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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED NOVEMBER 19, 1996 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1705-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BRENDA J. HESSEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Marathon County:
MICHAEL W. HOOVER, Judge. Reversed
in part and cause remanded.
CANE, P.J. Brenda Hessey appeals the trial court’s
judgment of conviction ordering her to pay $7,458.51 in restitution, of which
Hessey claims $3,542.11 is attributed to uncharged thefts she has neither
admitted nor agreed to for read-in purposes.
The State originally charged Hessey with two counts of theft from
Papillon’s Pizza where she was employed.
The first count alleged that between August 1, 1994, and October 6,
1994, Hessey stole cash from her employer.
The second count alleged that she took cash from Papillon’s on October
7, 1994. Pursuant to a plea bargain,
Hessey pled no contest to the first count and the second count was dismissed
and read in for sentencing purposes.
She denied taking any money prior to August 1994.
At sentencing, the trial
court rejected Hessey’s objection to being required to pay restitution for any
thefts from Papillon’s occurring prior to August 1994. It then ordered her to pay restitution for
the thefts from Papillon’s occurring since April 1994, totaling $7,458.51. Hessey claims the portion attributable to
the April to August period is $3,542.11.
The sole issue on appeal
is whether the trial court has the
authority to order that Hessey pay restitution for thefts she was neither
convicted of nor admitted. The State
has not filed a brief in response to Hessey’s appeal challenging that part of
the judgment ordering restitution.
Because this court agrees with Hessey, that portion of the judgment
ordering restitution for money stolen from Papillon’s prior to August 1994 is
reversed.
Section 973.20(1), Stats., permits the trial court to
order the defendant to pay restitution to any victim of the crime. The term crime includes both the crime of
conviction and any crime read in at sentencing. See Garski v. State, 75 Wis.2d 62, 71-72,
248 N.W.2d 425, 430-31 (1977). Hessey
correctly points out that the term "crime" for restitution purposes
has never been interpreted as to include an uncharged offense the defendant
does not admit.
Wisconsin cases have
consistently required that the defendant be convicted of the crime or admit to
the uncharged misconduct before restitution can be ordered. In State v. Scherr, 9 Wis.2d
418, 101 N.W.2d 77 (1960), a case almost identical to the present case, the
State charged the defendant with stealing property between September 15, 1956
and August 10, 1957. Scherr pled
guilty, but disputed the amount of restitution. The trial court, however, ordered restitution for items stolen
since 1955. The supreme court reversed
when it concluded that “It was error for the court to require restitution for
the entire period of dealing between the parties when the information charged a
definite period and the defendant had not consented either to the period or the
amount.” Id. at 427, 101
N.W.2d at 82. Also, in State v.
Mattes, 175 Wis.2d 572, 581, 499 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Ct. App. 1993), we
refused to allow restitution for victims of crimes not included in the
complaint or any read-ins.
Therefore, in order for
the trial court to order restitution for acts outside the charged crime, the
defendant must admit or consent to the restitution. Here, the trial court ordered Hessey to pay restitution for
crimes she was neither convicted of nor admitted, money stolen prior to August
1, 1994. Accordingly, this court
reverses that part of the judgment ordering restitution and remands the matter
to the trial court to order that Hessey pay restitution for the money stolen
from Papillon’s between August 1, 1994, and October 7, 1994.
By the Court.—Judgment
reversed in part and cause remanded.
This opinion will not be
published. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.