PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.: 94-2659-CR
†Petition to
Review Denied
Complete Title
of Case:
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
EUGENE
HEITKEMPER, SR.,
Defendant-Appellant.†
Submitted on Briefs: June 1, 1995
COURT COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
Opinion Released: August 2, 1995
Opinion Filed: August
2, 1995
Source of APPEAL Appeal from a judgment
Full Name JUDGE COURT: Circuit
Lower Court. COUNTY: Walworth
(If
"Special", JUDGE: JAMES L. CARLSON
so indicate)
Appeal from an order
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Walworth
JUDGE: MICHAEL
S. GIBBS
JUDGES: Anderson, P.J., Brown and Snyder, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented:
Appellant
ATTORNEYSOn behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was
submitted on the briefs of William J. Chandek of William J. Chandek
& Associates of Brookfield.
Respondent
ATTORNEYSOn behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was
submitted on the brief of James E. Doyle, attorney general, and Sharon
Ruhly, assistant attorney general.
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED August
2, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-2659-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
EUGENE
HEITKEMPER, SR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Walworth County: JAMES L. CARLSON, JUDGE. Affirmed.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Walworth County: MICHAEL S. GIBBS, Judge. Affirmed.
Before
Anderson, P.J., Brown and Snyder, JJ.
SNYDER,
J. Eugene
Heitkemper, Sr. appeals from a judgment of conviction for child abuse and an
order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Heitkemper challenges the jury's verdict on two grounds: (1) the verdict should be impeached because
of prejudicial statements made by a juror during jury deliberations, and (2) he
was denied the right to a unanimous verdict.
We are unpersuaded by Heitkemper's arguments, and we affirm the judgment
of conviction and the order denying postconviction relief.
Heitkemper
was charged with intentionally causing bodily harm to his sixteen-year-old son,
C.H., contrary to § 948.03(2)(b) and (5), Stats.[1] The charges arose out of a much disputed
incident at the Heitkempers' home on the morning of March 9, 1993. C.H. initially informed police that he was
arguing with his brother, A.H., and his mother, Sandra, when Heitkemper struck
him on the arms, legs and back with a two-by-four board, and then slapped him
on the face with an open hand. Sandra
also told police that Heitkemper struck C.H. with a two-by-four held in both
hands.
At
the preliminary hearing, both C.H. and Sandra told a different account of the
incident. C.H. testified that
Heitkemper hit him once or twice with a small, skinny piece of trim board, not
numerous times with a two-by-four, and that he could not remember if Heitkemper
struck him with his hands. Sandra
testified that Heitkemper slapped C.H. once in the face with an open hand, but
did not use a board to hit him.
Further, Sandra stated that she did not remember giving a statement to
police that morning about the incident.
The court found probable cause and bound Heitkemper over for trial.
At
trial, C.H. and Sandra again told a different account of the incident. C.H. testified that on the morning in
question, Heitkemper slapped him with an open hand, but did not hit him with a
stick. C.H. testified that his injuries
were sustained by falling on an automobile motor which he was fixing the night
before the incident. He further
testified that he lied about being struck with a board to get back at Heitkemper.
Sandra
testified at trial, as she did at the preliminary hearing, that Heitkemper
slapped C.H. once in the face with an open hand. However, she stated that she did not remember any of the events
after the incident because she had a reaction from the combination of two
medications she took in large doses, one which she identified as
Lorazepam. Accordingly, she maintained
that she did not recall making any statement to the police that morning and
denied ever stating that Heitkemper hit C.H. with anything other than his
hand.
Heitkemper
testified in his own defense at trial.
He admitted that he slapped C.H. in the face for disciplinary reasons
because C.H. was yelling, screaming and swearing at other family members. The jury found Heitkemper guilty as charged.
Heitkemper
filed a motion for postconviction relief to impeach the jury's verdict due to
statements made by a juror during deliberations. The juror, Richard Sams, was a licensed pharmacist. According to Sams's affidavit, he told
jurors that in his professional opinion Sandra was untruthful about the drug
she took because the quantities she testified she took would have knocked her
out. Sams also stated that he believed
that his “professional opinions did sway members of the jury in their
decision.” The trial court denied Heitkemper's
postconviction motion.
On
appeal, Heitkemper renews his postconviction argument regarding impeachment of
the jury verdict. In addition,
Heitkemper contends that he was denied his right to a unanimous verdict. We will address each argument in turn and
discuss further relevant facts as necessary.
JURY
IMPEACHMENT
When
a defendant attempts to impeach a jury verdict on the grounds that jurors came
into possession of prejudicial extraneous information, we must determine
whether the evidence offered in support is (1) competent, (2) shows substantive
grounds sufficient to overturn the verdict and (3) shows resulting
prejudice. State v. Williquette,
190 Wis.2d 678, 697, 526 N.W.2d 144, 151‑52 (1995); After Hour
Welding v. Laneil Management Co., 108 Wis.2d 734, 738, 324 N.W.2d 686,
689 (1982). If the proffered juror
testimony is not competent, we need not inquire further. State v. Casey, 166 Wis.2d
341, 346, 479 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1991).
