COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED December 14, 2010 A.
John Voelker Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT I |
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State of Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Sean Fitzgerald Rowell, Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for
Before Fine, Kessler and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Sean Fitzgerald Rowell, pro se, appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion. Rowell argues that his 1997 conviction for first-degree intentional homicide should be vacated because the prosecutor filed the information at the conclusion of the preliminary examination, without having first ordered a written transcript of the preliminary examination. We affirm on both procedural and substantive grounds.
¶2 Rowell was charged with first-degree intentional homicide in connection with the 1996 shooting of Christopher Perkins. At the conclusion of the preliminary examination, the trial court bound Rowell over for trial. The prosecutor then immediately filed an information, which Rowell’s lawyer acknowledged receiving. The case was tried to a jury and Rowell was found guilty.
¶3 Rowell was sentenced to life imprisonment, with a parole
eligibility date of April 25, 2022. He
appealed and we affirmed his conviction, rejecting his claim that he was
entitled to a new trial based on the trial court’s failure to remove a juror
for cause and based on newly discovered evidence.
¶4 Ten years later, in February 2010, Rowell filed a pro se postconviction motion in
Milwaukee County Circuit Court. He
alleged that his conviction was unlawful because the trial court lost jurisdiction
when the district attorney filed the information at the conclusion of the
preliminary examination without having first reviewed a transcript of the
preliminary examination. The circuit
court denied Rowell’s motion, without a hearing, on both procedural and
substantive grounds. Specifically, it
concluded that Rowell’s claim was procedurally barred by State v. Escalona-Naranjo,
185
¶5 We agree with the circuit court’s analysis. First, Rowell’s claim is procedurally
barred. A defendant cannot raise an
argument in a subsequent postconviction motion that was not raised in a prior
postconviction motion unless there is a sufficient reason for the failure to
allege or adequately raise the issue in the original motion. Escalona-Naranjo, 185
¶6 We also agree with the circuit court that Rowell’s motion is substantively without merit. The relevant statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.01(1), provides:
The district attorney shall examine all facts and circumstances connected with any preliminary examination touching the commission of any crime if the defendant has been bound over for trial and, subject to s. 970.03(10), shall file an information according to the evidence on such examination subscribing his or her name thereto.[[3]]
There is nothing in this
statute that requires the district attorney to order and review a written
transcript prior to filing an information.
Indeed, Wis. Stat. § 970.05
provides that the preliminary examination “shall
be transcribed if requested” and contemplates that such a request can be
made by the district attorney, the defendant or the judge. See
ibid. The plain language of § 971.01 does
not support Rowell’s motion for postconviction relief. See
Pasko
v. City of Milwaukee, 2002 WI 33, ¶26, 252
¶7 Rowell’s argument that a transcript is required appears to be
based on case law quoting a prior version of Wis.
Stat. § 971.01. In Mark
v. State, 228
The district attorney of the proper county shall inquire into and make full examination of all facts and circumstances connected with any case of preliminary examination as provided by law, touching the commission of any offense whereon the offender shall have been committed to jail, become recognized or held to bail, and file an information setting forth the crime committed, according to the facts ascertained on such examination and from the written testimony taken thereon, whether it be the offense charged in the complaint on which the examination was had or not.
Mark, 228
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.
[1] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.
[2] On
appeal, Rowell argues that his claim should not be procedurally barred for a
variety of reasons. Rowell’s allegation
of a sufficient reason to overcome the procedural bar must be alleged in the
postconviction motion itself, not for the first time on appeal.
[3] The current language of this statute is the same as it was in 1996, when Rowell’s preliminary examination was conducted.