PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.: 95-2977
Complete Title
of Case:
KOHLER
COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BEN
WIXEN and
FRANCINE
A. WIXEN,
Defendants-Appellants.
Submitted on Briefs: July 15, 1996
COURT COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
Opinion Released: September 4, 1996
Opinion Filed: September
4, 1996
Source of APPEAL Appeal from a judgment
Full Name JUDGE COURT: Circuit
Lower Court. COUNTY: Sheboygan
(If
"Special", JUDGE: TIMOTHY M. VAN AKKEREN
so indicate)
JUDGES: Anderson, P.J., Brown and Snyder, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented:
Appellant
ATTORNEYSOn behalf of the defendants-appellants, the cause was
submitted on the briefs of Robert C. Hahn of Holden & Hahn, S.C.
of Sheboygan.
Respondent
ATTORNEYSOn behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was
submitted on the brief of Stephen M. Seymour of Halvorsen, Buesing
& Seymour, S.C. of Sheboygan.
COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED September
4, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-2977
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
KOHLER
COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BEN
WIXEN and
FRANCINE
A. WIXEN,
Defendants-Appellants.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Sheboygan County: TIMOTHY M. VAN AKKEREN, Judge. Affirmed.
Before
Anderson, P.J., Brown and Snyder, JJ.
SNYDER,
J. Ben
and Francine A. Wixen appeal from a judgment requiring them to fulfill the
obligations of a personal guaranty by making remuneration for their corporate
debt to the Kohler Company. On appeal,
the Wixens contend that the “forum selection” clause in the guaranty was
insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over them. Alternatively, the Wixens argue that the
guaranty was limited to one year from the date of execution, and consequently
was not in effect at the commencement of this action. We conclude that the forum selection clause memorialized the
Wixens' consent to personal jurisdiction in any Wisconsin court capable of
exercising subject matter jurisdiction.
We also find sufficient grounds to support the jury's finding that the
guaranty was not limited to one year.
Accordingly, we affirm.
The
Kohler Company is a manufacturer of plumbing products and fixtures based in
Kohler, Wisconsin. Ben was the
president and principal owner of Wixen Pipe and Supply Company located in
California. Francine was the secretary
of the corporation. Wixen Pipe and
Kohler entered into a distributorship agreement whereby Kohler supplied Wixen
Pipe with plumbing products for sale in California. At some point during the course of the distributorship, Wixen
Pipe began having financial difficulties.
Subsequently, Kohler requested assurance of payment for the products it
supplied to Wixen Pipe on credit.
On
November 21, 1990, the Wixens executed an “Unconditional Guarantee” with which they
personally guaranteed payment for any debt owed to Kohler. Kohler drafted the guaranty, which included
the following provision:
Legal rights and obligations hereunder shall be
determined in accordance with the laws of the State of Wisconsin, and the undersigned
hereby agree that the venue for all actions initiated hereunder shall be the
court of competent jurisdiction within the State of Wisconsin.
Prior
to accepting Kohler's draft of the guaranty, Ben added additional language via
an attached letter which enumerated two conditions. Specifically, one condition limited the guaranty to “one (1) full
year from the date of execution.” This
guaranty, including this amendment, was subsequently accepted by both parties.
During
the following year, Wixen Pipe remained indebted to Kohler. Prior to the expiration of the first
guaranty, Kohler requested a second personal guaranty. Kohler prepared another “Unconditional
Guarantee” containing the same language as in the first draft. The parties discussed limiting this guaranty
to one year as in the original guaranty.
However, no such agreement was consummated either verbally or in a
separate written document. On November
5, 1991, the parties executed the second guaranty.
Throughout
the following year, Wixen Pipe continued to receive Kohler products on
credit. Kohler did not make any further
requests for assurance of payment of the debt and continued to extend credit to
Wixen Pipe until March 1993. Wixen Pipe
subsequently filed for bankruptcy protection.
Kohler then demanded payment of all of Wixen Pipe's debt under the
second personal guaranty. When the
Wixens failed to make payments on their debt, Kohler filed suit in Sheboygan
County against both Ben and Francine.
