|
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED November 5, 1996 |
NOTICE |
|
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1457
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SHIRLEY R. NUSHART,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
and an order of the circuit court for Marinette County: TIM A. DUKET, Judge. Affirmed.
MYSE, J. Shirley R. Nushart
appeals the court's denial of her motion to reopen a judgment involving a
forfeiture for violation of Wis. Adm.
Code § NR 10.02(1), the unlawful killing of a moose. Nushart argues that the court erred by
applying the penalty for unlawfully hunting a moose under § 29.99(3m), Stats., rather than the general penalty
of $100 plus costs and assessments under § 29.99(4), Stats. Nushart
asserts that in order to be subject to the penalties under § 29.99(3m), Stats., she must have been shot the
moose knowing the animal was a moose and intending to kill the moose. Because this court concludes that §
29.99(3m), Stats., does not
require any specific intent, the court, therefore, properly denied her motion
to reopen the judgment. We affirm.
The facts are
undisputed. Nushart was bow hunting for
deer during the 1995 bow deer season from an elevated tree stand approximately
twenty feet above the ground. A young
bull moose approached the tree stand but was not observed by Nushart until it
was under the tree stand. Nushart
believed that it was a six-point antlered white tail deer when she shot and
killed the animal. When she realized
the animal was a moose, she contacted the DNR and reported the incident. The DNR confiscated the carcass and issued a
citation for the violation of Wis. Adm.
Code § NR 10.02(1), which prohibits the unlawful hunting of a
moose.
Section NR 10.02(1) does
not have a specific penalty provision in it.
Rather, it prohibits the hunting of protected animals and lists which
animals are protected. As a result,
Nushart argues that § 29.99(4), Stats.,
applies to this case. Section 29.99(4)
states: "For any violation of any
provision of this chapter or any department order for which no other penalty is
prescribed, [the penalty will be] a forfeiture of not more than
$100." Nushart, however, was
sentenced under § 29.99(3m), which provides:
For
unlawfully hunting a moose, [punishment shall be] by a forfeiture of not less
than $1,000 nor more than $2,000 and the mandatory revocation of all hunting
approvals issued to the person. In
addition, no hunting approval may be issued to the person for the period of
time specified by the court. The time
period specified shall be not less than 3 years nor more than 5 years following
the date of conviction under the subsection.
Pursuant
to the penalty provisions of this section, the court, following a plea of
guilty, imposed the minimum punishment of $1,000 plus costs and assessments and
a revocation of hunting privileges for three years.
A determination of which
penalty provision is applicable involves the construction of a statute and as
such is a question of law which this court determines independently of the
trial court's determination. See
State ex rel. Frederick v. McCaughtry, 173 Wis.2d 222, 225, 496
N.W.2d 177, 179 (Ct. App. 1992). When
construing a statute the intent of the legislature shall be determined by the
plain language of the statute. Id. In determining the legislative intent the
more specific provisions of the statute must prevail over the more general
provisions. Kramer v. Hayward,
57 Wis.2d 302, 311, 203 N.W.2d 871, 876 (1973).
Nushart argues that
because she did not intend to kill a moose at the time she shot the animal she
believed to be a deer, the penalty provision specified for the killing of a
moose is inapplicable. This court
disagrees. While this court accepts
Nushart's contention that she had no intention of taking a protected wild
animal, the statutory provision clearly prohibits the unlawful hunting of a
moose. Section 29.99(3m), Stats.
Further, the statutes define hunting to include the "shooting,
shooting at, pursuing, taking, catching or killing any wild animal or animals
...." Section 29.01(8), Stats.
These definitions make
it clear that the statute imposes strict liability for the killing of a
moose. Notwithstanding Nushart's good
faith belief that the animal was a deer, she violated the statute when she
intentionally killed an animal that turned out to be a moose. Section 29.99(3m), Stats., specifies the penalty for the hunting of a moose to
include a forfeiture of not less than $1,000 and a suspension of hunting privileges
for not less than three years. The
penalty specifically provided for the killing of a moose is applicable over
other general penalty provisions.
Because a specific penalty is provided for the offense for which Nushart
was convicted, the court properly imposed the minimum punishment required by
law. The judgment of conviction and
order refusing to reopen are therefore affirmed.
By the Court.—Judgment
and order affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.