State v. Ervin Burris

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed.

¶1 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Burris, 2002 WI App 262, 258 Wis. 2d 454, 654 N.W.2d 866, which affirmed the circuit court's revocation of petitioner's supervised release under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 (1997-98).[1] The principal issue presented is whether a circuit court is required to expressly consider alternatives to revocation before revoking a sexually violent person's supervised release when the court makes a determination that "the safety of the public requires [the person's] commitment to a secure facility." This issue implicates due process, statutory interpretation, and public policy. The petitioner also contends that his revocation proceeding was "arbitrary and unfair" because it violated basic due process safeguards and that his revocation was not supported by the evidence.

¶2 We conclude that a circuit court is not required to expressly consider alternatives to revocation before revoking a sexually violent person's supervised release when the court determines that the safety of the public requires the person's commitment to a secure facility. Such a finding mirrors a finding that "the safety of others requires that supervised release be revoked." Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(d). We further conclude that the proceedings in this matter were neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. Consequently, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 In September 1989 Ervin Burris was convicted of first-degree sexual assault of a nine-year-old child.[2] He was sentenced to prison for 10 years. This sentence was the fourth time Burris had been sent to prison for felony convictions, some of which had a sexual component.

¶4 In September 1996, shortly before Burris's mandatory release date, the Rock County District Attorney's office petitioned the circuit court to detain Burris as a sexually violent person under Chapter 980. The case was tried to the court in April 1997. Rock County Circuit Judge James E. Welker found Burris to be a sexually violent person,[3] and committed him to the Department of Health and Family Services (DHFS) with instructions that DHFS prepare a plan for the defendant's supervised release. The State appealed the court's placement decision but the circuit court was affirmed.[4]

¶5 In October 1998 Burris was placed in the Rock Valley Community Corrections Program (the halfway house) in Janesville[5] at which time DHFS imposed certain "supervised release rules." A year later, in October 1999, DHFS amended the supervised release rules, and Burris acknowledged in writing that he had received a copy. The revised rules contained the following restrictions:

1. You shall avoid all conduct that is a violation of federal or state statute, municipal or county ordinances or that is not in the best interest of the public's welfare or your rehabilitation.

. . . .

4. You shall inform your agent of your whereabouts and activities as she/he directs.

. . . .

13. You shall provide true and correct information orally and in writing in response to inquiries by the agent.

. . . .

15. . . . The specific rules imposed at this time are:

a) You shall not consume or possess alcohol, illegal drugs or drug paraphernalia.

. . . .

18. You shall notify your agent of any involvement in an intimate relationship at its beginning and you shall introduce the person to your agent to disclose your past sexual offenses prior to engaging in any type of sexual activity with that person.

¶6 In December 1999 DHFS filed a petition for revocation of supervised release, charging that Burris had violated the terms and conditions of his release as set forth in the supervised release rules. This petition was later amended twice.

¶7 The initial petition, dated December 10, 1999, alleged that Burris violated Rule 1 in two respects: (1) Burris obtained a prescription for Viagra without his supervising agent's prior knowledge or consent; and (2) Burris refused to sign a release form allowing the department to interview the prescribing physician about the Viagra prescription.

¶8 The first amendment to the petition contained two additional allegations, namely: (3) Burris violated Rules 1, 4, and 13 by refusing to provide his supervising agent with a written statement about the events leading to Burris obtaining the Viagra prescription; and (4) Burris violated Rules 1, 4, and 18 by engaging in a consensual intimate relationship with a woman between October 25, 1998 and December 10, 1999, without informing his supervising agent. Although the date of this first amendment is not clear, Burris knew of the amendment as of December 28, 1999, because the parties discussed the amendment during a motion hearing that day.

¶9 On December 30 DHFS amended the petition a second time, charging that: (5) Burris violated Rules 1 and 15a by consuming alcohol and sharing it with another resident at the halfway house between November 3 and November 24, 1999. This second amendment also shortened the time frame within which Burris allegedly engaged in the unauthorized intimate relationship, asserting that the period began on October 25, 1999, rather than October 25, 1998, as originally claimed.

