|
COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED May
23, 1996 |
NOTICE |
|
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-0036-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RANDOLPH
O. NEUMEYER,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Dane County: STUART A. SCHWARTZ, Judge.
Affirmed.
VERGERONT,
J.[1] Randolph
Neumeyer appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of
§ 346.63(1)(a), Stats. He raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends that his prosecution and
sentence subjected him to double jeopardy because he had previously been
punished in administrative proceedings by suspension of his operating
privileges. Second, he contends the
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence because
the police officer's request that he perform field sobriety tests constituted
an arrest and was not supported by probable cause. We reject both arguments and affirm.
Neumeyer
acknowledges that we recently held in State v. McMaster, 198
Wis.2d 542, 543 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1995), petition for review granted,
(Wis. March 12, 1996), that criminal prosecution for operating a motor vehicle
with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration after administrative suspension
of operating privileges does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 544, 543 N.W.2d at 499. Neumeyer explains that he has raised this
issue on appeal solely to preserve it for subsequent review in light of the
fact that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has accepted the petition for review in McMaster. Following McMaster, we
conclude that the criminal prosecution did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
Neumeyer
next argues that the request to perform field sobriety tests transforms a Terry[2]
investigative stop into an arrest, and therefore probable cause to arrest is
required before such a request may lawfully be made. Neumeyer acknowledges that in State v. Swanson, 164
Wis.2d 437, 475 N.W.2d 148 (1991), the supreme court held that a person is not
under arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes when he or she is asked to perform
field sobriety tests because a reasonable person would not believe that he or
she is under arrest after merely being requested to perform field sobriety
tests during a routine traffic stop. Id.
at 448, 475 N.W.2d at 153. But,
according to Neumeyer, the subsequent case of State v. Babbitt,
188 Wis.2d 349, 525 N.W.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1994), requires a re-examination of Swanson.[3] In Babbitt, we held that a
refusal to perform a field sobriety test is not protected by the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and, therefore, the refusal may be used to
establish probable cause to arrest for driving while under the influence of an
intoxicant. Babbitt, 188
Wis.2d at 362, 525 N.W.2d at 106.
Neumeyer argues that a person who is detained is no longer really free
to decline to take a field sobriety test when requested because that refusal
may be used as evidence for probable cause to arrest. This "Hobson's choice," according to Neumeyer,
transforms a Terry investigative stop into an arrest as soon as
the person who is detained is asked to take a field sobriety test.
There
is no merit to Neumeyer's argument. A
person is not compelled to submit to field sobriety tests simply because a
refusal may be considered as evidence of probable cause to arrest for driving
while intoxicated. We did not hold in Babbitt
that refusal alone constitutes probable cause to arrest.[4] Babbitt is not inconsistent
with Swanson and does not require a re-examination of Swanson. In fact, our discussion and decision in Babbitt
assumes that the request to take field sobriety tests is not an arrest;
otherwise, we would not have discussed whether there was probable cause to
arrest after the detained person refused to take the field sobriety tests. Following Swanson, we conclude
that the request that Neumeyer take field sobriety tests did not transform the Terry
investigative stop into an arrest.
By
the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See
Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.
[3] We do not understand Neumeyer's argument that
we can decide that State v. Swanson, 164 Wis.2d 437, 475 N.W.2d
148 (1991), does not control this case without overruling it. He acknowledges that we cannot overrule Swanson. We do not address this argument in more
detail because of our conclusion that State v. Babbitt, 188
Wis.2d 349, 525 N.W.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1994), is not inconsistent with Swanson.
[4] In State v. Babbitt, 188 Wis.2d
349, 525 N.W.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1994), we concluded that there was probable cause
to arrest even without consideration of the refusal; but we discussed and
decided the permissibility of considering a defendant's refusal to submit to a
field sobriety test for purposes of establishing probable cause to arrest
because both parties requested that we do so.
Babbitt, 188 Wis.2d at 358, 525 N.W.2d at 105.