COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
March 27, 2008
David R. Schanker
Clerk of Court of Appeals
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NOTICE
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This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official
Reports.
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62.
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Appeal No.
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STATE OF WISCONSIN
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IN COURT OF
APPEALS
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DISTRICT IV
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State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Robert K. Bartlett,
Defendant-Appellant.
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APPEAL
from judgment of the circuit court for Dodge County: richard
rehm, Judge. Affirmed.
¶1 DYKMAN, J. Robert
Bartlett appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated (OWI), fourth offense, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a). Bartlett
contends that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence, arguing that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop
his vehicle for failing to display a yearly renewal sticker. He also contends that his sticker, located to
the left of the lower right-hand corner of his license plate, was not in
violation of the law and that, therefore, his continued detention after the
officer saw the sticker on his license plate was unlawful. The officer had sufficient grounds for an
investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion that Bartlett was violating Wis. Stat. § 341.15(1m)(a), and
thus Bartlett’s
detention was lawful. We affirm.
Background
¶2 The following facts are undisputed. On June 18, 2006, Horicon Police Officer
Jeremy Johnson was parked near the intersection of Vine Street and Mill Street in the City of Horicon when he observed a
light colored van turn left in front of him.
After glancing at the registration plate and following the vehicle for
two blocks, he did not observe a yearly renewal sticker on it. Johnson stopped the van.
¶3 As Johnson approached the van, he saw the sticker on the
lower part of the plate, towards the center. The sticker was located over a portion of the
words “America’s Dairy Land” from the “r” in “Dairy” to the “d” in “Land” and right
below the “9” and “8” of the license plate number. He spoke with the driver and identified him
as Robert Bartlett. Johnson notified Bartlett that he was
unable to see the sticker and that this was the reason for the stop. Johnson advised Bartlett
that the plate was currently registered and that once the new sticker arrived, Bartlett should apply it
to the lower right-hand corner.
¶4 While speaking to Bartlett, Johnson noticed a strong odor of
intoxicants coming from the vehicle.
Johnson also observed that Bartlett’s
eyes looked red and glassy and that his speech was slurred and difficult to
understand. Bartlett admitted he had been drinking, and he
performed poorly on field sobriety tests Johnson administered. Johnson then administered a preliminary
breath test, which yielded a 0.175 blood alcohol concentration. Johnson arrested Bartlett for operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated.
¶5 Bartlett
moved to suppress the evidence of his intoxication, asserting that Johnson did
not have reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic offense was being
committed. The State introduced Exhibit
1, a photocopy of the instructions the Department of Transportation (DOT)
provides with each sticker issued on how to place the sticker on the
registration plate. Bartlett introduced his license plate, as
Exhibit 2, to show the actual location of his sticker.
¶6 The trial court found that, as shown in Exhibit 1, “the box
on the right would give … anyone the understanding that the sticker has to go
in the bottom right-hand corner of the plate.”
It found that Bartlett’s
sticker was clearly not under the zero on the right, which is the last number
on his license plate, and that the sticker was not in the correct place in
violation of Wis. Stat. § 341.15(1m). It concluded that the officer had a right to
stop Bartlett
because the sticker was not where it was required to be. The trial court found the officer was reasonable
in making the stop and denied Bartlett’s
motion. Bartlett pled no contest to OWI and was
convicted. He appeals from his judgment
of conviction.
Standard of Review
¶7 The temporary detention of individuals during a traffic stop
constitutes a seizure of persons within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Whren
v. United States,
517 U.S.
806, 809-10 (1996). An officer may
perform an investigative stop if the officer reasonably suspects a person is
violating a non-criminal traffic law. County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 310, 603
N.W.2d 541 (1999) (citation omitted). “Reasonable
suspicion is based upon specific and articulable facts that together with
reasonable inferences therefrom reasonably warrant a suspicion that an
offense has occurred or will occur.” State
v. Longcore, 226 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 594
N.W.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (emphasis
added)). While reasonable suspicion is
insufficient to support an arrest or search, it permits investigation. Id.
