|
COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED November
7, 1996 |
NOTICE |
|
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to
review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will
appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1635
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
COUNTY OF JEFFERSON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LESLIE L. CROOK,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Jefferson County: JACQUELINE R. ERWIN, Judge. Affirmed.
DEININGER,
J.[1] Leslie
Crook appeals from a judgment finding him guilty of operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of an intoxicant and operating a motor vehicle with a
prohibited alcohol content. Crook
claims that the police did not have the reasonable suspicion required for a
police stop and that the evidence obtained as a result of the stop should have
been suppressed. We disagree and
affirm.
BACKGROUND
The
facts are not in dispute. On April 22,
1995, Jefferson County Deputy Sheriff Mark Miller received a call at 1:25 a.m.
from the police dispatcher informing him that a private citizen had spotted a
"possible drunk driver" operating a "blue-colored older model
Ford truck" heading eastbound on Interstate 94. The anonymous citizen reported the vehicle's registration number
and stated that the vehicle was "all over the road."
Miller
was headed toward the location identified by the anonymous citizen when the
dispatcher contacted him again and stated that the citizen had reported that
the truck had taken the exit to state Highway 89. As Miller exited the interstate, he spotted a truck matching the
citizen's description on Highway 89 and began to follow it. The truck headed north on Highway 89
briefly, then drove onto the westbound on-ramp for Interstate 94. Upon approaching the truck, Miller observed
that the registration number matched that given to him by the dispatcher. He also noted that the truck crossed the
white shoulder line twice by approximately two feet. At the suppression hearing, Miller testified that the anonymous
tip and the truck's uneven driving led him to suspect that the driver of the
blue truck was a drunk driver. He
stopped the truck and, after determining that the driver was Leslie Crook and performing
field sobriety tests, arrested him for operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicants (OMVWI).
Crook
brought a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a consequence of the stop
by Miller on the basis that Miller did not have a reasonable suspicion
sufficient to make the stop. The trial
court denied the motion and found Crook guilty of OMVWI and of operating with a
prohibited alcohol concentration after a stipulated trial.
ANALYSIS
When
reviewing a trial court's determination regarding the suppression of evidence,
we will uphold the trial court's findings of fact unless they are against the
great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. State v. Richardson, 156 Wis.2d 128, 137, 456
N.W.2d 830, 833 (1990). However,
whether an investigative stop meets statutory and constitutional standards is a
question of law which we review de novo.
State v. Krier, 165 Wis.2d 673, 676, 478 N.W.2d 63, 65
(Ct. App. 1991).
Under
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), the police must possess
sufficient information to form a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity to
justify an investigative stop.
Reasonable suspicion must be based on "`specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant th[e] intrusion.'"
Richardson, 156 Wis.2d at 139, 456 N.W.2d at 834 (quoting Terry,
392 U.S. at 21). Reasonableness is
measured against an objective standard, taking into consideration the
"totality of the circumstances."
Id. at 139- 140, 456 N.W.2d at 834-835. It is "a common sense question, [one]
which strikes a balance between the interests of society in solving crime and
the members of that society to be free from unreasonable intrusions." State v. Jackson, 147 Wis.2d
824, 831, 434 N.W.2d 386, 389 (1989).
Ordinarily,
an anonymous tip is not enough, by itself, to constitute reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity. Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990).
However, the corroboration by police of the innocent details of an
anonymous tip may, under the totality of the circumstances, give rise to
reasonable suspicion. Richardson,
156 Wis.2d at 142, 456 N.W.2d at 835.
The corroborated actions of a suspect "need not be inherently
suspicious or criminal in and of themselves." Id. Rather,
the cumulative facts, "along with reasonable inferences and deductions
which a reasonable officer could glean therefrom, is sufficient to supply the
reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot ... and to justify the
stop." Id. Further, the circumstances of the tip itself
may provide "indicia of reliability" sufficient to justify the
stop. See White,
496 U.S. at 328.
Crook
argues that the tip lacked both corroboration by the police and indicia of
reliability. We disagree. Miller, proceeding to the location described
by the anonymous caller, came across a vehicle matching the description and
registration identified by the caller.
Further, the vehicle left the interstate at the exit reported by the
caller. The anonymous caller's accurate
description of Crook's location and point of exit indicates that the caller had
an opportunity to observe Crook's driving, giving rise to some indicia of
reliability. Further, Miller also followed
Crook and observed his uneven driving, consisting of two instances in which he
crossed over the white shoulder line by approximately two feet. Miller's observations corroborated the
caller's report of Crook's erratic driving.
We conclude that the anonymous tip describing Crook's vehicle as being
"all over the road," combined with Miller's observations, constituted
sufficient information to form a reasonable suspicion of OMVWI.
Crook
also argues that because crossing the shoulder line "is not an offense in
Wisconsin," Miller could not possess a reasonable suspicion that he was
driving while intoxicated. The fact
that Miller did not observe an actual traffic violation by Crook is irrelevant
on these facts. Miller did not base his
stop on a violation of a traffic law; rather, he suspected Crook was OMVWI,
based on the tip and Miller's own observation of Crook's driving. As we noted in Krier, 165
Wis.2d at 678, 478 N.W.2d at 65, "[s]uspicious activity justifying an
investigative stop is, by its very nature, ambiguous." An officer has the right to temporarily
detain an individual for the purposes of inquiry "if any reasonable
inference of wrongful conduct can be objectively discerned." State v. Anderson, 155 Wis.2d
77, 84, 454 N.W.2d 763, 766 (1990) (emphasis added).
Further,
we note that we have previously held that where the potential crime involves a
dangerous ongoing activity, the alternative means available to the officer to
investigate short of making the stop is a consideration in determining
reasonableness. See State
v. King, 175 Wis.2d 146, 154, 499 N.W.2d 190, 193 (Ct. App. 1993). Requiring Miller to further investigate the
situation, for instance by allowing a potential drunk driver to continue
driving, could seriously endanger public safety. We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances, the
stop was justified. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment.
By
the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See
Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.