COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED January 25, 2011 A.
John Voelker Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT I |
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State of Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Edward Thomas Nisiewicz, Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for
Before Curley, P.J., Fine and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Edward Thomas Nisiewicz, pro se, appeals from an order denying
his motion to “quash” or “vacate” the DNA surcharge that was imposed when he
was sentenced in 2003.[1] Citing State v. Cherry, 2008 WI App 80, 312
¶2 Nisiewicz pled guilty to five counts of armed robbery. In September 2003, he was sentenced to five concurrent terms of seventeen years of initial confinement and seven years of extended supervision. He was ordered to provide a DNA sample and was assessed a single DNA surcharge. Nisiewicz did not appeal.
¶3 In 2008, this court released Cherry, which discussed
the on-the-record explanation required when a trial court exercises its
discretion to impose a DNA surcharge. See Cherry, 312
DISCUSSION
¶4 At issue is whether Nisiewicz’s motion to quash or vacate the
DNA surcharge was timely. We conclude it
was not, for the same reasons we recently discussed in State v. Nickel, 2010 WI
App 161, ___
¶5 First, we discussed sentence modification:
When a defendant moves to vacate a DNA surcharge, the defendant seeks sentence modification. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.19, a defendant may move for sentence modification within ninety days after sentencing. Nickel filed his motion more than six years after entry of his judgment of conviction on December 11, 2002, well outside the time limits imposed under § 973.19. While a defendant may obtain postconviction review of a sentence within the time limits of a direct appeal, see Wis. Stat. § 974.02 and Wis. Stat. Rule 809.30, Nickel’s deadline for pursuing a direct appeal expired twenty days after his sentencing when he failed to file a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief, see State v. Lagundoye, 2004 WI 4, ¶20 and n.13, 268 Wis. 2d 77, 674 N.W.2d 526. Therefore, Nickel’s judgment of conviction became final when he did not challenge the conviction or the sentence within the deadlines for doing so. See id. (judgment of conviction is final after a direct appeal from that judgment and any right to a direct review of the appellate decision is no longer available). Despite Nickel’s contention to the contrary, Cherry does not give the trial court the authority to revise a sentence after a criminal conviction becomes final.
Nickel, 2010 WI App 161, ¶5 (footnote omitted). The same reasoning applies here. Nisiewicz did not file a direct appeal and his judgment of conviction became final over seven years ago. His motion to quash or vacate his DNA surcharge was an untimely sentence modification motion.
¶6 In Nickel, we also held that Nickel could not challenge the imposition of the DNA surcharge under Wis. Stat. § 974.06. See Nickel, 2010 WI App 161, ¶7. We explained:
While a postconviction motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 is not subject
to the time limits set forth in Wis.
Stat. § 973.19 and Wis.
Stat. Rule 809.30, a § 974.06 motion is limited to constitutional and
jurisdictional challenges. It cannot be
used to challenge a sentence based on an erroneous exercise of discretion “when
a sentence is within the statutory maximum or otherwise within the statutory
power of the court.” Smith
v. State, 85
Nickel, 2010 WI App 161,
¶7. Like Nickel, Nisiewicz has not
raised a constitutional or jurisdictional challenge and, therefore, he cannot
rely on § 974.06 as a basis for seeking to vacate the DNA surcharge.[4] See
Nickel,
2010 WI App 161, ¶7.
¶7 Next, Nickel recognized that trial courts have inherent power to modify a sentence based upon a new factor at any time, but the court concluded that the issuance of the Cherry decision did not constitute a “new factor.” See Nickel, 2010 WI App 161, ¶8. Nickel explained:
A new factor is “a fact or set of facts highly relevant
to the imposition of sentence, but not known to the trial judge at the time of original
sentencing, either because it was not then in existence or because, even though
it was then in existence, it was unknowingly overlooked by all of the parties.” State v. Franklin, 148
Nickel, 2010 WI App 161, ¶8 (indenting omitted). Consistent with Nickel, we reject Nisiewicz’s argument that the Cherry decision is a new factor justifying sentence modification.
¶8 Finally, Nickel concluded that “Cherry’s holding is not a new procedural rule warranting retroactive application.” Nickel, 2010 WI App 161, ¶8. Thus, Cherry cannot be retroactively applied in this case.
¶9 For these reasons, Nisiewicz’s motion to quash or vacate the DNA surcharge was properly denied as untimely. We affirm the order.
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.
[1] Nisiewicz’s motion was entitled “MOTION TO QUASH DNA SURCHARGE,” but he used the terms quash and vacate interchangeably in his motion and in his appellate brief.
[2] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.
[3] Nisiewicz’s notice of appeal does not reference the trial court’s October 2009 order denying his motion to vacate the DNA surcharge.
[4] While Nisiewicz’s brief is difficult to comprehend, we are satisfied that he has not raised a constitutional or jurisdictional challenge.