Rule 906.06(2), Stats.,
controls the competency prong of the impeachment analysis and establishes a
general prohibition against the use of juror testimony to impeach a
verdict. State v. Messelt,
185 Wis.2d 254, 274, 518 N.W.2d 232, 240 (1994). However, Rule
906.06(2) provides two limited exceptions which allow jurors to testify whether
“extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's
attention” or whether “any outside influence was improperly brought to bear
upon any juror.”[2] Id.
Heitkemper
argues that Sams's statements during deliberations concerning the effect of the
drugs Sandra testified she took constituted extraneous prejudicial information
which was improperly brought to the jury's attention. In order to demonstrate that Sams's testimony is competent under
this first exception, Heitkemper bears the burden of proving that Sams's
testimony concerns extraneous information, that this information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention, and that the extraneous information was
potentially prejudicial. Id.
at 275, 518 N.W.2d at 240‑41.
We
first address whether Sams's comments regarding the effect of the drug
constitute extraneous information. “‘Extraneous’
information is information which a juror obtains from a non-evidentiary source,
other than the ‘general wisdom’ we expect jurors to possess.” Id. at 275, 518 N.W.2d at 241
(quoted source omitted). The supreme
court has defined extraneous knowledge for purposes of Rule 906.06(2), Stats.,
as follows:
The meaning of the word “extraneous” ... is “existing or
originating outside or beyond: external in origin: coming from the
outside.” The dictionary defines
“information” as ... “knowledge of a particular event or situation.” Thus, “extraneous prejudicial information”
is knowledge coming from the outside which is prejudicial.
State v. Shillcutt, 119 Wis.2d 788, 794, 350 N.W.2d 686, 690 (1984). The term does not extend to statements which
probe a juror's subjective mental processes.
Messelt, 185 Wis.2d at 275, 518 N.W.2d at 241.
We
cannot agree with Heitkemper that juror Sams's statements about the effect of
the drug taken by Sandra constitute outside knowledge. Jurors may rely on their common sense and
life's experience during deliberations.
This knowledge may include expertise that a juror may have on a certain
subject. See State v.
Aguilar, 818 P.2d 165 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (holding juror-physician's
personal knowledge regarding blackouts not extraneous). Sams's use of his own experience and
knowledge did not result in the bringing of outside evidence into the jury
room. See id. The fact that unforeseen evidence falls
within the expertise of a juror does not render it extraneous.
While
we are not bound by the trial court's legal conclusions, we recognize the
court's comments here as instructive:
Mr. Sams' views and knowledge about the effects of this
particular drug and maybe even a combination of other drugs ... [while he
obviously] knows more about what he is talking about than a layman, but any
layman who was taking those drugs could have come up with the same conclusion
....
The effect of a drug is something an average person
could have in his or her general knowledge.
The fact that Sams happened to be trained in pharmacy does not make his
life experiences extraneous.
Accordingly,
we conclude that the proffered evidence is not extraneous under
§ 906.06(2), Stats., and
therefore not competent. We need not
make further inquiry. See Casey,
166 Wis.2d at 346, 479 N.W.2d at 253.
UNANIMOUS VERDICT
Heitkemper
next argues that he is entitled to a new trial because he was denied his
constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict. See Holland v. State, 91 Wis.2d 134, 138, 280 N.W.2d
288, 290 (1979) (holding that the constitutional guarantee of the right to a
jury trial includes the right to a unanimous verdict), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 931 (1980). We briefly set forth
the facts relevant to Heitkemper's unanimity argument.
During
summation, Heitkemper's counsel argued that Heitkemper only slapped C.H. in the
face with an open hand and that this could not be considered felonious
conduct. The State responded in part as
follows:
I'd
like to take up first the last point, that [Heitkemper's attorney] made, which
is that a slap in the face is not felonious conduct. ... You can look at the jury instructions and
find that slap alone is felonious conduct. ...
And the elements of physical abuse of a child are that the defendant
caused bodily harm to [C.H.]. ... You
heard his wife testify about how he was angry on that morning; that slap could
be bodily pain and that slap could be a felony. There is no question about it.
After
summation, the court instructed the jury on the State's burden of proof as to
the elements of physical abuse of a child under § 948.03(2)(b), Stats., as follows:
Before the defendant may be found guilty of this
offense, the State must prove by evidence which satisfies you beyond a
reasonable doubt that the following three elements were present. First, that the defendant caused bodily harm
to [C.H.]. Second, that the defendant
intentionally caused such harm. Third,
that [C.H.] had not attained the age of 18 years at the time of the alleged
offense.
