2011 WI 65
Supreme Court of Wisconsin
Steven T. Kilian,
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Reported at: 324
(Ct. App. 2010 – Unpublished)
July 12, 2011
Submitted on Briefs:
January 5, 2011
Source of Appeal:
ROGGENSACK, J. concurs (Opinion filed).
ZIEGLER, J. did not participate.
plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent-petitioner there were briefs and oral
argument by Vincent P. Megna and Timothy
For the defendants-respondents-cross-appellants there was a brief by Patrick L. Wells and Owen Armstrong, Von Briesen & Roper, S.C. and oral argument by Patrick L. Wells.
2011 WI 65
This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports.
IN SUPREME COURT
Steven T. Kilian,
JUL 12, 2011
A. John Voelker
Acting Clerk of Supreme Court
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed and cause remanded.
¶1 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.
Steven Kilian seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of
that affirmed the order of the circuit court for
¶2 Kilian leased a Mercedes-Benz vehicle in 2006.
¶3 Kilian retained counsel to assist in stopping Mercedes-Benz
Financial's collection efforts. Kilian's
counsel informed Mercedes-Benz Financial that the car had been returned to, and
Kilian had received a refund from,
¶4 We conclude that Kilian may maintain an action for equitable relief under Lemon Law subsection (7). Further, we hold that Mercedes-Benz Financial's enforcement of the lease after it was informed by Kilian's attorney that Kilian had received a refund, and after it assured Kilian that collections efforts would cease, violated the Lemon Law. We also conclude that Kilian prevailed in his action when Mercedes-Benz Financial voluntarily ceased enforcement of the lease after Kilian filed suit. We conclude that Kilian, as the prevailing party, is entitled to his costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorney fees, but that Kilian is not entitled to an award for pecuniary loss. As a result, we reverse the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for a determination of the appropriate amount of Kilian's costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorney fees.
¶5 On March 21, 2006, Steven Kilian signed a thirty-nine month motor
vehicle lease agreement with Concours Motors, Inc. Concours Motors is an authorized dealer for
¶6 During the first year of the lease, Kilian's vehicle required
repairs on seven occasions and was out of service for an aggregate of
approximately forty days. Because of the
number of problems with his new car, Kilian decided to assert his rights under
¶7 On May 10, 2007, Kilian returned the car to Concours Motors,
Inc. On the same day, Kilian received a
$20,847.87 refund. Kilian then stopped making payments to
Mercedes-Benz Financial. He did so
because he believed that returning the vehicle to
¶8 The dispute leading to this case began when
¶9 On June 15, 2007, Attorney Megna wrote a letter on Kilian's behalf informing Mercedes-Benz Financial that the vehicle had been returned to Mercedes-Benz USA, that Kilian had received a refund under the Lemon Law, and that therefore Lemon Law § 218.0171(2)(cm)3. precluded enforcement of the lease. On June 20, Mercedes-Benz Financial responded with a letter from its Executive Referral Manager, Glen Bieler. In the letter, Bieler acknowledged receipt of Attorney Megna's June 15 letter and assured Attorney Megna that Mercedes-Benz Financial would refrain from further contact with Kilian regarding the lease.
¶10 After receiving Bieler's letter, Attorney Megna contacted the collections department of Mercedes-Benz Financial and was advised that the lease account remained open and active. On June 26, Attorney Megna sent a second letter to Mercedes-Benz Financial. In the second letter, Attorney Megna inquired as to whether the lease had in fact been cancelled by Mercedes-Benz Financial.
¶11 On July 1, 2007, Kilian received a "Federal Legal Notice" from Mercedes-Benz Financial. This document warned Kilian of consequences he could face after his payments became thirty or more days past due. Specifically, the notice cautioned: "We may report information about your account to credit bureaus. Late payments, missed payments, or other defaults on your account may be reflected in your credit report."
¶12 The following day, July 2, Kilian received an account statement reflecting a total amount due on the lease of $5,478.36. This amount reflected the aggregate of three months of lease payments, presumably for the months of May, June, and July. The statement listed July 21 as the payment due date.
