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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED JANUARY 14, 1997 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1227-FT
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
SUSAN M. TENNYSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE
MENOMONIE AREA,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Dunn County:
THOMAS H. BARLAND, Judge. Reversed
and cause remanded.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
PER CURIAM. Susan Tennyson appeals a judgment
dismissing her complaint alleging a constructive unlawful discharge on grounds
the complaint failed to state a claim.[1]
Tennyson's employment contract with the School District of the Menomonie Area
contained a provision that she could not be discharged without cause. She alleged that unaddressed "hostile
and intimidating" conditions caused her to resign and constituted a
constructive discharge without cause.
We conclude that when the reasonable inferences arising from the
allegations of the complaint are drawn in favor of Tennyson, the complaint
states a claim. We therefore reverse
and remand for further proceedings.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a complaint
states a claim is a question of law we review de novo. Heinritz v. Lawrence Univ.,
194 Wis.2d 606, 610, 535 N.W.2d 81, 83 (Ct. App. 1995). Where a motion to dismiss for failing to
state a claim is brought under § 802.06(2)(f), Stats., the facts as pled must be taken as admitted, and we
must draw any reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom the
motion is brought. Id. The pleadings must be liberally construed,
and a complaint will be dismissed only if the plaintiff cannot recover under
any circumstances. Id. at
611, 535 N.W.2d at 83.
ALLEGATIONS OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
Tennyson's complaint
alleges that she had an employment contract with the school district providing
that she was not to be discharged "without cause." She alleges that her supervisor, Al May,
created an intolerable work atmosphere to the point where she had to take and
was given medical leave from September 9, 1994, through January 31, 1995. These alleged conditions first arose
"in the summer of 1994," when she and May had a disagreement
concerning a job related decision, and May "lost his temper [and] became
verbally abusive ...." Thereafter,
she claims, May "took every opportunity to make plaintiff's work life
miserable; he frequently lost his temper and verbally abused Plaintiff in a
loud and threatening manner whether others were present or not ...." He made "demeaning comments regarding
Plaintiff's mannerisms, manner of dress [and] generally created an intimidating
and hostile work environment."
After leave was granted,
Tennyson met with the superintendent of schools, Dave Smette, to discuss May's
behavior. According to Tennyson, Smette
repeatedly "warned" her that she should be careful not to make any
false statements or slander the administration and told her that she must
confront May herself regarding his behavior.
Smette told her that May "would do anything to win if
challenged." In subsequent
meetings with Smette, Tennyson alleges she requested the district to investigate
and sought assurances that May's conduct would be monitored upon her return,
but the district had failed to do so by January 31, 1995. She alleged that she resigned "[a]s a
result of the intimidating and hostile work environment created by Al May, the
District's indifference to the situation, and the fear of returning to the same
intimidating and hostile work environment ...."
The trial court
concluded:
My
view is that for there to be constructive discharge she must show that upon her
return to work she was subjected to [the] same or similar intolerable work
conditions that would cause her to leave work to avoid a recurrence of the
medical problems that bothered her as a result of the stress when she was
employed or was working. And I conclude
that the complaint fails to state a claim for relief because it stops short of
alleging that she returned to work or attempted to return to work. She tendered
her resignation when she concluded that the school district did not meet her
requests to investigate or provide an assurance that her supervisor's behavior
would be monitored, and I think ... in my judgment [there is a] logical gap
that's missing to show that the work atmosphere would be the same or that she
made the attempt and found it to be the same.
For the following
reasons, we conclude that when all reasonable inferences from the facts alleged
are drawn favorably to Tennyson, the complaint infers a constructive
discharge. First, there is a reasonable
inference that the alleged abusive working conditions continued over a
sufficient period of time. The abuse
started "in the summer of 1994," occurred "frequently" and
continued until her medical leave in early September. In addition, a reasonable inference may be drawn favorable to
Tennyson that the district either did not believe her or did not take her
problem seriously. This inference may
be drawn from the allegations that the superintendent "repeatedly
warned" Tennyson that she should not make false statements, that she would
have to confront May herself despite the district's belief that May "would
do anything to win," and the district's failure, following her requests,
either to investigate or to assure her that it would monitor the situation upon
her return to work. Thus, Tennyson's
conclusive allegation that the district demonstrated an "indifference to
the situation" and that the conduct was likely to continue are reasonably
supported by the preceding inferences.
The district also
challenges the concept of a "constructive discharge" in context of an
ordinary employment contract with a "for cause" provision. It relies upon Tennyson's concession that
there is no Wisconsin precedent for such a doctrine.
We conclude that an
employer may constructively discharge a person where working conditions are so
intolerable that a reasonable person is compelled to resign to avoid recurrence. While it is true that the case cited by
Tennyson and many other constructive discharge cases we have located arise out
of claims based upon statutory employment rights, we see no reason why the
doctrine should not apply to a common law contract claim of unlawful
discharge. If an employee is able to
establish the necessary proof of sufficient continuing misconduct in the
workplace that is likely to continue unabated, resignation may be deemed to be
a discharge.
By the Court.—Judgment
reversed and cause remanded.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.