COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
May 17, 2011
A. John Voelker
Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals
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NOTICE
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This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official
Reports.
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62.
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Appeal No.
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STATE OF WISCONSIN
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IN COURT OF
APPEALS
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DISTRICT I
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State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Deville J. Anderson,
Defendant-Appellant.
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APPEAL
from judgments of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: M. Joseph
Donald and REBECCA F. DALLET, Judges.
Affirmed.
Before Curley, P.J., Fine and Kessler, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Deville J. Anderson, pro se, appeals judgments of conviction,
entered upon his guilty plea, on one count of first-degree reckless homicide by
use of a dangerous weapon as a party to a crime. Anderson
contends that the circuit court erred when it refused to suppress a custodial
statement he gave to police. Anderson also argues the
court’s erroneous denial of his motion resulted in the sentencing court relying
on inaccurate information. We reject Anderson’s arguments and
affirm the judgments.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Freddie Smith gave a statement to police implicating himself
and Anderson in the June 26, 2006 shooting death of Robert Taylor. Anderson
turned himself into police on June 30, 2006, after his mother told him that
police had been looking for him. While
in custody, Anderson confessed his role in Taylor’s death to
Detectives Paul Formolo and James Hensley.
¶3 Anderson
was originally charged with one count of first-degree intentional homicide,
while armed, as party to a crime. He
moved to suppress the custodial statement.
The motion alleged that he had not been adequately advised of his constitutional
rights, he did not understand those rights, officers misled him during
questioning, and the post-interview statement was not accurate as prepared.
¶4 When Anderson testified at the motion hearing, he said that
he asked for an attorney but was denied, that the detectives made him stand for
an extended period of time in a room with no chairs, and that one of his
interviewers hit him in the head repeatedly with a phone book. Detective Formolo and a detective who
interviewed Anderson on a subsequent day both
testified at the hearing, with significantly divergent accounts from Anderson.
¶5 The circuit court, noting that it “seriously question[ed] the
credibility of Mr. Anderson,” denied the motion. Anderson
then pled guilty, but sought to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing. After a hearing, the State indicated it did
not oppose the motion, and the court granted the plea withdrawal.
¶6 Anderson
subsequently agreed to plead guilty to one count of first-degree reckless
homicide, while armed, as party to a crime.
He was sentenced to thirty years’ initial confinement and twenty years’ extended
supervision. He filed a postconviction motion to modify
his sentence. The court reduced his initial
confinement time by one year. Anderson
appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. The suppression
motion.
A. The
right to remain silent.
¶7 Anderson
first argues that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to suppress
because he invoked his right to remain silent, but police did not scrupulously
honor that right by terminating the interview.
¶8 Detectives began interviewing Anderson at about 2:30 a.m. For the first several hours, Anderson
denied any involvement in Taylor’s
death. Midway through the interview, Anderson claimed to have
an alibi witness. Formolo and Hensley
brought the witness in for questioning and interviewed him themselves. The witness could not confirm Anderson’s alibi, and instead said that Anderson had asked him to provide an alibi if
questioned by police.
¶9 The detectives returned to Anderson to discuss the witness’s lack of corroboration. About an hour after the detectives returned
to the interview, Anderson
stopped his denials. When the detectives
asked Anderson whether he wanted to continue the
interview or stop, Anderson
replied he “just want[ed] to get it over with.”
Anderson ultimately admitted his role in Taylor’s death. He now contends that his statement that he
“just want[ed] to get it over with” was an invocation of his right to remain
silent.
¶10 An accused who wants to invoke the right to remain silent must
do so unambiguously. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S.Ct.
2250, 2260 (2010); see also State
v. Ross, 203 Wis. 2d
66, 75-76, 552 N.W.2d 428 (Ct. App. 1996).