The court went on to describe in greater detail each
element of the crime. The court also
instructed the jury on the penalty enhancer under § 948.03(5) and the
defense of parental privilege, see § 939.45(5), Stats.; Wis J I—Criminal 950.
The court concluded with the following unanimity instruction: “This is a criminal, not a civil case;
therefore, before the jury may return a verdict which may be legally received,
such verdict must be reached unanimously.
In a criminal case all 12 jurors must agree in order to arrive at a
verdict.”
Our
supreme court has adopted the logic and analysis of United States v.
Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977), when deciding jury unanimity
issues. See Manson v.
State, 101 Wis.2d 413, 429 n.6, 304 N.W.2d 729, 737 (1981). The test for determining whether a
defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict has been denied has been
described by the court as follows:
The first step is to determine whether the jury has been
presented with evidence of multiple crimes or evidence of alternate means of
committing the actus reus element of one crime. If more than one crime is presented to the
jury, unanimity is required as to each.
If there is only one crime, jury unanimity on the particular alternative
means of committing the crime is required only if the acts are conceptually
distinct. Unanimity is not required if
the acts are conceptually similar.
State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis.2d 582, 592, 335 N.W.2d 583, 589 (1983)
(citations omitted).
Heitkemper
contends that in light of the prosecutor's comments during summation, “[i]f
some jurors believed that [he] struck [C.H.] with a board and others believed
it was with an open hand, then [he] was denied his constitutional right to a
unanimous verdict.”[3] This argument is based on the belief that
the evidence presented two conceptually different and conflicting acts. As to one act, Heitkemper admitted that he
struck C.H. with an open hand, but claimed the parental privilege as a
defense. As to the other act,
Heitkemper denied ever hitting C.H. with a stick in the arm, back or legs, and
presented a defense that C.H. had fallen on a motor the night before which
caused his bruises.
Our
supreme court has previously addressed analogous arguments as applied to a
battery case. In State v. Giwosky,
109 Wis.2d 446, 326 N.W.2d 232 (1982), the defendant was charged with one count
of battery as the result of a fight with the victim. Id. at 448-49, 326 N.W.2d at 234. The evidence at trial indicated that the
victim was injured as a result of a thrown log and then various punches and
kicks. Id. at 449-50, 326
N.W.2d at 234. The court concluded that
it was proper for the jury to consider the incident as one continuous event, id.
at 457, 326 N.W.2d at 238, and that the acts of throwing a log and punching and
kicking were not conceptually distinct ways of committing battery, id.
at 458, 326 N.W.2d at 238. See also
Lomagro, 113 Wis.2d at 593, 335 N.W.2d at 590 (holding that
multiple acts of sexual intercourse over a two-hour period were conceptually
similar and therefore unanimity as to each act was not required).
Based
upon the rationale of Giwosky, we conclude that Heitkemper's
actions are not practically or legally separable or distinct. See Giwosky, 109 Wis.2d
at 458, 326 N.W.2d at 238. There is no
more of a conceptual distinction between being assaulted by a thrown log or a
punch than being abused by a board or an open hand. See Lomagro, 113 Wis.2d at 594, 335 N.W.2d
at 590. Here, unanimity was achieved
because the entire jury agreed that Heitkemper intentionally committed an
unprivileged act which caused bodily harm.
Giwosky, 109 Wis.2d at 451, 326 N.W.2d at 235.
By
the Court.—Judgment and order
affirmed.
[1] Heitkemper was
initially charged with intentionally causing harm to a child for whom he was
responsible by conduct which created a high probability of great bodily harm
contrary to § 948.03(2)(c) and (5), Stats. This charge was amended to the lesser charge
on the first day of trial.
[2] Rule 906.06(2), Stats., provides:
Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry
into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any
matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or
to the effect of anything upon the juror's or any other juror's mind or
emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or
indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith,
except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may the juror's affidavit or evidence of
any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be
precluded from testifying be received.
[3] The State
preliminarily contends that because Heitkemper did not object at the time, move
to strike, move for a mistrial or object to the jury instructions, he waived
any right to review any alleged unanimity problem arising from the prosecutor's
rebuttal. We disagree. The supreme court has held that “[t]he right
to a unanimous verdict ... is so fundamental that it cannot be waived.” Holland v. State, 87 Wis.2d
567, 597-98, 275 N.W.2d 162, 177 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931
(1980). Further, the supreme court has
recognized that when a defendant raises unanimity questions, a defendant's
failure to object at trial should not preclude him or her from raising them on
appeal because the right to a unanimous verdict goes directly to the integrity
of the fact-finding process. State
v. Baldwin, 101 Wis.2d 441, 446, 304 N.W.2d 742, 746 (1981). Accordingly, we address the merits of
Heitkemper's unanimity claim.