|
COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED November
27, 1996 |
NOTICE |
|
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1721
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DAVID
K. MARKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Dane County: P. CHARLES
JONES, Judge. Affirmed.
DYKMAN,
P.J. This is a single-judge appeal
decided pursuant to § 752.31(2)(c), Stats. David K. Marks appeals from an order
convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an
intoxicant in violation of § 346.63(1)(a), Stats., and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited
alcohol concentration in violation of § 346.63(1)(b), Stats.
Marks raises two issues on appeal:
(1) whether the police officer's request that he perform field
sobriety tests converted his detention into an arrest, which needed to be
supported by probable cause; and (2) whether his prosecution and sentence
were barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because his
operating privileges had previously been administratively suspended for the
same violation. Because this court recently
decided both issues against Marks, we affirm.
In
County of Dane v. Campshure, 204 Wis.2d 27, 29, 552 N.W.2d 876,
876 (Ct. App. 1996), we concluded that a request to perform field sobriety
tests does not convert an otherwise lawful investigatory stop into an
arrest. Marks concedes that Campshure
decides the first issue against him and explains that he raised this issue to
preserve it for subsequent review. We
conclude that the officer did not arrest Marks by requesting him to perform
field sobriety tests.
In
State v. McMaster, 198 Wis.2d 542, 544, 543 N.W.2d 499, 499 (Ct.
App. 1995), petition for review granted, 546 N.W.2d 468 (1996), we
concluded that criminal prosecution for operating a motor vehicle with a
prohibited blood alcohol concentration after an administrative suspension of
operating privileges does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Marks concedes that McMaster
decides the second issue against him and again explains that he raises this
issue solely to preserve it for subsequent review. We conclude that Marks' prosecution and sentence did not violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
By
the Court.—Order affirmed.
Not
recommended for publication in the official reports. See Rule
809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.