¶13 On July 10, 2007, Kilian filed a complaint in the circuit court for
¶14 On August 29,
2007, while Kilian's action was pending in the circuit court,
¶15 In an order dated January 28, 2009, the circuit court addressed Mercedes-Benz Financial's motion for summary judgment. The circuit court found no genuine issue of material fact related to Kilian's Lemon Law claim. Further, the circuit court found that Kilian did not suffer a pecuniary loss when Mercedes-Benz Financial continued to enforce the lease after the vehicle was returned. It grounded this conclusion on the finding that Kilian did not make any lease payments to Mercedes-Benz Financial after returning the car. As a result, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Mercedes-Benz Financial.
¶16 The court of appeals, in an unpublished decision, affirmed the
circuit court. The court of appeals first held that claims
for attorney fees, defamation, and inconvenience did not qualify as pecuniary
loss, and that a claim for pecuniary loss was required in order to recover
under Lemon Law subsection (7). Kilian
v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 2009AP538, unpublished slip op., ¶¶10-13 (
¶17 We granted review and now reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶18 This case comes before us on a motion for summary judgment. "We review the grant of a motion for
summary judgment de novo, and apply the methodology specified in Wis. Stat. § 802.08." Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. v. Jackson
County, 2010 WI 95, ¶11,
¶19 This case also involves the interpretation of
¶20 In 1983, the legislature enacted
¶21 A consumer who leases a vehicle may request a refund under the
Lemon Law if warranty nonconformities cause the vehicle to be out of service
for an aggregate of thirty or more days during the first year of the
¶22 Consumers aggrieved by a violation of the Lemon Law may maintain an action under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7). Subsection (7) states:
In addition to pursuing any other remedy, a consumer may bring an action to recover for any damages caused by a violation of this section. The court shall award a consumer who prevails in such an action twice the amount of any pecuniary loss, together with costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney fees, and any equitable relief the court determines appropriate.
¶23 Applying subsection (7) to the instant case requires us to consider
four issues: (1) whether Kilian may maintain a cause of action; (2) whether
Mercedes-Benz Financial violated the Lemon Law; (3) whether Kilian prevailed in
his action; and (4) whether recovery of pecuniary loss, costs, disbursements,
reasonable attorney fees, and other equitable relief is appropriate in this
A. Kilian May Maintain a Cause of Action Under Lemon Law Subsection (7)
¶24 We first must determine whether Kilian may maintain an action under
Lemon Law subsection (7). The first
sentence of subsection (7) provides that "[i]n addition to pursuing any
other remedy, a consumer may maintain an action to recover for any damages
caused by a violation of this section."
¶25 The parties agree that this case turns on our interpretation of the word "damages." Mercedes-Benz Financial argues that Kilian could maintain an action only if his damages included pecuniary loss. According to its theory, since Kilian suffered no pecuniary loss, he could not maintain an action under Lemon Law subsection (7). Kilian, by contrast, argues that the word "damages" encompasses more than just pecuniary loss. According to his theory, because he sought equitable relief, he could properly maintain an action under Lemon Law subsection (7).
¶26 These two theories on the proper interpretation of the word "damages" address one underlying issue: whether it is proper for Kilian to maintain an action under the Lemon Law. We therefore now consider whether Kilian may maintain his action under Lemon Law subsection (7)'s first sentence.
court of appeals held that a consumer must suffer a pecuniary loss in order to
maintain an action under Lemon Law subsection (7). Kilian, No. 2009AP538, ¶¶9-10,
unpublished slip op. (
the court of appeals decision overlooks the plain language of subsection (7)'s
introductory clause. The broad language
of the introductory clause allows Kilian, as a consumer, "to pursu[e] any
. . . remedy."
the only appellate decision interpreting identical statutory language permits
consumers to seek equitable relief. See Cuellar v. Ford Motor Co.,
2006 WI App 210, ¶22, 296
¶30 Third, the absence of any legislative amendment to MVAPA supports the conclusion that Cuellar's interpretation of MVAPA subsection (4), Wis. Stat. § 218.0172(4), is consistent with the legislature's intent. See Zimmerman v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 633-34, 157 N.W.2d 648 (1968) ("The legislature is presumed to know that in absence of its changing the law, the construction put upon it by the courts will remain unchanged . . . . Thus, when the legislature acquiesces or refuses to change the law, it has acknowledged that the court's interpretation of legislative intent is correct."). In the five years since Cuellar, the legislature has made no modifications to MVAPA subsection (4) or any other identical statute, such as Lemon Law subsection (7). Therefore, we presume that the legislature has accepted the court of appeals' interpretation of this language as permitting consumers to maintain an action seeking equitable relief.
