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COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
August 11, 2009
David
R. Schanker
Clerk of Court of Appeals
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NOTICE
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This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the official
version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports.
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62.
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Appeal No.
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STATE OF WISCONSIN
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IN COURT OF
APPEALS
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DISTRICT I
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State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Isaiah Trevor Reynosa,
Defendant-Appellant.
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: jeffrey
a. wagner, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Curley, P.J., Fine and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Isaiah Trevor Reynosa pled
guilty to first-degree intentional homicide, party to a crime. See Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(1)(a) and
939.05 (2003-04). The only issue on appeal is whether the trial
court erred when it denied Reynosa’s
pretrial suppression motion. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 An arrest warrant had been issued for Reynosa in connection with the murder of Luis
Trevino. Ramon Candelario, the executive
director of the Latin Community Center, had known Reynosa for several years. After Reynosa
told him that he wanted to turn himself in, Candelario arranged for police to
take Reynosa into custody at the community
center after Reynosa
said good-bye to family members.
¶3 Reynosa
was arrested at approximately 11:30 p.m. on September 17, 2004. Reynosa’s
first custodial interrogation began at 2:41 a.m. on September 18, 2004 and
lasted until 7:46 a.m. A second
custodial interrogation was held the next day, September 19, from 2:56 a.m.
until 6:01 a.m. A short, thirty-minute
interrogation began at 10:36 a.m. on September 19. Another thirty-minute interrogation occurred
later that day, beginning at 7:30 p.m. In
his statements, Reynosa
inculpated himself in Trevino’s murder.
DISCUSSION
¶4 Reynosa
contends that statements he gave to police after his arrest should have been
suppressed as not voluntary because he was intoxicated.
¶5 A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence
presents a mixed question of fact and law.
State v. Casarez, 2008 WI App 166, ¶9, 314 Wis. 2d 661, 762 N.W.2d 385. We will not reverse the trial court’s
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. “‘[T]he weight of the testimony and the
credibility of the witnesses are matters peculiarly within the province of the trial
court acting as the trier of fact.’” State
v. Young, 2009 WI App 22, ¶17, __ Wis. 2d __, 762 N.W.2d 736
(quoted source omitted). Accordingly, we
will “‘not reweigh the evidence or reassess the witnesses’ credibility, but
will search the record for evidence that supports findings the trial court
made, not for findings it could have made but did not.’” Id.
(quoted source omitted). We review the
application of constitutional principles to the factual findings de novo.
See Casarez, 314 Wis. 2d
661, ¶9.
¶6 The principles of law governing the voluntariness inquiry are
summarized in State v. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, ¶36, 261 Wis. 2d 294, 661
N.W.2d 407. There, the court observed
that a defendant’s statements are voluntary “if they are the product of a free
and unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice, as opposed to the
result of a conspicuously unequal confrontation in which the pressures brought
to bear on the defendant by representatives of the State exceeded the
defendant’s ability to resist.” Id. (citing State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 236,
401 N.W.2d 759 (1987)).
¶7 A necessary prerequisite for a finding of involuntariness is
coercive or improper police conduct. Id., ¶37 (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U.S. 157, 167 (1986); Clappes,
136 Wis. 2d
at 239). The voluntariness of a
confession is evaluated on the basis of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding that confession. Id., ¶38 (citing Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at
236). This analysis involves a balancing
of the personal characteristics of the defendant against the pressures and
tactics used by law enforcement officers.
Id. (citing Clappes,
136 Wis. 2d
at 236). A defendant’s statement is not
involuntary merely because the defendant was intoxicated. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163-67.
¶8 With those standards in mind, we turn to the facts of this
case. At the suppression hearing, Reynosa’s mother, aunt, and cousin all testified that Reynosa had been drinking
heavily and smoking marijuana in the days immediately preceding his
arrest. Candelaria testified that Reynosa had a large can of
beer with him when he arrived at the Community Center at about 10:00 p.m. on
the night of September 17. Candelaria
described Reynosa as “real emotional” and testified
that Reynosa
seemed drunk.
¶9 Detective Paul Formolo testified that he conducted the first
interrogation of Reynosa
after his arrest. He and his partner
questioned Reynosa
for approximately five hours. The interrogation
began three hours after Reynosa’s
arrest. Formolo first asked Reynosa background
“pedigree” questions. Formolo asks the
pedigree questions first so he can judge whether the person is understanding
the questions. According to Formolo, Reynosa appeared
“oriented,” was “aware of [his] surroundings,” and was able to accurately
describe his family background.
¶10 Formolo then read Reynosa
the Miranda
rights. Reynosa told Formolo that he understood them
and he was willing to answer questions about Trevino’s homicide. Reynosa
“appeared to be paying attention” when Formolo read the Miranda rights, and he
did not have any questions about the rights.
Formolo testified that Reynosa
did not ask for an attorney at any time during the interrogation nor did he ask
Formolo to stop the interrogation.
Formolo was not armed, and Reynosa
was not handcuffed or chained. Formolo
did not threaten Reynosa
or make any promises to him. Two breaks
were taken during the interview. Reynosa was given a slice
of pizza, a breakfast sandwich, hash browns and a soda.
¶11 Reynosa
gave a narrative statement to the detectives.
