entirety that “alternative
services and supports offered by the Family Care Program to be effective to
meet her needs and less expensive than the requested power stair lift,” is
still supported by substantial evidence because it is weighted so heavily on
safety concerns. See Hamilton, 94
¶18 The final two
bases on which Heinrich presents her appeal are: (1) that the ALJ erred by failing to give
her a de novo hearing as required by Wis. Admin. Code § DHS 10.55; and (2)
that the ALJ’s decision does not comply with the overall philosophy of the Managed
Care Organization program as listed in Wis.
Admin. Code § DHS 10.44(2)(e)2.
These two arguments simply reiterate her primary argument—that the ALJ
ignored Heinrich’s evidence of the cost-effectiveness of the stair lift and
failed to properly weigh her goals and outcomes. For example, to advance her argument that the
ALJ did not properly grant her a de novo
hearing, Heinrich contends that the ALJ wholly ignored the cost estimates she
presented at the hearing. However, as we
noted, the ALJ’s decision makes clear that these estimates were considered, but
disregarded on account of their unreliability.
Similarly, Heinrich’s argument that the ALJ’s decision does not comply
with the Managed Care Organization program’s goals rehashes the alleged
ignoring of her cost estimates, and then discusses how the ALJ did not, in her
opinion, weigh and balance the evidence concerning Heinrich’s “goals and
outcomes.” This court concludes that
contrary to Heinrich’s claim, the ALJ admitted, considered, and weighed all
evidence presented and exercised statutory authority in doing so. See
Wis. Stat. § 227.57(6). The ALJ has discretion as the finder of fact
to determine the weight of evidence offered, and this court evaluates this
discretion with the substantial evidence standard. Knight, 220
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
Not recommended for publication in the official reports.
No. |
2009AP1954(D) |
¶19 Fine, J. (dissenting). The Majority and the Wisconsin Department of Health Services agree that, under the applicable regulations, Linda Heinrich was entitled to a de novo hearing. The Majority asserts that the administrative law judge considered but disregarded as “unreliab[le]” the matters Heinrich says should have been considered at the required de novo hearing. The Department contends that we should not even address whether Heinrich was given the required de novo hearing because she did not argue that before the circuit court. I respectfully dissent.
¶20 The
Record indicates that the administrative law judge limited his consideration to
“facts presented to the Family Care CMO [an acronym for Care Management
Organization] as of the time of the denial of March 4, 2008, as well as the
similar denial dated December 7,
2007,” and, based on those facts,
“conclude[d] that the alternatives provided by the [Care Management
Organization] of installing a washer/dryer upstairs; or having Supportive Home
Care services perform the laundry; or assisting [Heinrich] in utilizing a laundromat
with a voluntary [sic] assistant; were each sufficient alternatives to meet the
activity of daily living needed, doing laundry.” Indeed, the administrative law judge
proclaimed that he ignored the
evidence submitted by Heinrich after the denials by the Care Management
Organization: “[Heinrich] does not get
to frame the decision with after-acquired estimates of what a new laundry room
would cost based upon estimates she procures for modifications she decides are
necessary, and then compare them to after-acquired
estimates she has likewise obtained from stair lift providers.” (Emphasis added.) But that is the whole purpose of a de novo hearing—to require the de
novo tribunal to consider matters that were not presented to the original
tribunal. See Stuligross v. Stuligross, 2009 WI App 25, ¶12, 316 Wis. 2d
344, 351–352, 763 N.W.2d 241, 245 (“The commonly accepted meaning of a de novo hearing is ‘[a] new hearing of a
matter, conducted as if the original hearing had not taken place.’”) (quoted
source omitted).
¶21 Second,
although it is generally true that we will not consider matters not first
presented to the circuit court, see State v. Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131,
144, 569 N.W.2d 577, 584 (1997), that rule is of significantly less force
(and may not be applicable at
all) where, as here, we review that decision of the agency and not that of the
circuit court, see Hilton
ex rel. Pages Homeowners’ Association v. Department of Natural Resources,
2006 WI 84, ¶15, 293 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 717 N.W.2d 166, 172 (“When an appeal is
taken from a circuit court order reviewing an agency decision, we review the
decision of the agency, not the circuit court.”); State ex rel. Treat v. Puckett, 2002
WI App 58, ¶23, n.13, 252 Wis. 2d 404, 421, n.13, 643 N.W.2d 515, 524 n.13
(When reviewing an agency decision, “we are not precluded from addressing a
challenge to the administrative decision … even though the circuit court did
not address it.”) (certiorari review).
¶22 I would reverse the circuit court’s order and remand to the agency for the de novo hearing to which Heinrich is
entitled. Accordingly, I respectfully
dissent.
[1] The mold on Heinrich’s basement walls was so severe that a weatherization service refused to work on her house until it was cleaned.
[2] Like the trial court, we find this final suggestion unreasonable, insulting, and not in keeping with the goals of the Managed Care Organization program.
[3] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.
[4] We disagree with the dissent’s contention that the ALJ “proclaimed that he ignored” Heinrich’s estimates in forming his conclusions. The conclusion at issue does not even mention the cost effectiveness of the lift:
Under the facts presented to the Family Care [Managed Care Organization] as of the time of the denial of March 4, 2008 … I conclude that the alternatives provided by the [Managed Care Organization] … were each sufficient alternatives to meet the activity of daily living need, doing laundry.
Instead, it is clear that the ALJ utilized facts that were submitted prior to Heinrich’s estimates only to conclude that the Managed Care Organization’s proffered alternatives were sufficient to meet Heinrich’s needs. Consequently, the dissent’s interpretation of this particular conclusion is far too broad.