¶10 On January 8, 2000, the circuit court held a hearing to determine whether Burris's supervised release should be revoked. Based on the evidence presented, Judge Welker made the following factual findings that outlined the manner in which Burris had engaged in "deceitful activity."

¶11 Judge Welker found that while Burris resided at the halfway house, he continued a relationship with a named married woman with children, despite his supervising agent's admonition against further contact with her. Burris not only failed to abide by the agent's instruction but also went so far as to meet the woman in a motel to have sexual intercourse. In order to meet with the woman, Burris violated the conditions of a pass provided to him, leaving the area where he was permitted to travel. Furthermore, Burris did not meaningfully participate in the sex offender treatment program as he was "secretive about what was going on in his life."

¶12 Judge Welker also found that Burris obtained a prescription for Viagra. While Judge Welker declined to decide whether Viagra was a prohibited substance for a sexually violent person, he indicated that Burris's reaction to being caught with the substance indicated that Burris believed his action was prohibited. Burris thus engaged in a course of deceitful conduct regarding the Viagra prescription. Furthermore, Burris was secretive and failed to cooperate with his supervising agent after the halfway house staff discovered the Viagra prescription.

¶13 In addition, Judge Welker found that Burris drank alcohol and arranged meetings outside the halfway house to exchange cigarettes in a way designed to avoid detection by surveillance cameras. The court noted the significance of this conduct in light of Burris's history of drug and alcohol abuse.

¶14 Based on the conduct involved in these rule violations, Judge Welker revoked Burris's supervised release, saying:

Mr. Burris's conduct represents an example of rather extreme compulsive behavior[.] [G]iven the fact that he was released under the conditions that he was, he had the strongest incentive to follow every rule, dot every I, cross every T, do what he was supposed to do, and he did not do that. He engaged in, as I say, deceitful activity. He skirted the rules as best he could, and his history with that compulsive behavior, his history makes him an extreme risk for harm to the public if there is not significantly more control exercised over his activities than have been exercised in the past.

He's had a history of drug and alcohol abuse. He's had a history of forcible sexual activity. He's had a history of sex with children. And he has mixed all of those elements, and he clearly does not have the ability to control his own antisocial urges and desires, based upon what I conclude to be an extremely compulsive behavior, compulsive personality.

I conclude that this compulsive behavior which makes him unable to control his own action coupled with the fact that he has this history of violent sexual activity and sex with children creates a high likelihood that his compulsive behavior will manifest itself in sexually violent behavior which is harmful to the public in the future if there are not significant more controls imposed upon him. And I do not think that the public can be protected in his present placement because of his, number one, refusal to obey the directives of his agent; number two, his refusal to be candid in sex offender treatment; number three, his refusal to follow the rules during temporary releases which were designed to transition him into the community; and, number four, his refusal to be candid with his agent particularly involving matters of his sex life.

. . . .

I believe that the safety of the public requires his commitment to a secure facility, and I am going to order that the prior order of this Court is modified to provide that he is committed to the Wisconsin Resource Center for commitment and treatment until such time as it's safe to release him into the public. (Emphasis added).

¶15 The circuit court rejected Burris's post-revocation motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and inadequate notice. Burris appealed the revocation of his supervised release, arguing that Rule 1 of his supervised release rules was unconstitutionally vague, that the petition to revoke his supervised release provided insufficient notice of the allegations against him, and that Judge Welker erred because he did not consider alternatives to revocation before revoking his supervised release. Burris, 258 Wis. 2d 454, ¶1. The court of appeals affirmed. Id. We accepted Burris's petition for review and now affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

ANALYSIS

¶16 Chapter 980 creates statutory civil procedures for a court to commit a sexually violent person to the custody of DHFS "for control, care and treatment until such time as the person is no longer a sexually violent person." Wis. Stat. § 980.06(1).[6] Until the law was changed in 1999,[7] the court was authorized to place a sexually violent person on supervised release at the time of the person's initial commitment. Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(b). When this occurred, the person was placed in the custody and control of DHFS and was "subject to the conditions set by the court and to the rules of the department." Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(d).[8] Supervised release also came into play when a sexually violent person was committed to an institution under § 980.06 and, after a period of confinement, petitioned for supervised release. Wis. Stat. § 980.08. This latter feature is still part of the law.[9]

