COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED April 6, 2011 A.
John Voelker Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT II |
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State of
Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Steve L. Trattner,
Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for
Before
Brown, C.J., Neubauer, P.J.,
and
¶1 PER CURIAM. Steve Trattner appeals from an order denying his Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (2009-10),[1] motion to withdraw his no contest plea to first-degree reckless homicide. He contends that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered because he was not aware, as illustrated in State v. Miller, 2009 WI App 111, 320 Wis. 2d 724, 772 N.W.2d 188, review denied, 2010 WI 5, 322 Wis. 2d 123, 779 N.W.2d 176 (No. 2007AP1052-CR), that imperfect self-defense can negate the “utter disregard for human life” element of first-degree recklessness. The trial court concluded that Miller did not make new law and, therefore, Trattner’s § 976.06 motion was procedurally barred because he failed to establish a sufficient reason for not challenging his plea in his first appeal. We agree and affirm.
¶2 In 2006, Trattner killed his wife in a physical confrontation during which he strangled her. Trattner reported that he believed his wife, who had become increasingly agitated and aggressive toward him in the weeks leading to the confrontation and his wife’s request for a divorce, was grabbing for a knife to harm him. He entered a no contest plea to first-degree reckless homicide. During the plea colloquy, Trattner’s trial counsel acknowledged that the defense had “explored a number of possible factual and legal defenses to the charge, including self-defense, including adequate provocation under [Wis. Stat. §] 939.44,” that the defense had the assistance of two forensic psychiatrists who evaluated Trattner, and that ultimately the defense concluded that Trattner did not have a viable defense to the charge at trial.
¶3 Trattner filed a postconviction motion under Wis. Stat. Rule 809.30, only
challenging his forty-five-year sentence.
He sought to establish by expert testimony that he was suffering from a
mental disorder that caused him to irrationally believe he was being threatened
by his wife and had to kill her in self-defense. The denial of his postconviction motion and
his conviction were affirmed on appeal. State
v. Trattner, No. 2007AP1124-CR, unpublished slip op. (
¶4 In 2009, Miller was decided. A jury convicted Miller of first-degree
reckless injury while armed with a dangerous weapon. Miller, 320
While the jury rejected Miller’s claim of self-defense
and defense of others under Wis. Stat. § 939.48,
the prosecutor acknowledged in his closing argument that Miller “was acting in
self-defense, but he wasn’t acting in lawful self-defense.” It would appear undisputed that a reason, if
not the reason, for Miller’s conduct
was to protect himself and his friends.
This reason is inconsistent with conduct evincing utter disregard. See
Seidler
v. State, 64
Miller, 320
¶5 On appeal, Trattner argues that Miller recognized for the first time that one’s belief in the need for self-defense, even if not sufficient to establish the privilege to act in self-defense under Wis. Stat. § 939.48, could negate the utter disregard for human life element of first-degree reckless homicide. Essentially he claims that Miller created a defense he did not know was available to him at the time of his plea and consequently he did not fully understand the charge against him, rendering his plea constitutionally invalid. He further asserts that his failure to understand that a viable defense existed directly impacted his decision to plead to the charge.
¶6 Whether the procedural bar encompassed in Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4), as
explained in State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185
¶7 Miller
was a sufficiency of the evidence case.
It did not create any new defense.
Rather, it applied existing law to a unique and novel set of facts. The Miller court first looked to State
v. Bernal, 111 Wis. 2d 280, 330 N.W.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1983), which stated
that pointing a loaded gun at another is not conduct evincing an utter disregard
if it is “otherwise defensible” even if it is not privileged. Miller, 320
¶8 Additionally, Miller has no application to
Trattner as the cases are factually distinct.
Miller involved undisputed facts of Miller’s conduct which
evinced some regard for human life in that Miller did not engage the victim
physically for the first several hours, even after the victim struck Miller,
Miller intended only to shoot the victim in the leg, he called 911 after the
shot was fired, and he inquired as to the victim’s well-being. Miller, 320
¶9 Trattner cannot rely on Miller as providing a sufficient reason for his failure to challenge his plea in his direct appeal. We conclude that Trattner’s Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion was procedurally barred.
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.