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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED DECEMBER 10, 1996 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-0453
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
JULIE YOUNG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WAL-MART STORES, INC.,
DELAWARE d/b/a SAM'S
CLUB, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Outagamie County:
JOHN A. DES JARDINS, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Julie Young appeals a judgment on a verdict that
dismissed Young's personal injury lawsuit against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Young suffered injuries while shopping in
one of Wal-Mart's many Sam's Club warehouse stores. Numerous industrial size, twenty-five-pound, aluminum foil boxes
fell on her back, neck, and shoulders when she attempted to remove one from a
stacked merchandise display. The jury
found Wal-Mart 33% causally negligent and Young 67% causally negligent. On appeal, Young argues that the verdict
contradicts the evidence and that she deserves a new trial in the interest of
justice. We reject these arguments and
therefore affirm the judgment dismissing her complaint.
Negligence is the
failure to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances. Marciniak v. Lundborg, 153
Wis.2d 59, 64, 450 N.W.2d 243, 245 (1990).
The apportionment of causal negligence is a jury question and will not
be upset on appeal except where it is unreasonably disproportionate as a matter
of law. Skybrock v. Concrete
Constr. Co., 42 Wis.2d 480, 490, 167 N.W.2d 209, 214 (1969). Someone is causally negligent whenever his
negligent actions were a substantial factor contributing to the result. Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co.,
87 Wis.2d 723, 735, 275 N.W.2d 660, 666 (1979). Like other jury questions, appellate courts sustain jury verdicts
on the issue as long as the record contains any credible evidence to support
them. Ford Motor Co. v. Lyons,
137 Wis.2d 397, 442, 405 N.W.2d 354, 372 (Ct. App. 1987).
In negligence cases, the
trier of fact, not appellate courts, judge the weight of the evidence and the
credibility of witnesses. Fehring
v. Republic Ins. Co., 118 Wis.2d 299, 305, 347 N.W.2d 595, 598
(1984). As an appellate court, we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, Black v.
Gundersen Clinic, Ltd., 152 Wis.2d 210, 214, 448 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Ct.
App. 1989), and search the record for evidence to sustain the verdict, not for
evidence to sustain a verdict that the jury could have but did not reach. Fehring, 118 Wis.2d at 306,
347 N.W.2d at 598. Furthermore, we give
additional deference to verdicts that trial courts have approved against
challenges for insufficient evidence. Watts
(Bishoff) v. Watts, 152 Wis.2d 370, 381, 448 N.W.2d 292, 296 (Ct. App.
1989). Here, the trial court did not
affirmatively confirm the verdict, allowing the postverdict motions to
lapse.
Nonetheless, the jury
could reasonably find Young 67% causally negligent and Wal-Mart 33% causally
negligent. The jury had an obligation
to consider the facts as a whole and make a judgment on the degree of diligence
exercised by reasonable warehouse store shoppers. Each juror could consider his own experience in warehouse stores
in evaluating the kind of care necessary in that shopping environment. Warehouse store shoppers regularly encounter
stacked merchandise when shopping. In
fact, other shoppers have the opportunity to restack the merchandise, without
the store's knowledge or control. For
these reasons, warehouse store shoppers must exercise reasonable care in
judging the nature of the stacking method, the danger posed by the stacked
merchandise, and the feasibility of attempting to unstack the merchandise
without assistance from store personnel.
They may not overestimate their competence in such matters. After considering Young's testimony and the
incident's inherent nature, a reasonable jury of experienced shoppers could
rationally find that Young should have recognized the risk of a faulty stack
method and solicited assistance from store personnel before attempting to
remove the box herself. On this basis,
the jury could reasonably find Young twice as causally negligent as Wal-Mart.
We also reject Young's
request for a new trial in the interest of justice. We possess the discretionary power to reverse judgments in the
interests of justice. State v.
McConnohie, 113 Wis.2d 362, 374, 334 N.W.2d 903, 909 (1983). We will not exercise this discretionary
power, however, unless the real controversy was not tried or justice has
miscarried. State v. Wyss,
124 Wis.2d 681, 734-35, 370 N.W.2d 745, 770-71 (1985). Here, the trial court fully tried the issue
of Wal-Mart's liability. Young
introduced a substantial amount of evidence on the subject. She fully argued her case to the jury, and
the trial court furnished proper instructions.
Although the jury drew inferences that Young wishes it had not drawn, the
jury had the right, as the fact finder, to apportion the causal negligence in the
manner that it did. In the final
analysis, we are persuaded that Young's trial resolved the real controversy at
issue and produced no miscarriage of justice.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.