¶17 Understandably, Chapter 980 also provided procedures for the revocation of supervised release. Former Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(d) read in part:

The state has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that any rule or condition of release has been violated, or that the safety of others requires that supervised release be revoked. If the court determines after hearing that any rule or condition of release has been violated, or that the safety of others requires that supervised release be revoked, it may revoke the order for supervised release and order that the released person be placed in an appropriate institution until the person is discharged from the commitment under s. 980.09 or until again placed on supervised release under s. 980.08.[10]

¶18 Under § 980.06(2)(d), the court could revoke a person's supervised release if it determined that (1) any rule or condition of release had been violated; or (2) the safety of others required that supervised release be revoked.

¶19 Two terms ago, in State v. Keding, 2002 WI 86, ¶1, 254 Wis. 2d 334, 646 N.W.2d 375, this court considered as a certified question, "whether a circuit court is required to consider alternatives to revocation before revoking a sexually violent person's supervised release under Chapter 980." The court split evenly on this issue, but it affirmed Lenny Keding's revocation because a majority agreed that the circuit court had investigated alternatives to revocation before revoking Keding's supervised release. Id., ¶¶2-3.

¶20 In this case, the issue is narrower than the issue in Keding. See Burris, 258 Wis. 2d 454, ¶19. Judge Welker revoked Burris's supervised release on grounds that the "safety of the public required [Burris's] commitment to a secure facility." This finding mirrored the second ground for revoking supervised release, namely, "that the safety of others requires that supervised release be revoked." Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(d). Hence, the specific issue presented in this case is whether the court must, for any reason, expressly consider alternatives to revocation before revoking supervised release when the court determines that the safety of others requires revocation, or when the safety of others requires a person's commitment to a secure facility.

A. Due Process

¶21 Burris contends that due process required the circuit court to expressly consider and reject alternatives to revocation before revoking his supervised release. He relies on State ex rel. Plotkin v. Department of Health & Social Services, 63 Wis. 2d 535, 217 N.W.2d 641 (1974), to support this contention.

¶22 An alleged sexually violent person, subject to commitment under Chapter 980, is not a criminal defendant but has the same constitutional rights as a criminal defendant at trial. State ex rel. Seibert v. Macht, 2001 WI 67, ¶12, 244 Wis. 2d 378, 627 N.W.2d 881, as revised in State ex rel. Seibert v. Macht, 2002 WI 12, ¶2, 249 Wis. 2d 702, 639 N.W.2d 707; Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m). Moreover, the court of appeals has concluded that procedural due process protections afforded to persons in probation and parole revocation proceedings also apply in supervised release revocation proceedings under Chapter 980. See State v. VanBronkhorst, 2001 WI App 190, ¶9, 247 Wis. 2d 247, 633 N.W.2d 236.

¶23 Burris asserts that due process protections afforded in probation and parole revocation proceedings include a requirement that the decision-maker consider alternatives to revocation. For this proposition, he points to Plotkin. This, however, is where his analysis breaks down.

¶24 The law has evolved as follows: In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the United States Supreme Court considered whether due process required a state to afford an individual some opportunity to be heard before revoking his parole. The Iowa Board of Parole had revoked the parole of two parolees without providing them an adversary hearing. The Court stated that the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal proceeding did not apply to parole revocation, id. at 480; rather, the minimum requirements of due process required the following:

(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.

Id. at 489.

¶25 These due process protections were extended to probation revocation hearings in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973), along with a recognition that the state must provide counsel to probationers in some revocation proceedings.

¶26 Twelve years later, the Supreme Court confronted the question whether Morrissey and Gagnon required a court to consider alternatives to incarceration before revoking probation. The Court concluded that due process did not require the trial court to consider alternatives to revocation and indicate on the record that it had done so. Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606 (1985). The Court said: "One point relevant to the present case is immediately evident from a review of the minimum procedures set forth in some detail in Gagnon and Morrissey: the specified procedures do not include an express statement by the factfinder that alternatives to incarceration were considered and rejected." Id. at 612 (emphasis added).

