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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED OCTOBER 1, 1996 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-0698-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
TIMOTHY R. PAMONICUTT,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
and an order of the circuit court for Shawano County: EARL SCHMIDT, Judge. Affirmed.
CANE, P.J. Timothy Pamonicutt appeals the sentence
portion of his convictions for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated,
fifth offense, and operating a motor vehicle after revocation, fourth
offense. Pamonicutt alleges that the
State failed to prove, and he did not admit, his prior convictions for
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and operating a motor vehicle after
suspension or revocation. Because
Pamonicutt admitted as part of the plea bargain that this was his fifth OWI
offense and fourth OAR offense, which is sufficient for the imposition of
enhanced penalties, the judgment and order are affirmed.
The procedure in this
case is undisputed. As part of a plea
bargain, Pamonicutt entered a no contest plea to the charges of operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated, fifth offense, and operating a motor vehicle
after revocation, fourth offense. In
exchange for the plea on the OWI charge, the prosecutor recommended one year in
the county jail, three years' revocation of Pamonicutt's driving privileges and
a fine and costs of $2,780. The
prosecutor also recommended a consecutive sixty days in jail, six months
revocation of operating privileges and a fine and costs of $1,915 on the OAR
offense. In the plea colloquy, the
trial court informed Pamonicutt of the penalties he was facing and at no time
did Pamonicutt or his attorney dispute the number of prior offenses as alleged
in the criminal complaints. The court
accepted Pamonicutt's pleas and sentenced him in accordance with the plea
bargain as recommended by the prosecutor.
Pamonicutt filed a postconviction motion to
modify his sentences on his contention that the enhanced penalties could not be
imposed because the State failed to prove his prior convictions and he had not
admitted the convictions. On appeal,
Pamonicutt does not challenge the voluntariness of his pleas, but rather argues
that the State failed to prove the penalty enhancers as required in the general
repeater statute.
Because the facts of
record in this case are undisputed, whether the record satisfies the statutory
requirement necessary to enhance the penalties presents a question of law this
court resolves without deference to the trial court's determination. State v. Keith, 175 Wis.2d 75,
78, 498 N.W.2d 865, 866 (Ct. App. 1993).
Essentially, Pamonicutt
asserts that the general principles of law applicable to criminal repeater
statutes in §§ 939.62 and 973.12, Stats.,
are applicable to the enhanced penalties provided for traffic offenses which
are defined by statute as being criminal in nature. He argues that under the criminal enhancer provisions, the State
is required to prove each of the relevant prior convictions before the enhanced
penalties can be assessed unless the defendant admits the repeater allegation.
In State v.
Rachwal, 159 Wis.2d 494, 509, 465 N.W.2d 490, 496 (1991), the supreme
court held under circumstances similar to this case that the defendant's plea
of no contest constituted an admission to all the facts alleged in the action,
including those pertaining to the prior convictions.
The court stated:
We conclude that, under the circumstances
of this case, a plea of guilty or no contest to a criminal complaint containing
a "repeater provision" alleging a prior conviction constitutes, under
sec. 973.12, Stats., an admission by the defendant of such prior conviction so
that the state need not prove such prior conviction for purposes of sentence
enhancement according to sec. 939.62.
Id. at
512-13, 465 N.W.2d at 497.
As in Rachwal,
Pamonicutt knew his plea would constitute an admission of his prior
convictions. During the plea colloquy
with the court, Pamonicutt acknowledged that the factual allegations contained
in the complaint were true. The court
informed him that his no contest plea would subject him to the maximum
penalties which were in excess of the prosecutor's recommendation. Pamonicutt was free to challenge and present
evidence at the sentencing stage of these proceedings to rebut any of the
factual allegations charging him as a fifth offense OWI offender and fourth
offense OAR offender. He presented no
such evidence and never challenged the factual allegations. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in
finding that Pamonicutt had admitted the allegations in the complaint.
Because this court
concludes that Pamonicutt admitted the existence of the prior convictions and
their applicability to enhance the penalties of the OWI and OAR charges, this
court need not address the question whether the enhanced penalty provision
contained in the traffic code is subject to the same procedural requirements as
a penalty enhancer statute applicable to nontraffic criminal charges.
By the Court.—Judgment
and order affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.