COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED February 7, 2012 A. John Voelker Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
Cir. Ct. No. 2007CF1033 |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT I |
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State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Andrey Aponte, Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: jean a. dImotto, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Curley, P.J., Kessler and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Andrey Aponte appeals from an order denying his motion to modify the
text of a judgment of conviction that he claims does not conform to the order
for restitution pronounced by the circuit court. He alternatively seeks relief from the
restitution obligation on the ground that the circuit court ordered restitution
without first determining his ability to pay it. Because the modification motion is groundless
and the motion for relief from the restitution obligation is raised for the
first time on appeal, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Aponte
pled guilty to the felony offense of first-degree reckless homicide while
armed. He also pled guilty to two
misdemeanors, namely, criminal trespass to a dwelling while armed, and pointing
a firearm at a person. At the outset of
the sentencing hearing, Aponte advised the circuit court through his counsel
that he would stipulate to restitution of $11,260.26, the amount sought by the
State. The circuit court questioned
Aponte, who personally confirmed his stipulation, and the circuit court then
stated that it would “set that [amount] as restitution.” Next, the circuit court heard statements from
the attorneys, from Aponte’s family members, and from the victim’s
relatives. Aponte then exercised his right
to allocution, during which he entreated the court and the victim’s family to
tell him about “anything [he] can do to help with anything.... Anything.”
¶3 After
these remarks, Aponte’s counsel again reminded the circuit court that Aponte
“stipulate[s] to the amount of restitution.”
The circuit court acknowledged the stipulation, stating that “because
this is a prison case, the court will order that [restitution] to be paid up to
25 percent of his prison earnings.” The
court next discussed various sentencing factors and then imposed an aggregate
term of thirty-five years and nine months of imprisonment, bifurcated as
twenty-six years and nine months of initial confinement and nine years of
extended supervision.
¶4 Near
the end of the sentencing hearing, the State asked the circuit court whether
Aponte had an obligation to pay restitution after completing his initial
confinement. The State prefaced its
inquiry by stating: “[a]nd restitution,
the court orders twenty-five percent prison wages to apply as to count one.” The State then asked: “[a]nd the remainder if not paid would be on
extended supervision and if not paid when that’s over with [will] revert to a
civil judgment?” The circuit court
answered, “yes.”
¶5 The
judgment of conviction provides for restitution of $11,260.26, and states that
the money shall be “collected by the DOC from 25% of funds under Wis. Stat. § 973.05(4)(b). Any balance due and owing to revert to civil
judgment if not fully paid during the period of extended supervision.”
¶6 Aponte,
pro se, moved the circuit court for
relief, alleging that the judgment of conviction contains an error.[1] He asserted that “the State established with
the [circuit] court the manner in which defendant was to pay restitution.” Relying on the prosecutor’s description of his
restitution obligation, Aponte argued that the judgment of conviction should be
amended to require payment only from his “prison wages and not from his
incoming monies received from family and friends.” The circuit court rejected the claim,
concluding that a correction was not needed.
¶7 Aponte
appeals, raising two issues. He first
contends that only his prison wages should be subject to the restitution order
and that his other sources of income, such as gifts and sales of hobby items,
should be shielded. He further contends
that the circuit court erred by ordering restitution at sentencing without
determining his ability to pay.
DISCUSSION
¶8 Whether
the sentence portion of a written judgment of conviction should be corrected
presents a question of law. State
v. Prihoda, 2000 WI 123, ¶8, 239 Wis. 2d 244, 618 N.W.2d 857. We review questions of law de novo. State v. Ploeckelman, 2007 WI App 31,
¶8, 299 Wis. 2d 251, 729 N.W.2d 784.
¶9 “[A]
court may ... order a defendant to pay restitution out of all funds held or
available to a defendant, including gifted funds.” State v. Greene, 2008 WI App 100,
¶12, 313 Wis. 2d 211, 756 N.W.2d 411.
Aponte thus does not suggest that the circuit court lacked the authority
to impose an order requiring him to pay restitution from the entirety of his
financial resources. Rather, Aponte
argues that the circuit court ordered him to pay restitution exclusively by
deductions from his “prison wages” and that the judgment of conviction
permitting deductions from his “funds” must be amended to conform to the
circuit court’s pronouncement. We
disagree.
¶10 Aponte’s
position relies on an argument that the phrase “prison wages” means only money
for prison employment. In support of his
position, he offers a dictionary definition of the word “wage.” Because the circuit court did not use the
phrase “prison wages” when imposing restitution, Aponte’s reliance on this
argument is misplaced.
¶11 The
circuit court ordered Aponte to pay restitution from twenty-five percent of his
“prison earnings.” The State, not the
circuit court, used the phrase “prison wages.”
The State’s imprecise reiteration of the circuit court’s words, offered
merely to preface an inquiry, did not establish the terms of the circuit
court’s restitution order.
¶12 Aponte
offers no argument that the phrase “prison earnings” encompasses less than all
of the funds received by a person in prison. We decline to construct an argument for
him. See
State
v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 647, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (we
cannot act as both advocate and judge).
¶13 Moreover,
a circuit court may enter an amended order clarifying the mechanics of
satisfying a restitution obligation if the amended order does not affect the
total amount of restitution originally imposed.
See Greene, 313 Wis. 2d
211, ¶¶18-20. In Greene, a victim’s
parents wrote to the sentencing court complaining that they were not receiving
restitution payments from the incarcerated defendant. Id., ¶3. The circuit court responded by entering an
amended order requiring immediate payments from the defendant’s “‘wages,
earnings and accounts’ at a rate of twenty-five percent,” and the defendant
objected. Id., ¶4. The circuit court reduced the disbursement
percentage to ten percent but otherwise denied relief. Id.
We affirmed.
¶14 In resolving Greene, we concluded that
an order arguably requiring payment of restitution only during extended
supervision could later be amended to state that the defendant must pay
restitution from his or her prison accounts while incarcerated. See
id.,
¶¶18-20. We explained that the
amended order in Greene merely “clarified when [the defendant] would be required
to start paying the restitution established in the original order” and “d[id]
not increase [the defendant’s] sentence by any measure.” See
id.,
¶¶19, 20. We held that such an amendment
neither modifies the sentence nor effects an unconstitutional
resentencing. Id., ¶20.
¶15 Here, the judgment of conviction similarly
clarifies the mechanics of how Aponte must pay restitution. When Aponte moved to amend that judgment, the
circuit court reviewed the matter and determined that no amendment was
required. In light of Greene,
nothing in Aponte’s submissions persuades us that a judgment of conviction
entered after an oral pronouncement may not include clarifying language such as
the circuit court approved here.
¶16 Aponte mounts a second argument in this
court. He asserts that the circuit court
erred because it “failed to take Aponte’s ability to pay into account when it
ordered restitution.” Aponte did not
raise this issue in his postconviction motion.
He cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. See Shadley v. Lloyds of London, 2009
WI App 165, ¶25, 322 Wis. 2d 189, 776 N.W.2d 838.
By
the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5. (2009-10).
[1] Aponte litigated a postconviction motion for plea withdrawal with the assistance of counsel before initiating the pro se motion underlying this appeal. The State concedes that the earlier litigation does not bar Aponte’s claims. Cf. State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994) (discussing limits on serial postconviction litigation). We accept the concession.