¶8 “[W]hether a traffic stop is reasonable is a question of
constitutional fact.” State
v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶8, 301 Wis.
2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634. We defer to the
trial court’s factual determinations unless they are clearly erroneous, but we
review de novo whether those facts are sufficient to create reasonable
suspicion. Id. The reasonableness is determined based on the
totality of the facts and circumstances. Id.,
¶13.
Discussion
¶9 Bartlett argues that the trial
court erred when it determined that the placement of his registration sticker
gave Johnson probable cause to believe Bartlett
was in violation of Wis. Stat. § 341.15. While § 341.15 deals with the display of
registration plates, subsection (1m)(a)
specifically requires a vehicle owner to place any sticker issued by the DOT on
the plate in a manner directed by the DOT.
The DOT directs that the sticker be affixed in the lower right-hand
corner of the license plate.
¶10 Bartlett argues that Johnson
made a mistake of law and did not have probable cause to detain Bartlett. See
State v. Longcore,
226 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 594 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Ct. App.
1999) (holding in the context of an evaluation of probable cause that “when
an officer relates the facts to a specific offense, it must indeed be an offense”). Bartlett
contends there are three ways to violate the registration display requirement,
as listed in Wis. Stat. § 341.15(3),
and that his license plate and sticker violated none. He contends that the DOT directs that the
sticker be in a visible location on the lower right portion of the plate and
that his sticker was in this location. He also argues that the legislative intent of
the statute is to enable an outside observer to determine that a vehicle is
validly registered and that his sticker satisfied this intent. He argues that once Johnson saw the sticker in
the lower right portion of the plate, the continued detention was
unreasonable.
¶11 We do not accept Bartlett’s
interpretation of the statute. While Bartlett’s sticker does
not violate Wis. Stat. § 341.15(3),
it does violate § 341.15(1m)(a), which states that “any registration decal
or tag issued by the department shall be placed on the rear registration plate
of the vehicle in the manner directed by the department.” The DOT directs the manner of placement by issuing
every renewal sticker in an envelope with a diagram showing where to affix the
sticker. The DOT’s diagram represents
the yearly renewal sticker location as a box on the lower right-hand corner of
the license plate, underneath the last digit of the license plate number. Bartlett’s
sticker was to the left of the last digit of his license plate number, not
underneath it. Because Bartlett’s sticker was not on the plate in
the manner directed by the DOT, thus violating Wis. Stat. § 341.15(1m)(a), Johnson had reasonable
suspicion to stop him. Accordingly, the investigatory traffic stop
was justified.
¶12 Because the placement of his sticker violated the law, Bartlett’s argument that it was unlawful for Johnson to
continue to detain Bartlett
after Johnson saw the sticker also fails. The scope of the officer’s inquiry may be
broadened beyond the purpose for which the person was justifiably stopped if
additional particularized and objective factors come to the officer’s
attention. See State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 94, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999); see
also State v. Gammons, 2001
WI App 36, ¶18, 241 Wis. 2d 296, 625 N.W.2d 623. “If, during a valid traffic stop, the officer
becomes aware of additional suspicious factors which are sufficient to give
rise to an articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is committing
an offense or offenses separate and distinct from the acts that prompted the
officer’s intervention in the first place, the stop may be extended and a new
investigation begun.” Betow,
226 Wis. 2d
at 94. “The validity of the extension is
tested in the same manner, and under the same criteria, as the initial stop.” Id.
at 94-95.
¶13 Johnson had grounds to stop Bartlett
based on his reasonable suspicion that Bartlett
had failed to properly display his registration sticker. Once Johnson approached Bartlett, Johnson observed signs of
intoxication. These specific and
articulable facts would provide an officer in Johnson’s position reasonable
suspicion to investigate for OWI.
¶14 We conclude that the stop and detention of Bartlett’s
vehicle did not violate Bartlett’s Fourth
Amendment rights because there was reasonable suspicion that Bartlett had violated Wis. Stat. § 341.15(1m)(a). Accordingly, we affirm.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
Not
recommended for publication in the official reports. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4.