¶27 The Court acknowledged the desirability of considering possible alternatives to imprisonment before probation is revoked, id. at 613, but it emphasized that the "decision to revoke probation is generally predictive and subjective in nature," id., and "a general requirement that the factfinder elaborate upon the reasons for a course not taken would unduly burden the revocation proceeding without significantly advancing the interests of the probationer." Id.

¶28 There is an exception to this rule. In Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), the Supreme Court held that in probation revocation proceedings, a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for failure to pay a fine and restitution if that failure is the ground for revocation. "If the probationer could not pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court must consider alternative measures of punishment other than imprisonment." Id. at 672. The Court added that only if alternative measures are not adequate to meet the state's interests "may the court imprison a probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay." Id. The Court later explained that the decision in Bearden "did not rest on the view that Gagnon and Morrisey generally compel consideration of alternatives to incarceration." Black, 471 U.S. at 614 (emphasis added). Rather, it indicated that such consideration "is required only if the defendant has violated a condition of probation through no fault of his own." Id.

¶29 In Plotkin, decided in 1974 after the State of Wisconsin lost the Gagnon case in the Supreme Court, this court approved and adopted Section 5.1 of the American Bar Association's Standards Relating to Probation. 63 Wis. 2d 544-45. Section 5.1 established "[g]rounds for and alternatives to probation revocation." Id. at 544. The section provided these grounds for revocation:

(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity by the offender; or

(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or

(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.

Id. More important for this case, the standards provided that the court find one of these three grounds for revocation after considering various intermediate steps as an alternative to revocation. Id. at 544-45.

¶30 In Plotkin, this court adopted these standards for probation revocation, not as a requirement of due process but as a prescription of good policy.[11] Thus, reasoning by analogy, we conclude that due process does not require that a court expressly consider and reject alternatives to revocation before revoking a sexually violent person's supervised release when the court determines that the public safety requires the person's commitment to a secure facility.

B. Statutory Interpretation

¶31 Burris contends that Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(d), now § 980.08(6m), requires the court to consider alternatives to revocation in every case prior to revoking a sexually violent person's supervised release. This presents a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. Keding, 254 Wis. 2d 334, ¶13.

¶32 This court has been wrestling with statutory interpretation in recent years, culminating in our decision in State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what a statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended effect. Id., ¶44. We understand our obligation to faithfully give effect to the policy choices enacted into law by the legislature. Id. To achieve this end, we look first to the language of the statute. Id. If the language is ambiguous, even after considering its intrinsic context, scope, and purpose, we may turn to extrinsic sources such as legislative history. In this instance, the statute is not ambiguous, but after stating our conclusion, we turn to the history of similar legislation to confirm our interpretation of the statutory language.

¶33 Under the former statute applicable in this case, the court was directed to commit a sexually violent person to the custody of DHFS for control, care, and treatment until such time as the person "is no longer a sexually violent person." § 980.06(1). An order for commitment was to specify either institutional care or supervised release. § 980.06(2)(b). DHFS was directed to "arrange for control, care and treatment of the person in the least restrictive manner consistent with the requirements of the person and in accordance with the court's commitment order." Id. (emphasis added).

¶34 The "least restrictive manner" language conforms to a provision in the patients rights statute, which applies to Chapter 980 patients: Each patient shall "have the right to the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of . . . commitment." Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(e). It is also consistent with Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982), where the Supreme Court said that "[p]ersons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish."

¶35 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.06(2)(b) was cited by this court in State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 266, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995), as part of the rationale for upholding Chapter 980 as a remedial, treatment-oriented statute.

¶36 This discussion, grounded in the statutes, provides the policy backdrop against which Chapter 980 must be implemented and interpreted. We are fully cognizant that Chapter 980 is not intended to be a punitive statute. At the same time, the purpose of the chapter is to protect the public from sexually violent persons who have a mental disorder and whose mental disorder creates a substantial probability that they will engage in acts of sexual violence. The statute allows and common sense requires that the department and the court have reasonable latitude in trying to achieve these two objectives. "A person on supervised release is subject to the conditions set by the court and to the rules of the department." Wis. Stat. § 980.06(d).

