

OFFICE OF THE CLERK WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS

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DISTRICT IV

September 23, 2015

To:

Hon. Peter Anderson Circuit Court Judge Br. 17, Rm. 6103 215 South Hamilton Madison, WI 53703

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You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:

2013AP2391-CR State of Wisconsin v. Damien D. Smith (L.C. # 2008CF1010)
2013AP2392-CR State of Wisconsin v. Damien D. Smith (L.C. # 2008CF2232)
2013AP2393-CR State of Wisconsin v. Damien D. Smith (L.C. # 2009CF557)

Before Kloppenburg, P.J., Lundsten and Sherman, JJ.

Damien Smith appeals judgments of conviction and an order denying his postconviction motion. Based upon our review of the briefs and record, we conclude at conference that this case is appropriate for summary disposition. *See* WIS. STAT. RULE 809.21 (2013-14). We affirm.

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2013-14 version unless otherwise noted.

The circuit court originally withheld sentence and placed Smith on probation for several

felonies and misdemeanors. After Smith's probation was revoked, the court imposed prison

sentences. Smith filed a postconviction motion challenging the sentences, and the court denied

it.

Smith's argument on appeal proceeds in the following steps. In sentencing him, the court

relied in part on Smith's conduct involving heroin that led to Smith's probation revocation and

was the subject of then-pending federal charges; that the heroin conduct should be considered

unproven because it had not yet been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and the sentencing

court erred because unproven charges can be used only for certain purposes, and here the court

went beyond those purposes.

We focus on the last of those steps. We assume, for purposes of this opinion, that the

heroin charges should be considered unproven. Smith argues that use of unproven conduct is

limited to only consideration of the defendant's character and need for rehabilitation, and cannot

be used for other factors like the need to protect the public. However, Smith cites no case law

limiting unproven conduct to these purposes. Instead, he appears to concede that no such case

law exists, but notes that so far the only uses for which unproven conduct has been expressly

permitted are the uses he cites.

We do not agree with Smith's suggestion that only the expressly permitted uses of

unproven conduct are proper. In the absence of case law limiting the use of unproven conduct,

we do not consider it reasonable to infer such a limit from the existing case law. Smith argues

that we should create such a limit, but he does not develop a persuasive argument as to what

legal or policy distinction exists to support use of unproven conduct for some sentencing factors,

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but not the others that were considered by the circuit court in this case. Therefore, we conclude

that the postconviction motion was properly denied.

IT IS ORDERED that the judgments and order are summarily affirmed under WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.21.

Diane M. Fremgen Clerk of Court of Appeals

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