The
trial court held a separate evidentiary hearing in which it determined that the
forum selection clause was legally sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction
over the Wixens to the court, barring a finding of unconscionability. A second hearing found the clause not to be
unconscionable. At trial, the Wixens
argued that because the original guaranty was limited to one year, the second
guaranty was also limited to one year.
A jury found in favor of Kohler.
From these findings, the Wixens appeal.
On
appeal, the Wixens first contend that the language used in the forum selection
clause did not confer personal jurisdiction over them to the trial court. The relevant language provides that the
parties “agree that the venue for all actions initiated hereunder shall be the
court of competent jurisdiction within the State of Wisconsin.” They submit that the forum selection clause
is ambiguous and, in particular, point to the phrase “the court of competent
jurisdiction.” They argue that this
phrase should be interpreted as binding them to submit to the jurisdiction of
any Wisconsin court that has subject matter jurisdiction and can obtain
personal jurisdiction over them.
Kohler
maintains that the forum selection clause should be interpreted as conferring
personal jurisdiction over the Wixens to any Wisconsin court with the proper
authority to adjudge issues relating to the personal guaranty.
Issues
of personal jurisdiction are questions of law which we review de novo. Landreman v. Martin, 191
Wis.2d 787, 798, 530 N.W.2d 62, 66 (Ct. App. 1995). The parties are in agreement that absent the Wixens' consent,
there is no independent basis for the trial court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the Wixens.
Therefore, whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the
Wixens depends upon whether the forum selection clause can be interpreted as
consenting to personal jurisdiction in Wisconsin.
The
initial step in the analysis is to determine whether the forum selection clause
is ambiguous. This is a question of law
which we review independently. Wausau
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Dane County, 142 Wis.2d 315, 322, 417 N.W.2d
914, 916 (Ct. App. 1987). The parties
put forth two possible constructions for the clause—that it confers personal
jurisdiction over the Wixens in any Wisconsin court that is competent to hear
the case, or that it memorializes the Wixens' agreement to appear in any
Wisconsin court that can obtain personal jurisdiction over them. Any contract provision that is reasonably
susceptible to more than one construction is ambiguous. Wausau Joint Venture v. Redevelopment
Auth., 118 Wis.2d 50, 58, 347 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Ct. App. 1984). We conclude that the clause is ambiguous.
When
interpreting ambiguous provisions of a contract, the court must select a
construction which gives effect to each part of the contract and reject
constructions resulting in surplusage or unreasonable results. Id. Also, when construing ambiguous contractual language, we must
give effect to the true intentions of the parties. See Maas v. Ziegler, 172 Wis.2d 70, 79, 492
N.W.2d 621, 624 (1992). We must
consider all language included in the forum selection clause, as well as the
document as a whole. See Crown
Life Ins. Co. v. LaBonte, 111 Wis.2d 26, 36, 330 N.W.2d 201, 206
(1983); see also DOR v. United States Shoe Corp., 158 Wis.2d 123,
128, 462 N.W.2d 233, 235 (Ct. App. 1990).
In
order to construe the language of the forum selection clause, we first consider
the interrelationship between personal jurisdiction, subject matter
jurisdiction and competency. Personal
jurisdiction allows a court with the requisite power to exercise its subject
matter jurisdiction to enter a judgment in personam against an individual
party. See § 801.04(2), Stats.
In Wisconsin, courts may obtain personal jurisdiction over a party
through any one or more of the grounds stated in Wisconsin's long-arm statute,
§ 801.05, Stats., see
§ 801.04(2), or by consent, Datronic Rental Corp. v. DeSol, Inc.,
164 Wis.2d 289, 292, 474 N.W.2d 780, 781 (Ct. App. 1991). The parties here agree that the only way for
a Wisconsin court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Wixens in this
action is through consent.
Subject
matter jurisdiction is defined as the power of the court to entertain a certain
type of action. See Mack
v. State, 93 Wis.2d 287, 294, 286 N.W.2d 563, 566 (1980). Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be
conferred on a court by consent. See
§ 801.04(1), Stats.