¶31 In light of subsection (7)'s broad introductory clause, the court of appeals decision in Cuellar, and the legislature's tacit acceptance of Cuellar's holding, we conclude that Kilian may maintain an action under the Lemon Law for equitable relief without alleging any pecuniary loss.
B. Mercedes-Benz Financial Violated the Lemon Law
¶32 We have concluded that Kilian may bring suit under the Lemon Law
for equitable relief. In order to obtain
relief under Lemon Law subsection (7), however, Kilian must prove that
Mercedes-Benz Financial violated some part of the Lemon Law.
¶33 Kilian argues that Mercedes-Benz Financial violated Lemon Law § 218.0171(2)(cm)3. This claim highlights an inherent tension in the statute because Mercedes-Benz Financial is the lease financing company, and not the manufacturer. The Lemon Law is primarily focused on imposing duties on manufacturers. However, it just as clearly precludes "[any] person" from enforcing a lease once the manufacturer has issued a refund. § 218.0171(2)(cm)3. ("No person may enforce the lease against the consumer . . . .").
¶34 We agree with Kilian that a lender who continues to enforce a lease after the consumer returns the vehicle and receives a refund from the manufacturer may be held to violate the plain language of the statute prohibiting "[any] person" from doing so. We now turn to an examination of the specific conduct undertaken by Mercedes-Benz Financial after Kilian received his refund.
¶35 On May 10, 2007, Kilian returned the leased vehicle pursuant to the Lemon Law and that same day received from the manufacturer a $20,847.87 refund. It is undisputed that the collections department of Mercedes-Benz Financial contacted Kilian and attempted to obtain payment on the lease after May 10.
¶36 Moreover, in his June 15 letter to Mercedes-Benz Financial, Kilian's attorney informed Mercedes-Benz Financial that Kilian had returned the vehicle to the manufacturer and had obtained a refund. In his June 20 reply, Bieler acknowledged receipt of the June 15 letter and assured Kilian's attorney that Mercedes-Benz Financial would stop contacting Kilian. However, on July 1, Kilian received a document entitled "Federal Legal Notice" from Mercedes-Benz Financial and, on July 2, Kilian received a bill for three months of payments from Mercedes-Benz Financial. The notice threatened that Mercedes-Benz Financial "may report information about your account to credit bureaus. Late payments, missed payments, or other defaults on your account may be reflected in your credit report." The bill was obviously a demand for payment.
¶37 Mercedes-Benz Financial attempts to defend its enforcement of the lease by arguing that there was "no way" for it to stop these notices from being mailed by its automated collections system. In essence, Mercedes-Benz Financial alleges that it made an innocent mistake and therefore cannot be penalized under the Lemon Law. This argument ignores the fact that the Lemon Law unambiguously prohibits enforcement of the lease following the issuance of a refund to the consumer, and nothing in its plain language provides an exception for accidental enforcement of a lease. Moreover, even if there were a "mistaken enforcement" exception, Mercedes-Benz Financial would not be entitled to it in light of the letter from Kilian's attorney informing Mercedes-Benz Financial of Kilian's receipt of a Lemon Law refund, the assurances by Bieler that further contacts with Kilian would cease, and Kilian's representations for over a month to Mercedes-Benz Financial collections employees that he had received a refund under the Lemon Law.
¶38 Therefore, in light of (1) Mercedes-Benz Financial's repeated efforts to enforce the lease for two months after Kilian received his refund, (2) the notice of the refund that Mercedes-Benz Financial received from both Kilian and his attorney, and (3) Bieler's assurances that Mercedes-Benz Financial's collection efforts would cease, we hold that Mercedes-Benz Financial violated Lemon Law § 218.0171(2)(cm)3.
C. Kilian Prevailed in His Lemon Law Action
¶39 We have concluded that Kilian may appropriately maintain a cause of
action under Lemon Law subsection (7) seeking equitable relief for
Mercedes-Benz Financial's violation of Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(cm)3.
If Kilian prevails in "such an action", he would be entitled to certain enumerated relief. Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7)
Specifically, he would be entitled to "twice the amount of any
pecuniary loss, together with costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney
fees, and any equitable relief the court determines appropriate."
¶40 We determine the precise nature of Kilian's claim for relief by examining its substance and not merely the label he affixed to it. We do so in order to determine whether Kilian received the relief he actually sought. We consider two issues in this regard: (1) whether we are limited by the fact that Kilian sought only one type of equitable relief, and (2) whether Kilian prevailed in his action seeking equitable relief.
