COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED August 1, 2012 Diane M. Fremgen Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
Cir. Ct. No. 2007CF1450 |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT II |
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State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Diane Marie Zimmerman, Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Racine County: faye M. flancher, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Neubauer, P.J., Reilly and Gundrum, JJ.
¶1 REILLY, J. Diane Zimmerman wanted her husband dead so she offered Michael Isferding
$50,000 and a new Harley-Davidson motorcycle to kill him. Isferding agreed to her offer and brutally
stabbed Zimmerman’s husband but failed to kill him. Zimmerman was charged with party to the crime
of attempted first-degree intentional homicide and proceeded to trial. The trial was not going well for Zimmerman
and on the fourth day of trial she changed her plea to no contest. Zimmerman was sentenced to thirty-five years
of initial confinement, eight years of extended supervision, and ordered to pay
$185,000 in restitution. Zimmerman
seeks: (1) withdrawal of her plea, alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) resentencing on the grounds that the court
failed to consider her “positive” character in a meaningful way; and (3)
modification of the restitution amount given her inability to pay. We disagree with Zimmerman in all respects
and affirm her conviction and sentence.
Plea Withdrawal
¶2 Zimmerman
argues that a manifest injustice will occur if she is not allowed to withdraw
her plea. To withdraw a guilty plea
after sentencing, a defendant “carries the heavy burden of establishing, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the trial court should permit the defendant
to withdraw the plea to correct a ‘manifest injustice.’” State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶16,
232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836 (citation omitted). One way a defendant can demonstrate a “manifest
injustice” is to prove he or she received ineffective assistance of counsel
during the plea process. See
State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 311, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996). Zimmerman alleges that her trial attorneys
were deficient and ineffective, as they coerced and threatened her into
changing her plea and promised her eight years in prison if she entered a no
contest plea.
¶3 To
determine whether a convicted defendant received ineffective assistance of
counsel, a convicted defendant must satisfy both prongs of the two-part Strickland
test: deficient performance and
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶21,
264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305. We
defer to the circuit court’s findings unless clearly erroneous, but whether
counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudicial to the defendant are
questions of law that we review de novo.
State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 634, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985).
¶4 The
circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on Zimmerman’s allegations that her
attorneys were deficient. The facts from that hearing do not support
Zimmerman’s allegations.
¶5 At
the postconviction hearing, Zimmerman’s trial attorneys testified that they
never promised Zimmerman what her sentence would be. Zimmerman conceded that she was never
promised an eight-to-ten-year sentence, but rather her attorneys told her they
would argue for an eight-to-ten-year sentence based on department of
corrections sentencing guidelines. The
circuit court found that neither attorney promised Zimmerman anything to get
her to plead no contest. The court also
found that Zimmerman was not threatened to change her plea from not guilty to
no contest. We agree with the circuit
court that Zimmerman’s attorneys were not deficient and that Zimmerman’s
uncorroborated allegations do not support a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Sentencing Discretion
¶6 Zimmerman
argues that the court did not meaningfully consider her “positive” character
and seeks resentencing. We
disagree. The court considered all
relevant character evidence, including Zimmerman’s psychological evaluations,
the State’s presentence investigation report, the public defender’s office’s
presentence investigation report, and the testimony of nineteen witnesses. In assessing Zimmerman’s character, the court meticulously went through
her background. The court noted that
Zimmerman’s attorney described her as “loving[,] caring[,] religious, [and]
giving,” but stated, “That wasn’t the evidence that I saw.” The court also noted that Zimmerman reported
being sexually assaulted when she was thirteen and that her husband was abusive
during their marriage. It considered
Zimmerman’s educational background, her employment history, and her lack of a
criminal record. The court also stated
that Zimmerman’s community was her family and that she “morally” failed to
protect them.
¶7 The
court stated that the attack on Zimmerman’s husband was “one of the most
horrendous crimes” it had ever seen and concluded that Zimmerman was a high
risk to reoffend. The court indicated
punishment served as the foremost sentencing objective.
¶8 The
circuit court specified its sentencing objectives on the record, identified the
objectives of greatest importance, and described why the sentence imposed
supported the objectives. As the circuit court fully considered all
the sentencing objectives and addressed the relevant sentencing factors, we
affirm Zimmerman’s sentence. See State
v. Stenzel, 2004 WI App 181, ¶8, 276 Wis. 2d 224, 688 N.W.2d 20.
Restitution Order
¶9 Zimmerman
seeks modification of the restitution order.
After the circuit court imposed restitution at the sentencing hearing,
Zimmerman’s attorney stated, “Given the Court’s sentence of 43 years and Ms.
Zimmerman’s age, I believe that there would not be an ability to pay
restitution.” Zimmerman presented no
other evidence on her inability to pay.
A defendant who argues that she is unable to pay a court ordered
restitution must present evidence to that effect and may not simply rely on an
argument by her attorney. See State
v. Boffer, 158 Wis. 2d 655, 663, 462 N.W.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1990).
¶10 As
Zimmerman failed to present any evidence on her financial resources or her
ability to pay, she “cannot now complain that the sentencing court failed to
consider [her] financial circumstances.”
Id. We affirm the
$185,000 restitution amount.
By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.
Not recommended for publication in the official reports.