COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED January 27, 2011 A.
John Voelker Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT I |
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State of
Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jessica R. Cody,
Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for
Before Vergeront, P.J.,
¶1 PER CURIAM. Jessica Cody appeals from a judgment of conviction for two counts of second-degree recklessly endangering safety while armed. Wis. Stat. §§ 941.30(2) and 939.63 (2007-08).[1] Cody argues on appeal that the circuit court erred when it allowed the State to use video-taped deposition testimony at trial, and when it denied her request for a lesser-included offense jury instruction. Because we conclude that the circuit court properly allowed the taped testimony and correctly denied the requested instruction, we affirm.
¶2 Cody was charged with two counts of first-degree recklessly endangering safety while armed for having used a pocket-knife to injure two women in a bar fight. The jury found her guilty of the lesser-included offense of second-degree recklessly endangering safety while armed. The court imposed and stayed a sentence of four years of initial confinement and four years of extended supervision, and placed her on three years of probation with one year in the House of Correction as a condition of probation.
¶3 Cody’s first argument on appeal is that the circuit court erred when it allowed the State to use the video-taped testimony of one of the victims, Janel Higgs. Cody argues that the State did not make efforts to secure Higgs’ presence at trial, and therefore Higgs was not “unavailable” within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 967.04. Cody also argues that the circuit court did not make a “specific finding of unavailability” or a specific finding that the State made any effort to secure Higgs’ presence at trial.
¶4 Prior to trial, the State moved the circuit court to be allowed to use Higgs’ videotaped testimony. In the motion, the State represented that Higgs was going to be studying abroad, was leaving in early January, and would not return until the summer. The trial was scheduled for January 21. The court granted the motion on the grounds that the request was to accommodate both the defendant’s interest in a speedy trial and the State’s interest in having the witness’s testimony presented at trial.
¶5 We review the decision of the circuit court to allow the use
of videotaped testimony for an erroneous exercise of discretion.
¶6 We conclude that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion when it allowed the State to use the video-taped testimony. Cody does not dispute that Higgs was, in fact, unavailable on the date of trial. Unlike in Temby, however, Higgs’ absence was not temporary but was quite lengthy. Cody argues that the court should have postponed the trial until Higgs’ return during the summer. Cody, however, had invoked her right to a speedy trial. The circuit court allowed the use of video-taped testimony in order to accommodate both Cody’s interest in having a speedy trial and the State’s interest in presenting the testimony of one of the victims.
¶7 Cody also argues, without citation to any authority, that the
use of video-taped testimony violated her constitutional right to confront a
witness. We will not consider an
argument that is not supported by legal authority. See
Post
v. Schwall, 157
¶8 Cody next argues that the circuit court erred when it refused
to give the jury an instruction on the offense of endangering safety by use of
a dangerous weapon as a lesser-included offense of second-degree recklessly
endangering safety while armed. The
decision whether to give a lesser-included offense instruction is a question of
law that we review de novo. State v. Fitzgerald, 2000 WI App 55,
¶7, 233
¶9 Assuming without deciding that the offense of endangering
safety by use of a dangerous weapon is a lesser-included offense of second-degree
recklessly endangering safety while armed, we conclude that the circuit court
properly denied the request for the instruction based on the evidence. An element of the crime of endangering safety
by use of a dangerous weapon is that the defendant used a dangerous weapon in a
criminally negligent manner.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.
[1] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.
[2] We note, however, that in State v. Thomas, 144 Wis. 2d 876, 890, 425 N.W.2d 641 (1998), the supreme court stated that the videotaped testimony of a child witness under § 967.04(7)-(10) was “the functional equivalent of live testimony and ensures the fundamental protections of the confrontation clause, namely the right of cross-examination, the observation of witness demeanor and the requirement of testimony under oath.”