¶41 First, we consider whether we are limited by the fact that the only
equitable remedy Kilian sought in his complaint was rescission of his lease
with Mercedes-Benz Financial. Rescission is an equitable remedy,
the effect of which is to "restore the parties to the position they would
have occupied if no contract had ever been made between them." Seidling v. Unichem, Inc., 52
of the precise label Kilian affixed to his request, it is well settled that a
court sitting in equity has the "power to enlarge the scope of the
ordinary forms of relief, and even to contrive new ones adapted to new
circumstances." Mulder v.
¶43 We now turn to consideration of the second issue, whether Kilian prevailed in receiving the equitable remedy he actually sought. In a typical case, it is clear which party prevails because that party will have a final judgment granted in its favor. Obtaining final judgment is not, however, the only way a party may earn the status of a prevailing party. While Mercedes-Benz Financial had provided assurances to Kilian prior to the filing of his lawsuit that its enforcement efforts would stop, it was only after Kilian commenced his lawsuit that Mercedes-Benz Financial ceased its efforts to enforce the lease.
¶44 In order to prevail in a consumer protection action, it is
sufficient that a consumer satisfy one of two tests. We address each of these two tests in
turn. The first test requires that the
consumer show (1) a causal link between his or her lawsuit and the relief
obtained, and (2) that the defendant's conduct in response to the lawsuit was
required by law. Cmty. Credit Plan,
Inc. v. Johnson, 228
¶45 A direct causal link exists between Kilian's
lawsuit and the equitable relief he obtained——that is, cessation of the enforcement of the lease by
Mercedes-Benz Financial after
he received a refund from
¶46 The second test the Community Credit Plan court applied was
also a two-prong test: (1) whether the consumer received a significant benefit
sought in litigation, and (2) whether there was a violation of a consumer
protection statute by the defendant. 228
D. Recovery of Pecuniary Loss, Costs, Disbursements, Reasonable Attorney Fees, and Other Equitable Relief
¶47 We have determined that Kilian may maintain an action against
Mercedes-Benz Financial for its violation of the Lemon Law and that Kilian
qualifies as a prevailing party under subsection (7). Because of his status as a prevailing party,
Kilian is entitled to "twice the amount of any pecuniary loss, together
with costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney fees, and any equitable
relief the court determines appropriate."
1. Twice Kilian's Pecuniary Loss
¶48 Under the Lemon Law, a consumer may seek relief for his or her
purchase or lease of a "lemon" vehicle by requesting a refund from
the manufacturer. See
¶49 If the consumer's refund is delayed, miscalculated, or withheld,
the consumer may commence litigation under Lemon Law subsection (7). See
¶50 On May 10, 2007, Kilian received a timely refund from
¶51 The legislature did not intend that consumers who have already received a proper refund should also recover twice the amount they paid under the lease as pecuniary loss. Granting Kilian’s request would not serve subsection (7)'s purpose——to encourage manufacturers to provide consumers proper Lemon Law refunds without resorting to litigation——because he has already received a $20,847.87 refund. Such a result would provide a windfall to Kilian without advancing a central purpose of subsection (7)——discouraging manufacturers from withholding legitimate refunds.
¶52 We conclude that, because Kilian has already received a properly calculated and timely refund, he did not suffer any pecuniary loss within the meaning of subsection (7). Therefore, we turn to a discussion of other relief available to Kilian under subsection (7).
2. Costs and Disbursements
¶53 Kilian is entitled to an award for his costs and disbursements
caused by a violation of the Lemon Law.
¶55 The circuit court did not determine the amount of Kilian's costs and disbursements. We therefore remand the cause to the circuit court to determine the appropriate amount.
3. Reasonable Attorney Fees
¶56 Kilian is also entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees
caused by Mercedes-Benz Financial's violation of the Lemon Law.
¶57 We have held that "an important purpose of fee-shifting
statutes is to encourage injured parties to enforce their statutory rights when
the cost of litigation, absent the fee-shifting provision, would discourage
them from doing so." Kolupar v.
Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2007 WI 98, ¶55, 303
¶58 As a result, Kilian may recover reasonable attorney fees caused by Mercedes-Benz Financial's violation of Lemon Law § 218.0171(2)(cm)3. The circuit court did not determine the amount of Kilian's reasonable attorney fees in the first instance. Therefore, we remand the cause to the circuit court to determine the appropriate amount.