A suspect “must articulate his or her desire to remain silent or cut off
questioning sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances
would understand the statement to be an invocation of the right to remain
silent.” State v. Markwardt, 2007
WI App 242, ¶28, 306 Wis. 2d
420, 742 N.W.2d 546 (internal quotation marks and quoted sources omitted). Whether the right to remain silent has been sufficiently
invoked is a question of constitutional fact reviewed under a two-part
standard. Id., ¶30.
¶11 Anderson
contends that “the courts should understand that there was a direct question. …
The police ask[ed] Anderson specifically, whether or not he
wanted the interview to be over. Anderson responded by
saying ‘I just want to get it over with.’” Anderson
asserts this question and answer could only be viewed to mean “I just want to
get the interview over with” and that his response is “an unambiguous request.”
¶12 There is no question that Anderson
wanted to end the interview. However, the
ambiguity is in how he wished to end it.
Anderson
is implicitly arguing that he wanted the detectives to end their
questioning. However, a reasonable
police officer, who has just informed a long-denying suspect that his alibi has
been rejected by the alleged witness, could interpret the statement to mean
that the suspect has realized continued denial will be futile and wishes to
“get the interview over with” by providing a statement. “[T]here is no invocation of the right to
remain silent if any reasonable
competing inference can be drawn.” Id.,
¶36. Officers are not required to stop questioning
if there is ambiguity in an attempted invocation of the right to remain
silent. See Ross, 203 Wis. 2d at 78. Thus, the statement to Formolo was not obtained
in violation of Anderson’s
right to remain silent, so no basis for suppression exists on this ground.
B. Involuntariness
and Police Coercion.
¶13 Next, Anderson
claims that his confession was involuntary because detectives “applied improper
police tactics” by interviewing him for twelve hours, that the police coerced
him to sign the statement while he was falling asleep, and that the circuit
court ignored the law.
Coercive police conduct is a necessary prerequisite
to a finding of involuntariness. State
v. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, ¶37, 261 Wis. 2d
294, 661 N.W.2d 407. In addition, Anderson complains that
“the trial court ignored the law and misstated the facts when making a
decision. Apparenntly [sic] the trial
court thought that if a person is nodding off or visually tired he can still
make a rational decision.”
¶14 First, there is no bright-line rule that establishes interviews
of a certain length as inherently coercive. See
Markwardt,
306 Wis. 2d
420, ¶45. Second, Anderson fails to specify how detectives coerced him to sign the
statement at the end of the interview.
He merely indicates that he was tired, but Formolo agreed that all parties were tired by
the end of the interview and that Anderson
was yawning. However, Formolo also testified
that Anderson
was able to follow along as the detective read the statement, signing and
making corrections throughout. Third, Anderson does not identify
the misstatements of law or fact he believes the court committed or elaborate
on his complaint. Accordingly, Anderson’s conclusory
claim of involuntariness fails on its own and, in any event, we discern no involuntariness
from this record. No basis for
suppression of the custodial statement exists on this ground, either.
II. Inaccurate
sentencing information.
¶15 Finally, Anderson
also claims that the court relied on inaccurate sentencing information because
it believed he lied at the suppression hearing.
Anderson
believes that once we reverse the suppression ruling, we will vindicate his testimony,
thereby proving the sentencing court relied on inaccurate information at sentencing. Because we affirm the denial of the
suppression motion, Anderson’s
argument necessarily fails.
¶16 However, we note that the circuit court’s statement at the suppression
hearing, that it “seriously question[ed] the credibility of
Mr. Anderson,” is a factor that the sentencing court was entitled to consider because
it is a facet of Anderson’s character.
In addition, Anderson himself told the sentencing court during allocution
that “as far as that [suppression] hearing, hey, it was – It was a lot of
foolish stuff that I said. I don’t want
to make no more excuses, but that wasn’t me.
It wasn’t me. And I’m sorry for
that too. I wasted a lot of time.” Accordingly, we conclude the sentencing court
did not rely on inaccurate information.
By the Court.—Judgments affirmed.
This
opinion shall not be published. See Wis.
Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.