Competency
is a narrower concept than subject matter jurisdiction and is grounded in the
court's power to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction. Brandt v. LIRC, 160 Wis.2d
353, 367, 466 N.W.2d 673, 678 (Ct. App. 1991), aff'd, 166 Wis.2d
623, 480 N.W.2d 494 (1992). Although a
court is vested with subject matter jurisdiction by the constitution, the
legislature may enact statutes which limit a court's power to exercise subject
matter jurisdiction. Such legislative
measures affect a court's competency rather than its jurisdiction.[1] Thus, a court may have subject matter
jurisdiction and yet not be competent to entertain a particular matter.
Competency
is not synonymous with either personal or subject matter jurisdiction. If a court is competent, it is so regardless
of whether it can attain personal jurisdiction over an individual party. The definition of competency, as accepted in
Wisconsin, is the power of a court to exercise its subject matter
jurisdiction. See Village
of Shorewood v. Steinberg, 174 Wis.2d 191, 200, 496 N.W.2d 57, 60
(1993). Therefore, substituting this
definition for “competent jurisdiction,” the forum selection clause would read,
“the court with the power to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction within
the State of Wisconsin.”
Also,
consent to venue clauses, as indicated in this instance by the language “the
undersigned hereby agree that the venue ... shall be ...,” implicitly confer to
courts the right to exercise personal jurisdiction. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Frumin, 739 F. Supp.
1307, 1310 (E.D. Wis. 1990). Thus,
based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the Wixens consented to
personal jurisdiction in any Wisconsin court with the authority to entertain
matters relating to the guaranty.
Moreover, this construction is fortified by the fact that it is the only
interpretation which renders no language superfluous and produces a reasonable
business document. See Borchardt
v. Wilk, 156 Wis.2d 420, 427, 456 N.W.2d 653, 657 (Ct. App. 1990).
In
opposing this construction, the Wixens contend that the clause should be interpreted
as consenting only to a Wisconsin venue that could independently attain subject
matter and personal jurisdiction. Such
a construction relies on including personal jurisdiction in the definition of
competency. This reading runs contrary
to the accepted meaning of competency and consequently must be rejected.
Furthermore,
without reading the clause as conferring the Wixens' consent to personal
jurisdiction, the forum selection clause becomes operative only if there exists
an additional means of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the foreign
party. Such a construction would render
the clause meaningless because the Wixens ultimately would not be consenting to
anything. It is well settled in
Wisconsin that a construction which renders contractual language meaningless
should be avoided. See Maas,
172 Wis.2d at 79, 492 N.W.2d at 624.
Moreover,
such an interpretation of a similar clause was likewise rejected by a federal
court. Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Home Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 710, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1060 (1987). In that case, the
court stated that such a reading was “hypertechnical” and construed the clause
as consenting to personal jurisdiction.
Id.
The
Wixens also argue that in the event of ambiguous contractual language, the terms
should be construed against Kohler as the drafter. However, to do so would be inconsistent with the terms of the
contract as a whole and the intent of the parties. See Wilke v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 108
Wis.2d 650, 655, 323 N.W.2d 179, 181 (Ct. App. 1982). The purpose of the unconditional guarantee was to allow Wixen
Pipe to continue receiving goods on credit, while at the same time protecting
Kohler from pecuniary loss in the event Wixen Pipe became insolvent. Both parties advanced certain interests
through the agreement. Both parties had
input into the agreement before it was signed.
Thus, to construe the contract against Kohler would be to ignore the
intent of the contracting parties, which was to draft an agreement that would
address the needs of both parties.
In
the alternative, the Wixens argue that the forum selection clause is
unconscionable if it is construed to confer personal jurisdiction over them to
Wisconsin courts. In general, forum
selection clauses which confer personal jurisdiction are enforceable unless
found to be unconscionable. Leasefirst
v. Hartford Rexall Drugs, 168 Wis.2d 83, 88, 483 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Ct.
App. 1992). Unconscionability is a
question of law which we review independently.
See Discount Fabric House v. Wisconsin Tel. Co.,
117 Wis.2d 587, 602, 345 N.W.2d 417, 425 (1984).
In
Wisconsin, unconscionability has been defined as “the absence of a meaningful
choice on the part of one party, together with contract terms that are
unreasonably favorable to the other party.”