4. Other Appropriate Equitable Relief
¶59 The final remedy allowed under subsection (7) permits the court to
award Kilian "appropriate" equitable relief.
¶60 We conclude that Kilian may maintain an action for equitable relief under Lemon Law subsection (7) and that Mercedes-Benz Financial's enforcement of the lease after it was informed by Kilian's attorney that Kilian had received a refund, and after it assured Kilian that collections efforts would cease, violated the Lemon Law. We also conclude that Kilian prevailed in his action when Mercedes-Benz Financial voluntarily ceased enforcement of the lease after Kilian filed suit. As the prevailing party, we conclude that Kilian is entitled to his costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorney fees, but that Kilian is not entitled to an award for pecuniary loss. As a result, we reverse the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for a determination of the appropriate amount of Kilian's costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorney fees.
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶61 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J., did not participate.
¶62 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring). I
join the majority opinion, but I write in concurrence in order to point out a
¶63 First, as the majority underscores, without a requirement that the manufacturer notify financing institutions that a vehicle has been returned pursuant to the Lemon Law, a consumer may be adversely affected. Without notice of the return, the financing institution will likely continue in its efforts to collect payments that it believes the consumer owes under the financing agreement. For example, the financing institution could harm a consumer's credit rating by reporting the missed payments or, in an attempt to prevent harm to his credit rating, a consumer may be forced to incur litigation expenses in order to stop enforcement efforts.
¶64 Second, without a requirement that the manufacturer notify
financing institutions that the vehicle has been returned pursuant to the Lemon
Law, financing institutions may be adversely affected. Pursuant to
¶65 In the case at hand, these conclusions are not troublesome because Kilian informed Mercedes-Benz Financial that he had returned his car under the Lemon Law, and therefore, Mercedes-Benz Financial was on notice that it was improper to continue collection efforts against Kilian. However, the conclusions we reach today become troublesome where the financing institution has not had notice that the consumer has returned the vehicle to the manufacturer.
¶66 In order to avoid unwarranted adverse consequences to consumers and to financing institutions, it would be helpful if the Wisconsin Legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 218.0171 to add two notice requirements to Wisconsin's Lemon Law upon the return of the vehicle: (1) that the consumer notify the manufacturer of the current financing information for the vehicle and (2) that the manufacturer notify the financing institution of the vehicle's return. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.
 Kilian v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 2009AP538, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2010).
 Mercedes-Benz Financial was
described in the record as the "financing arm" of
 Kilian also alleged that
Mercedes-Benz USA violated Lemon Law § 218.0171(2)(b)3.a. by failing to
pay off the lease with Mercedes-Benz Financial.
On December 15, 2008, the circuit court granted
 Kilian, No. 2009AP538, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2010).
 See 1983
 The Lemon Law is clear as to its intent to hold automobile manufacturers accountable, and to provide remedies to those consumers who have incurred damages as a result of conduct which the statute proscribes. While the Lemon Law's general purpose is clear, the particular terms and provisions contained in the statute are sometimes opaque. In subsection (7), for example, no definition is provided for the term "damages." And while § 218.0171(2)(cm)1. prescribes specific actions a manufacturer must take when issuing the consumer a refund, § 218.0171(2)(cm)3., by contrast, makes only the blanket statement that "no person" may enforce a lease after a refund has been issued. This case centers on these ambiguities, which we intend to clarify today in a fashion consistent with the legislature's intent.
 Kilian argued that he suffered defamation damages as a result of Mercedes-Benz Financial's negative reports to credit agencies, and that those damages were sufficient to bring an action under Lemon Law subsection (7). We do not agree. Lemon Law subsection (7) claims do not include personal injury damages. Gosse v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 2000 WI App 8, ¶14, 232 Wis. 2d 163, 605 N.W.2d 896 (holding that a consumer was not entitled to recover personal injury damages under the Lemon Law). Nothing precluded Kilian from alleging defamation as an independent cause of action in his complaint. No evidence indicates the legislature intended to include such claims under the Lemon Law. Therefore, we conclude that Kilian may not bootstrap a defamation claim to his Lemon Law subsection (7) claim. For the purposes of this decision, we also assume, without deciding, that pre-suit attorney fees and unspecified "inconvenience" damages do not qualify as pecuniary loss under subsection (7).
