COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED December 21, 2010 A.
John Voelker Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT I |
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State of Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Benjamin Cruz, Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for
Before Curley, P.J., Kessler and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Benjamin Cruz, pro se, appeals the circuit court’s order denying his motion for postconviction relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (2007-08).[1] He contends that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
¶2 On November 21, 2002, Cruz was convicted of two counts
second-degree sexual assault of a child.
His appointed appellate counsel filed a no-merit report. Cruz was informed of his right to respond to
the report so that he could raise any issues he thought had arguable merit, but
he did not respond. We accepted the
no-merit report and affirmed the judgment of conviction on
January 14, 2005. We stated in our
decision that the circuit court “fully complied with the requirements set forth
in Wis. Stat. § 971.08 and State
v. Bangert, 131
¶3 On April 11, 2008, Cruz filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06, arguing that he should be
allowed to withdraw his plea. On April
10, 2009, the circuit court denied the motion, ruling that the motion was
barred by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185
¶4 On July 9, 2009, while his second appeal was still pending, Cruz
filed another pro se motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.06, in which he
argued:
(1) that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea because he did not
understand that he would not be eligible for parole under the new
truth-in-sentencing laws, which abolished parole in favor of extended
supervision; (2) that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea because he did
not understand the nature of the charges against him; (3) that he should be
allowed to withdraw his plea because the circuit court failed to alert him during
the plea colloquy to the fact that his lawyer might discover defenses to the
charges; (4) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
attorney should not have allowed him to waive his preliminary hearing when
there was no physical evidence to support the sexual assault allegations; (5)
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney should
have investigated whether Cruz was in custody during the time the third sexual
assault allegedly occurred; and (6) that the State suppressed exculpatory
evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963). The circuit court denied the
motion on July 22, 2009, once again concluding that it was barred by Escalona-Naranjo
because Cruz did not raise the issues in response to the no-merit
report filed by his counsel during his direct appeal.
¶5 “[A]ny claim that could have been raised on direct appeal or
in a previous Wis. Stat. § 974.06 … postconviction motion is barred from
being raised in a subsequent § 974.06 postconviction motion, absent a
sufficient reason.” State v. Lo, 2003 WI 107,
¶2, 264
¶6 Cruz contends that he has sufficient reason for not raising his arguments in his response to the no-merit report; he has mental health issues, he has difficulty communicating in English and he has a limited education. Beyond baldly asserting that these circumstances should allow him to escape the Escalona-Naranjo bar, Cruz has provided no explanation of how these circumstances prevented him from previously raising his issues. The simple fact that Cruz suffers from mental health problems is not a sufficient reason under Escalona-Naranjo absent an explanation of how the mental health problems prevented Cruz from responding to the no-merit report. Cruz’s contention that his poor knowledge of English and lack of education were sufficient reasons under Escalona-Naranjo is belied by the record. We have reviewed the transcripts and Cruz’s prior filings in this case, including the briefs on appeal, which all show that he is able to meaningfully participate in these proceedings despite a limited education and his status as a non-native English speaker. The record shows that Cruz communicated with his bilingual attorney in both English and Spanish with ease. In sum, we conclude that Cruz has not provided a sufficient reason for failing to previously raise his arguments in the response to the no-merit report, and he is therefore barred from raising them now by Escalona-Naranjo and Allen.
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.