COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED April 27, 2011 A.
John Voelker Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT II |
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2671 LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Plymouth Glass Co., LLC,
Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for
¶1 REILLY, J.[1] Plymouth Glass Co., LLC appeals from a small claims judgment. The circuit court entered a replevin judgment in favor of 2671 LLC after it found that Plymouth Glass failed to return a set of glass panels to 2671 LLC. When the glass panels could not be returned, the court granted 2671 LLC a monetary judgment. Plymouth Glass argues that the judgment should be vacated for three reasons: (1) Plymouth Glass and 2671 LLC were not in privity; (2) the replevin judgment was not supported by a bailment theory; and (3) 2671 LLC’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS
¶2 In January 2002, David and Kelly Kastelic purchased a
property located at
¶3 2671 LLC alleges that after it purchased the property, David Kastelic told 2671 LLC that he turned over the glass panels to Plymouth Glass for repair. Additionally, 2671 LLC states that it was told by Kastelic to contact Plymouth Glass to get the panels back. 2671 LLC claims that it contacted Plymouth Glass “at least six or seven times personally” over the course of three years and asked about the status of the glass panels. After Plymouth Glass failed to turn over the glass panels, 2671 LLC wrote two letters to Plymouth Glass in 2007, the second letter stating that 2671 LLC would take legal action if Plymouth Glass did not return the panels. When 2671 LLC did not receive the glass panels, it filed a replevin action against Plymouth Glass in September 2009.
¶4 Plymouth Glass tells a different story. It concedes that in the spring of 2002
Kastelic contacted Plymouth Glass about renovating and repairing some of the
glass panels, and that Plymouth Glass picked up the panels and provided
Kastelic with a repair estimate.
Plymouth Glass, however, states that after Kastelic decided the repair
estimate was too expensive, Plymouth Glass returned the glass panels to
Kastelic in the fall or winter of 2002.
¶5 Kastelic did not testify at the trial. Instead, a written statement by Kastelic was read into the record:
In approximately early spring of 2003, I asked the
Plymouth Glass Co. to help me load up the sheet of glass. I ha[d] no idea what condition the glass was
in, as it was sandwiched between two pieces of plywood. My idea was to get it out of my way so it
would not be damaged and to have it repaired, at some point, for future use.
After this statement was read, the circuit court asked an employee of Plymouth Glass what happened to the glass. The employee replied, “[t]hat’s the stuff I’m telling you went into our rack and we stored it for [Kastelic]…. After about two years of laying in the rack … we dumped it…. In other words, that whole thing got junked.”
¶6 The circuit court granted a judgment of replevin in favor of
2671 LLC for the glass panels. When the
glass panels could not be located, 2671 LLC asked for a damages hearing.[2] Three days before the scheduled damages
hearing, Plymouth Glass filed a supplemental answer and alleged that it was not
in privity with 2671 LLC and that 2671 LLC’s claim was barred by the six-year
statute of limitations imposed by Wis.
Stat. §§ 893.43 and 893.51(1). A
court commissioner dismissed 2671 LLC’s action after she found that 2671 LLC did
not have a contractual relationship with Plymouth Glass. 2671 LLC subsequently demanded a trial before
a circuit court judge. The circuit court
ruled that 2671 LLC’s claim was not time-barred by §§ 893.43 and 893.51(1), and
awarded a $1,620 judgment plus costs against Plymouth Glass.
¶7 Plymouth Glass appeals and argues that the circuit court’s decision was erroneous for three reasons: (1) there was no privity between Plymouth Glass and 2671 LLC; (2) the replevin judgment was not supported by a bailment theory; and (3) 2671 LLC’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm the circuit court’s replevin judgment and damages award.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8 We will not set aside the circuit court’s factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2). It is for the circuit court, and not this
court, to resolve conflicts in testimony and to determine the credibility of
witnesses. Global Steel Prods. Corp. v.
Ecklund, 2002 WI App 91, ¶10, 253
¶9 Whether two parties are in privity is a question of law that
we review de novo. Paige K.B. ex rel. Peterson v.
Steven G.B., 226
DISCUSSION
¶10 A bailment is created by the delivery of personal property from
one person to another to be held temporarily for the benefit of the bailee (the
person receiving the property), the bailor (the person giving the property), or
both.
¶11 We hold that a gratuitous bailment relationship existed between 2671 LLC and Plymouth Glass. The circuit court found that the Kastelics gave the glass panels to Plymouth Glass and that Plymouth Glass had the responsibility of either taking care of the panels or disposing of them according to statutory guidelines. We defer to the circuit court’s factual findings. See Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2).
¶12 Furthermore, we hold that 2671 LLC and Plymouth Glass are in
privity. While we cannot verify that the
glass panels were part of 2671 LLC’s purchase of the East Mill Street property
(as the offer to purchase is not included in the record), the circuit court
found that 2671 LLC was entitled to a replevin judgment for the panels,
presumably because the glass panels were included in 2671 LLC’s purchase of the
property. Plymouth Glass argues that it
returned the glass panels to the
¶13 Finally, we conclude that 2671 LLC’s claim is not barred by a
statute of limitations.
CONCLUSION
¶14 We affirm the circuit court’s replevin judgment in favor of 2671 LLC.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not
be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule
809.23(1)(b)4.
[1] This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(a) (2009-10). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-10 version unless otherwise noted.
[2]
[3] At
the replevin hearing, the circuit court noted that the bailment issue was not
before the court. 2671 LLC did, however,
raise the issue of bailment in its brief opposing Plymouth Glass’s motion for
summary judgment (although this was after
the replevin judgment). Both parties
have also briefed the issue on appeal.
Additionally, we determine that the bailment issue is inseparable from
the replevin issue. We will therefore
address whether 2671 LLC and Plymouth Glass had a bailment relationship. See Harvest Sav. Bank v. ROI Invs., 209