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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED NOVEMBER 19, 1996 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-0599
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE EX REL. JAG
OUTDOOR
ADVERTISING, INC.
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
DOOR COUNTY BOARD OF
ADJUSTMENT,
Respondent-Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Door County:
JOHN D. KOEHN, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
PER CURIAM. JAG Outdoor Advertising, Inc., appeals a
circuit court order denying certiorari relief from a decision of the Door
County Board of Adjustment (BOA) compelling JAG to conform to maximum size
requirements (thirty-two square feet) as a condition to a permit to
"reconstruct" two billboards blown down in a storm. JAG contends that the BOA acted contrary to
law and that its decision was arbitrary and unreasonable because it did not
apply the "50% rule" permitting repairs to nonconforming uses.[1]
The County contends that JAG stipulated
prior to the hearing that the 50% rule was inapplicable. Even if we presume without deciding that the
parties did not intend to stipulate that the 50% repair rule was inapplicable,
we conclude that the record includes substantial evidence to support the BOA's
finding that the restoration of the billboards constituted a reconstruction and
not a mere repair. We therefore affirm
the circuit court order upholding the decision of the BOA.
Upon review of a common
law certiorari judgment, the appellate court reviews the decision of the BOA
and not the circuit court. State
ex rel. Harris v. Annuity & Pension Bd., 87 Wis.2d 646, 651, 275
N.W.2d 668, 671 (1979). We must decide:
1. Whether the decision maker kept
within its jurisdiction.
2. Whether it acted according to
law.
3. Whether its action was arbitrary,
oppressive and unreasonable and represents its will and not its judgment.
4. Whether
the evidence was such that it might reasonably make the order or determination
made.
The test on certiorari
review is the substantial evidence test.
State ex rel. Palleon v. Musolf, 120 Wis.2d 545, 549, 356
N.W.2d 487, 489 (1984). Substantial
evidence does not mean a preponderance of the evidence; rather the test is
whether, taking into account all the evidence in the record, reasonable minds
could arrive at the same conclusion as the board or agency. Id. The rules of construction applicable to statutes apply to the
construction of ordinances. Hambleton
v. Friedmann, 117 Wis.2d 460, 462, 344 N.W.2d 212, 213 (Ct. App.
1984). The meaning of a statute or an
ordinance is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. at 461, 344 N.W.2d at 213.
The two billboards at
issue were located for many years along Highway 57/42 in the Town of Sevastopol
in Door County, and the County does not dispute that they predate the zoning
ordinance regulating billboards.
Although the parties raise issues concerning the BOA's additional
finding that one of the billboards was not a legal nonconforming use, we do not
address those questions because the finding of a reconstruction rather than a
repair is dispositive.
After the signs were
blown down and damaged in a windstorm during the week of Thanksgiving 1994, the
county zoning administrator advised JAG that the county zoning ordinance
required a permit for reconstruction of a sign, and that no permit could issue
absent compliance with the maximum size requirements, no more than thirty-two
square feet in area.
JAG appealed to the BOA
on grounds that the signs were in existence pursuant to leases long before the
County adopted its sign ordinances.
Prior to the hearing before the BOA, the parties entered into a written
stipulation. JAG does dispute the
County's assertion that it prepared the stipulation, which provided in relevant
part:
Because
the basis for the Order by [the zoning administrator] was that [the
reconstruction provisions of the ordinance] prohibits the reconstruction of a
sign unless such sign is in full conformity with the requirements of the
Ordinance and because the 50% maximum requirement of [the county ordinance
relating to repairs] does not apply therefore the "50% rule"
set forth in [the ordinance] is not relevant to these proceedings; and,
in addition, because the signs in question have no "equalized assessed
value," therefore, there shall be no need nor requirement on the part of
JAG Outdoor Advertising to address the "50% rule" referred to. (Emphasis added.)
The County contends that
because JAG drafted the stipulation, any ambiguities should be construed
against it, citing cases applying the well-known rule of construction
applicable to contracts. JAG, on the
other hand, cites Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp. v. Milwaukee
County, 82 Wis.2d 420, 263 N.W.2d 503 (1978), for the proposition that
pretrial stipulations excluding evidence should be construed consistent with
the apparent intent of the parties, the spirit of justice, and the furtherance
of fair trials upon the merits, and should not be construed technically so as
to defeat the purposes for which they were made. Id. at 442, 263 N.W.2d at 515-16. In any case, the primary rule is to
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties. Id.
The record of the
proceedings before the BOA contains remarks by counsel for the opposing sides
that could be used both to support and to diminish JAG's contention that the
stipulation was not meant to treat the 50% rule as irrelevant. We decline to rely upon the now disputed
stipulation as a basis to deny JAG relief.
It is our conclusion that substantial
evidence supports the BOA's decision that the restoration constituted a
reconstruction. The dictionary meaning
of the two words provides: A
reconstruction is "something reassembled (as from parts) of its original
form or appearance." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary
1898 (Unabr. 1978). A repair is
"restoration to a state of soundness, efficiency, or health
...." Id. at 1923.
While the distinction
between a repair and a reconstruction may not be a bright line, this is not
dispositive.
[I]t
must be borne in mind that the policy of the law is the gradual elimination of
nonconforming uses and, accordingly, ordinances should not be given an
interpretation which would permit an indefinite continuation of the
nonconforming use.
State
ex rel. Peterson v. Burt, 42 Wis.2d 284, 291, 166
N.W.2d 207, 210 (1969) (quoting 8 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations, § 25.189 and cases cited (3d ed.)).
It is not an
unreasonable construction of the zoning provisions to interpret
"reconstruction" of billboards to cover the circumstances described
to the BOA by JAG's general manager, Paul Wauters. Wauters told the BOA that although the face of the north sign was
totally intact, it was necessary to redig the holes and put in new posts and
then replace the existing sign face. He
testified that repairs to the south sign also involved replacing two poles and
reinstalling one-half the existing sign face.
These requirements constitute a reassembling from parts to an original
form or appearance and go beyond the ordinary restoration of worn and aging components
of a sign. Because this is so, the
decision of the board was neither contrary to law nor arbitrary and
unreasonable. We therefore affirm the
circuit court order upholding the decision of the Door County BOA.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] The 50% rule is a reference to the provisions found both in § 59.97(10)(a), Stats., and a corresponding provision of the Door County ordinances. The statute provides that a county may not prevent a legal nonconforming use in existence prior to the adoption of the zoning ordinance, but it may prohibit repairs in excess of 50% of the property's assessed value.