¶37 Burris contends that to comply with the "least restrictive" language in the statutes, the court is required, in every case, to expressly consider alternatives to revocation before revoking a sexually violent person's supervised release. We disagree.

¶38 When a person is placed on supervised release, DHFS must develop a plan that identifies treatment and services the person will receive and specify who will be responsible for providing the treatment and services. Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(c). The plan is then presented to the court for approval. Id. Thereafter, DHFS has latitude to control the person, care for the person, and treat the person "in the least restrictive manner consistent with the requirements of the person and in accordance with the court's commitment order." § 980.06(2)(b). As the requirements of the person change, the manner of control, care, and treatment may change, so long as the change does not conflict with the court's commitment order. If the court-approved plan is so restrictive that it deprives DHFS of reasonable flexibility in responding to the changing circumstances of the person, DHFS may seek added flexibility from the court. Hence, revocation of supervised release is not the only option DHFS has when a sexually violent person violates conditions or rules.

¶39 When the department moves to revoke supervised release on grounds that the released person has violated one or more conditions or rules, "or that the safety of others requires that supervised release be revoked," the state has the burden of proving its case by clear and convincing evidence. § 980.06(2)(d).

¶40 The statute does not state explicitly what the court must consider. We think it is self-evident, however, that when the court determines, on the evidence after a hearing, that "the safety of others requires that supervised release be revoked," the court has found that there is clear and convincing evidence that it has no alternative but to revoke to assure the safety of others. Put another way, the court has found that the safety of others requires the person's commitment to a secure facility because supervised release will not be adequate.

¶41 The dictionary definition of the word "require" contains such phrases as: "To have as a requisite," "To call for as obligatory," "To impose an obligation on; compel." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1533 (3d ed. 1992). If the court finds that the safety of others compels that supervised release be revoked, the court need not provide an explicit statement why alternatives to incarceration were considered but not selected. If the court ever has question about the need to revoke on this ground, it can find that the state has not satisfied its burden of proof, or it can proactively explore alternatives to revocation.

¶42 The court of appeals offered a slightly different interpretation of the statute. It noted that under the statute, the court must first determine whether any rule or condition of release has been violated or whether the safety of others requires revocation. Burris, 258 Wis. 2d 454, ¶22. "If either of these conditions is met, the circuit court 'may' revoke an order for supervised release." Id. "However, upon a finding that the safety of others requires revocation, the plain language of the statute removes any discretion from the circuit court. Simply stated, it is irrational to require consideration of alternatives to revocation after a court has found that the safety of others requires revocation." Id. We do not dispute this interpretation.

¶43 In examining this issue, the statutory scheme must be understood. Under the old law and under the current law, the court makes the decision whether to place a person on supervised release. When the department seeks to revoke supervised release, the court serves as a check on the department. The court cannot be expected to automatically rubber-stamp a petition to overturn its own previous determination and find that the safety of others requires revocation, unless the state has adduced clear and convincing evidence.

¶44 As noted, the statute also provides that if "the court determines after hearing that any rule or condition of release has been violated . . . it may revoke the order for supervised release and order that the released person be placed in an appropriate institution." Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(d) (emphasis added). Here again, the statute does not state explicitly what the court must consider or what the court must explain. However, given the wide range of potential rule violations, including the failure to pay fines and restitution, we expect courts will recognize that revocation of supervised release based upon violation of one or more conditions or rules is likely to receive much closer scrutiny than revocation based on a finding that "the safety of others requires" revocation. In such a case, a court should explore alternatives or fully explain why some step short of revocation would not be adequate.

¶45 We stated in Keding, 254 Wis. 2d 334, ¶13, that "the revocation decision itself is a discretionary one, subject to a deferential standard of review. We will uphold a circuit court's exercise of discretion if the court employs a process of reasoning based on the facts of record and reaches 'a conclusion based on a logical rationale founded upon proper legal standards'" (quoting State ex rel. J.H. Findorff & Son, Inc. v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 2000 WI 30, ¶21, 233 Wis. 2d 428, 608 N.W.2d 679). "Discretion not only entails the process of decision making on the basis of the relevant facts but also requires that the decision be consonant with the purposes of the established law or other guides to discretion." Plotkin, 63 Wis. 2d at 545. One of the purposes of the law is to control sexually violent persons "in the least restrictive manner consistent with the requirements of the person." Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(b). When supervised release is revoked on the basis of the violation of a rule or condition of release, the court should explain its decision and square that decision with the treatment-oriented purposes of the law.

