COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED March 9, 2011 A.
John Voelker Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for
Before Brown, C.J., Neubauer, P.J., and
¶1 BROWN, C.J William
and Elaine Honeyager and WED Development, LLC, sued the City of
¶2 The Honeyagers and the City entered into a development
agreement on November 2, 2005. As part
of the contract, the Honeyagers agreed to construct a sanitary sewage system
for their eight lots that would also benefit seven[3]
already developed lots across the street.
In consideration for this agreement, the City promised to specially
assess and charge the owners of the properties across the street for part of
the cost of the improvements, the proceeds of which would go to the Honeyagers.
¶3 The Honeyagers assert that when they signed the development
agreement with the City, their understanding was that the City would attempt to
collect 7/15 of the total cost of the improvements, or approximately $38,000,
from the seven properties across the street from them. According to an affidavit signed by William
Honeyager, that understanding was based in part on a neighborhood meeting
before the contract was signed where the city engineer announced that the
properties across the street would be “collectively assessed half of the cost
of the sewer main and individually assessed for the full cost of the sewer
laterals connecting their respective properties to the sewer main.” But, subsequently, the City chose a different method of assessment than what was
recommended by the city engineer, which resulted in other property owners being
charged approximately $19,000.
¶4 Once the total compensation amount was known to them, the
Honeyagers filed a civil lawsuit against the City for breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing in contract. The City moved for summary judgment, but the
trial court denied that motion, stating that there were genuine issues of
material fact.
¶5 Between
the City’s summary judgment motion and trial, the Honeyagers filed a trial
brief with some proposed jury instructions.
In it, they pointed out that the City “chose a rare and hardly ever used
method of assessment whereby the Honeyagers’ lots were charged almost three
times per lot as much … as each of the pre-existing homes.” They argued that, by law, the City was
supposed to assess the properties reasonably and in a way that would achieve
uniformity between similarly situated properties. Then, their proposed jury instructions asked
the jury to find a breach if they found that the special assessment was not
fairly apportioned between the properties.
¶6 That
is when the City moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming
that the Honeyagers’ proposed trial arguments were actually a challenge to the
special assessments that could have and should have been brought under Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12). The City pointed out that under Bialk
v. City of
¶7 Whether
the court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case is a question of law,
which we review de novo. Van
Deurzen v. Yamaha Motor Corp. USA, 2004 WI App 194, ¶ 9, 276 Wis. 2d 815, 688 N.W.2d 777.
We analyze this case on
the assumption that, at least initially, the Honeyagers adequately laid out a
breach of duty of good faith claim against the City. The City based its contractual obligations on
the assessments of the neighbor’s property; in doing so, it consented to
bringing the assessment analysis into the contract. Therefore, although the parties frame it
somewhat differently, we deem the issue to be whether the Honeyagers, through
their proposed trial arguments, effectively amended their valid breach of duty
of good faith claim by turning it into a Wis.
Stat. § 66.0703(12) special assessment appeal.
¶8 As
we observed in Autumn Grove Joint Venture v. Rachlin, 138
¶9 Nor can it be
said that the Honeyagers impliedly amended their pleadings by virtue of their
pretrial brief and proposed instructions.
The Honeyagers’ complaint
alleged that the City breached the duty of good faith by unilaterally choosing
a manner of assessment that violated their understanding that the City would
obtain 7/15 of the development costs from the neighbors. As we read the Honeyagers’ pretrial brief,
they sought only to illustrate how they were harmed by the City’s bad
faith. They divided the development into
fifteen parcels, eight of which they owned.
They then argued that they were effectively being over assessed for
their eight parcels and the neighbors were being under-assessed for their seven
parcels. This illustration in no way
amounts to an implied changing of the Honeyagers’ pleadings. Rather, it purported to allegorize its breach
of contract claim in this way. In other
words, it was the Honeyagers’ way of “drawing a picture.” So, while it is true that their allegory
sounded a lot like the arguments that property owners make when objecting to
their assessments, the fact of the matter is that the Honeyagers’ intent was
merely to illuminate the harm done to them.
¶10 It
is irrelevant whether the Honeyagers could
have pursued a Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)
action. See Daughtry v. MPC Systems,
Inc., 2004 WI App 70, ¶37, 272
Wis. 2d 260, 679 N.W.2d 808 (explaining why a party could litigate an issue as
factual backdrop for a claim even though it would not have had standing to
litigate the issue on its own). Evidence
of the City’s allegedly unusual assessment method in this case affects the
strength of the Honeyagers’ breach of contract claim.
¶11 In
Autumn
Grove, the trial court persuaded the defendant to change his
counterclaim from tort to contract on the morning of trial. Autumn
Grove, 138
By the Court.—Order reversed and cause remanded for proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
Not recommended for publication in the official reports.
[1] The plaintiffs will be referred to collectively as “the Honeyagers” throughout this opinion.
[2] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-10 version unless otherwise noted.
[3] The Honeyagers’ complaint and brief state that there were seven benefitted properties on the other side of the street. Much of the paperwork in the record seems to reflect that there were six properties that were specially assessed. The precise number is irrelevant to our analysis.