 In Part III.D.1. of this opinion, we explain that Kilian suffered no pecuniary loss because he had already received a properly calculated refund from Mercedes-Benz Financial.
 "Legislative failure to
act is ordinarily weak evidence of legislative intention to acquiesce in or
countenance a judicial or executive branch interpretation. . . . Under proper
circumstances, however, inaction by the legislature may be evidence of
legislative intent." Schill v.
Wisconsin Rapids School Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶124, 327 Wis. 2d 572,
786 N.W.2d 177. In the instant
case, we conclude the "presumption of tacit adoption and
ratification" is relevant insofar as it is consistent with the plain
language contained in subsection (7)'s broad introductory clause. See Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v.
Dep't of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 72
 While we do not rely on legislative
history when a statute is unambiguous on its face, this court, on occasion,
will "consult legislative history to show how that history supports our
interpretation of a statute otherwise clear on its face." Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶52,
In the instant case, the legislative history of the Lemon Law supports our interpretation of the term "damages." The legislative drafting notes from 1983 show that the term "pecuniary loss" was originally used in place of the term "damages." Subsection (7) initially provided that "any person suffering a pecuniary loss because of a violation of this section may bring a civil action . . . ." However, the final bill was amended to state that "a consumer damaged by a violation of this section may bring an action . . . ." See LRBs0091/1; WLCS:92/1 (March 4, 1983). This amendment suggests the legislature intended to provide a broader range of remedies under this provision than merely pecuniary loss.
 The Lemon Law imposes no duty on the manufacturer to inform the lease financing company of a vehicle's return under the Lemon Law. This absence is disconcerting as Justice Roggensack discusses in her thoughtful concurrence. Without such a duty, a consumer may incur damages as a result of a manufacturer's failure to provide such notice. We leave open the question of whether the Lemon Law imposes a duty of good faith on a manufacturer which would require it to give notice of the refund to a lease financing company. We do not reach this question because Kilian has not alleged that Mercedes-Benz USA acted in bad faith when it failed to inform Mercedes-Benz Financial of the refund.
 Kilian asserts that he received daily phone calls from Mercedes-Benz Financial collections employees. Bieler (Mercedes-Benz Financial's agent) stated in his deposition "I don't know for sure if it's daily. I really couldn't answer that." The precise extent of Mercedes-Benz Financial's early enforcement efforts is not discernible from the record. It is, however, undisputed that Kilian received at least two documents attempting to enforce the lease after Mercedes-Benz Financial (1) had been explicitly informed by Attorney Megna that Kilian had received a refund under the Lemon Law and (2) had assured Kilian that its collection efforts would cease.
 Nothing in the record indicates that either Mercedes-Benz USA or Mercedes-Benz Financial intentionally violated the Lemon Law.
 Pecuniary loss incorporates "a
reasonable allowance for use" before being doubled. Tammi, 320
 "This action may
be reviewed by the court on motion of the party aggrieved made and served
within 10 days after taxation."
Costs allowed by the court are taxed by the clerk of the court of appeals, irrespective of the filing by a party of a petition for review in the supreme court. In the event of review by the supreme court, costs are taxed by the clerk of the supreme court . . . . The clerk of the supreme court shall include in the remittitur the costs allowed in the court. The clerk of circuit court shall enter the judgment for costs in accordance with s. 806.16.
 A "fee-shifting
statute" is a statute that provides for an award of attorney fees for a
prevailing plaintiff. See 11
Wisc. Prac., Trial Handbook for
 These "reasonable
expenses" exclude costs and disbursements already allowed to Kilian under
§ 814.04 so that Kilian receives no double recovery for overlapping items. Chmill v. Friendly Ford-Mercury of
Janesville, Inc., 154
 This includes
"attorney fees for appellate work essential to the consumer's
success." Chmill, 144
 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated.
 A referral to the legislature's law review committee of the Legislative Council may be of assistance in this matter.
 Majority op., ¶35 n.14.
 Not surprisingly, the standard Lemon Law notice form provided by the Department of Transportation already asks the consumer to provide the manufacturer with this information and to authorize the manufacturer to contact the financing institution. See Motor Vehicle Lemon Law Notice, available at http://www.dot.wisconsin.gov/safety/consumer/rights/lemonlaw.htm (scroll down to "What should a lemon owner do?" and click on "Motor Vehicle Lemon Law Notice" pdf link). However, the statutes do not so require.