Leasefirst, 168 Wis.2d at 89, 483 N.W.2d at 587. A clause is deemed unconscionable when there
is both a quantum of procedural and a quantum of substantive
unconscionability. Id. at
90, 483 N.W.2d at 588.
Procedural
unconscionability refers to the process of the parties' assent to
contract. Id. at 89-90,
483 N.W.2d at 587. Factors such as the
age, intelligence, business acumen, business experience and relative bargaining
power of the parties are considered. Discount
Fabric House, 117 Wis.2d at 602, 345 N.W.2d at 425.
An
evidentiary hearing was held on this matter which concluded that the clause was
not procedurally unconscionable. See
Datronic, 164 Wis.2d at 294, 474 N.W.2d at 782. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court
properly considered Ben's maturity, age and college education. The court also noted that Ben had been a
businessman for approximately fifteen years at the time the second guaranty was
executed and had prior business relations with companies other than
Kohler. The court also weighed the
relative bargaining power of the parties and noted that other means for
securing the Wixens' debt apart from a personal guaranty were discussed and
rejected by one or both of the parties.
Thus, the court found no procedural unconscionability.
Substantive
unconscionability addresses the reasonableness of the contract terms assented
to by the parties. Leasefirst,
168 Wis.2d at 90, 483 N.W.2d at 587.
Due to the commercial nature of the transaction, the trial court
reasoned that the clause would not be unconscionable unless it was commercially
unreasonable, according to the mores and business practices commonly
employed. The court concluded that it
was not unreasonable for a large multinational corporation headquartered in
Wisconsin to draft a contract requiring all litigation between it and a
distributor to take place in its home state.
Therefore, the court found that the clause was not flawed on substantive
grounds.
Based
upon our independent review, we conclude that the trial court correctly
identified the applicable legal standards and appropriately applied them in
deciding this issue. We therefore adopt
the trial court's reasoning and agree that the forum selection clause was not
unconscionable.
Finally,
the Wixens argue that the second guaranty was limited to a single year from the
date of execution because it was merely a “renewal” of the original guaranty. Therefore, even though there was no written
language to that effect, the conditions of the original guaranty should be
implicitly read into the second guaranty.
Since
there is no written contractual language to construe, whether the second guaranty
was only effective for one year is solely a question of fact which was properly
presented to the jury. After hearing
the evidence, the jury determined that the guaranty was not limited to one
year. On appeal, this court must
sustain the verdict if there is any credible evidence to support it. Hauer v. Union State Bank, 192
Wis.2d 576, 602, 532 N.W.2d 456, 466 (Ct. App. 1995).
The
second guaranty was a separate instrument undertaken after separate
negotiations. There was no dispute that
the second guaranty did not include a written time limitation. Consequently, the trial focused on whether
the one-year limit should be inferred into the second guaranty by the terms of
the original guaranty. The jury heard
testimony from both parties regarding the negotiations and correspondence
between the parties pertaining to the execution of the second guaranty. Whether the parties referred to the second
guaranty as a renewal of the first, or whether the Wixens construed it as such,
was argued to the court. After weighing
the facts and relevant testimony, the jury affirmatively answered the special
verdict question: “Was the
unconditional guarantee executed November 5, 1991, indefinite in duration as
opposed to being for a one-year period of time?” Thus, the jury found the Wixens' personal guaranty to Kohler to
be enforceable.
Upon
review, we conclude that the jury's decision was well grounded in the facts and
within the great weight of the evidence.
Accordingly, we uphold the jury's determination.
In
summary, we conclude that the forum selection clause included in the Wixens'
“Unconditional Guarantee” conferred personal jurisdiction over the Wixens to
any Wisconsin court capable of hearing the action. We affirm the jury's finding that the guaranty was of indefinite
duration as supported by the facts and testimony presented at trial.
By
the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
[1] Competency
issues typically arise where there are multiple trial court levels or where
certain types of action can be entertained only in specialized courts. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
noted, “[T]here is lack of competency for excess sums where a court has the
power to deal with an action but for no more than a designated amount.” Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis.2d
171, 177, 313 N.W.2d 790, 793 (1982).