Formolo testified that Reynosa
appeared “coherent” and nothing suggested that he was confused or
intoxicated. Reynosa
reviewed the statement at the end of the interrogation, some changes were made,
and Reynosa
signed the statement. Formolo testified
that “for the most part [Reynosa
was] very relaxed, polite, [and] soft-spoken.”
Reynosa
did get “very emotional” at times and “would cry a lot.” Formolo asked Reynosa
if he was under the influence of intoxicants, and Reynosa told him that he was not. Reynosa
told Formolo that he had two beers before his arrest. Formolo testified that Reynosa did not smell of alcohol or marijuana.
¶12 Formolo testified that he questioned Reynosa a second time for
approximately three hours on September 19, 2004, beginning at 2:56 a.m. Formolo again read Reynosa
his Miranda
rights, and Reynosa
agreed to answer questions. Reynosa was coherent and
not confused. He did not ask for an
attorney nor did he refuse to answer any questions. Reynosa
was not as emotional as he had been during the first interrogation, and he was
“very cooperative” and “a little bit more … relaxed.” Formolo did not threaten Reynosa or make any promises to him. Two breaks were taken during the interview,
and Reynosa was
given three glasses of water and a candy bar.
¶13 Formolo testified that he met with Reynosa
for approximately thirty minutes later that morning to obtain physical evidence
from him and that Reynosa
again was cooperative, coherent and not confused.
¶14 Officer Patrick Pajot was one of the officers who arrested Reynosa at the community
center. Pajot testified that he knew Reynosa from prior contacts and that Reynosa was crying and “seemed very upset” as
he said good-bye to family members before the arrest. Pajot did not see Reynosa with any beer before the arrest. Pajot did not smell alcohol or marijuana on Reynosa’s breath.
¶15 Officer Michael Michalski also participated in Reynosa’s arrest. Michalski testified that he stood “very
close” to Reynosa and that he did not observe
anything unusual about Reynosa’s
demeanor. On a booking form, Michalski
answered “no” to a question asking whether Reynosa appeared under the influence of an
intoxicant. Michalski reviewed the form
with Reynosa, and Reynosa signed the form.
¶16 Detective Charles Mueller testified that he questioned Reynosa
for approximately thirty minutes on September 19, 2004, beginning at 7:30
p.m. Mueller read the Miranda
rights to Reynosa, and Reynosa agreed to speak with Mueller. Mueller showed some photographs to Reynosa, and Reynosa
“began to tear up” and started “shaking.”
Mueller did not ask Reynosa any questions,
but Reynosa
told him a long, inculpatory narrative about the homicide. Mueller testified that Reynosa was coherent, not confused, and did
not appear to be under the influence of intoxicants. Reynosa
appeared “very remorseful” and “pretty upset.”
Mueller did not threaten Reynosa
or make any promises to him.
¶17 On appeal, Reynosa
argues that the police “failed to observe, willfully ignored or misrepresented
their observations concerning [his] level of intoxication.” Reynosa
relies on testimony from his family members and Candelaria, and notes that the
police testimony “conflicts incredibly” with their testimony. Reynosa
describes Candelaria as “the one person … who had nothing to gain or lose by
exaggeration or minimization of Reynosa’s
condition” on the night of Reynosa’s
arrest. Based on Candelaria’s testimony,
Reynosa asks
this court to “find the credibility of the police witnesses to be deficient as
a matter of law.”
¶18 In this case, the trial court stated that the testimony of the
arresting officers and detectives was “wholly persuasive and credible.” The court singled out the observations of
Officers Pajot and Michalski as “very credible,” in part because they do not
testify in court as often as the detectives.
The court stated that the officers’ credibility was easier to assess
than the detectives who were more experienced witnesses.
¶19 The court expressly found that the testimony of Reynosa’s family members
was not persuasive. The court stated
they were “clearly biased” witnesses with a “very significant” interest in the
case.
¶20 As for Candelaria’s testimony, the court noted that “[t]here
were a number of times when he had to stop in order to get control of himself
before he could continue with his testimony,” which reflected the “sadness” of Reynosa’s arrest. The court noted that Candelaria saw Reynosa holding a beer and that Reynosa seemed “a little drunk.”
¶21 The court noted that the various written forms completed
incident to the arrest indicated that Reynosa
did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The court also relied on the “credible”
testimony of the detectives that Reynosa
“was not suffering from a degree of intoxication that they could note.” Although “it [wa]s clear that [Reynosa] had been drinking,” the court found that “[Reynosa] was not so
intoxicated that he was incapable of waiving his Miranda rights and giving
a voluntary statement.” The court
concluded that there had not been any coercive police conduct, that Reynosa was
“properly advised” of his constitutional rights, that Reynosa was capable of
making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision to waive those rights,
and that Reynosa made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of those
rights and made a voluntary statement.
¶22 As noted above, questions of witness credibility are
“peculiarly within the province of the trial court acting as the trier of fact,”
and this court will not “reassess the witnesses’ credibility.” Young, 762 N.W.2d 736, ¶17. Moreover, the trial court is not required to
“explicitly explain why it finds one witness more credible than another.” Id.,
¶18. This court cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court, and, therefore, we reject Reynosa’s request that we
“find the credibility of the police witnesses to be deficient as a matter of
law.” Consequently, we conclude that the
trial court did not err in denying Reynosa’s
motion to suppress.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See Wis.
Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.