¶46 It must be acknowledged that the phrase "may revoke" follows a finding of a rule violation as well as a finding that "the safety of others requires that supervised release be revoked." This poses the question whether the word "may" has different applications as it is tied to different clauses in the same sentence. We believe that it does.

¶47 Parallel legislative history provides assistance. There is little doubt, because of consistent organization and use of language, that parts of Chapter 980 are modeled after Wis. Stat. § 971.17 entitled "Commitment of persons found not guilty by reason of mental disease or mental defect." In the 1987 statutes, Wis. Stat. § 971.17(3) speaks of revoking the conditional release of a person found not guilty because of mental disease or defect: "If . . . the court determines after a hearing that the conditions of release have not been fulfilled and that the safety of the person or the safety of others requires that his or her conditional release be revoked, the court shall immediately order the person recommitted to the department." (Emphasis added.).

¶48 In 1990 the legislature approved 1989 Act 334, a bill drafted by the Insanity Defense Committee of the Judicial Council. In that act, Wis. Stat. § 971.17 was repealed and recreated. Subsection (3)(a) provided that after a person was found not guilty of a crime by reason of mental disease or mental defect, "an order for commitment . . . shall specify either institutional care or conditional release." Wis. Stat. § 971.17(3)(a) (1991-92). Subsection (e), which closely parallels § 980.06(2)(d) (1997-98), then provided for revocation of conditional release. Part of the text reads:

The state has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that any rule or condition of release has been violated, or that the safety of the person or others requires that conditional release be revoked. If the court determines after hearing that any rule or condition of release has been violated, or that the safety of the person or others requires that conditional release be revoked, it may revoke the order for conditional release and order that the released person be placed in an appropriate institution.

¶49 An early draft of this legislation provided, in part, that: "If the court determines after a hearing that any rule or condition of release has been violated, it may revoke the order for conditional release." Judicial Council Insanity Defense Committee File 4 of 5 (1988-1991), Document 67 (LRB 0902/1 draft dated 11/14/88). At the urging of the Department of Health and Social Services, Judge Mark Frankel asked the Insanity Defense Committee to provide more discretion to revoke the conditional release of defendants under the statute. The December 15, 1989, minutes of the committee read in part as follows:

Ms. Greenley pointed out that proposed par. (3)(c) allows the person to be taken into custody if he or she "violates any condition or rule." This does not include the broader language suggested by Judge Frankel earlier in our deliberations, allowing the person to be taken into custody if he or she is becoming dangerous again, notwithstanding no rule or condition of supervision has been violated. Last month, a draft was circulated which includes the concept Judge Frankel suggested (LRB-2701/4). It allows a conditional released person to be taken into custody "if the safety of the person or others requires revocation of conditional release."

Chairman Pappas said that one of our original goals in this committee had been to address that situation. He asked if there were objection to including this alternative standard for revocation. Ms. Greenley said she had no objection. The committee agreed to make this chan


Case No.:		00-1425
Complete Title:
		In re the Commitment of Ervin Burris: State of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Ervin Burris, Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.

		REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 2002 WI App 262 Reported at: 258 Wis. 2d. 454, 654 N.W.2d 866 (Ct. App. 2002-Published)

Opinion Filed:		June 30, 2004
Submitted on Briefs:
Oral Argument:		September 9, 2003

Source of Appeal:
	Court:	Circuit
	County:	Rock-Beloit
	Judge:	James Welker

Justices:
	Concurred:	CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.
	Dissented:	ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).
	Not Participating:

Attorneys:

(L.C. No.	96 CF 1436B)
STATE OF WISCONSIN :		IN SUPREME COURT

In re the Commitment of Ervin Burris: State of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Ervin Burris, Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.			FILED JUN 30, 2004 Cornelia G. Clark Clerk of Supreme Court