COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED May 19, 2010 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
|
NOTICE |
|
|
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
|
APPEAL
from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Before Brown, C.J., Neubauer, P.J., and Snyder, J.
¶1 NEUBAUER, P.J. In this mortgage foreclosure action, Vito and Marta Gieron, pro se, appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of First Bank of Highland Park (“the bank”) and from the order denying their motion for reconsideration. Because we agree with the circuit court that the Gierons’ mortgage was recorded second entitling the bank to priority and that the Gierons contractually agreed that their mortgage was second to the bank’s, we affirm.
¶2 The underlying facts are taken from the pleadings and summary
judgment submissions. Real estate
developer Summer Haven, LLC, purchased several parcels of real estate using
funds it borrowed from the bank, an
¶3 Summer Haven purchased one of the real estate parcels
(“Parcel 3”) from the Gierons for $514,000.
It was to pay $100,000 of the amount after the closing pursuant to a
note secured by a mortgage it granted the Gierons, also on August 3, 2005. The mortgage states that Summer Haven
warranted title to
Parcel 3 except for “a first mortgage to [] First Bank.” The bank’s and the Gierons’ mortgages both
were recorded at 9:24 a.m. on August 15, 2005.
The bank’s was recorded as Document No. 650029, the Gierons’ as Document
No. 650031.
¶4 The Gierons signed closing and settlement statements at the
August 3 closing. The closing
statement noted: “Second mortgage and
note to be held by Seller”; the line immediately above the signature line
stated: “I accept this statement as
being correct.” Similarly, the
settlement statement twice indicated: “2ND
MTG & NOTE TO BE HELD BY SELLER,” and the line just above the signature
line read: “I have carefully reviewed
the HUD-1 Settlement Statement and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it
is a true and accurate statement ….”
¶5 Summer Haven defaulted on the mortgage and the bank sought a judgment of foreclosure. Neither Summer Haven nor Burkart filed an answer. The Gierons answered, cross-claimed against Summer Haven and counterclaimed against the bank, claiming their mortgage was prior and senior to the bank’s mortgage.
¶6 The bank moved for summary judgment. The Gierons opposed the motion. They sought, in the alternative, to continue the hearing on the summary judgment motion to permit them to complete discovery to explore whether the bank acted in bad faith and engaged in a conspiracy with Summer Haven to extinguish the Gierons’ interest in Parcel 3. The circuit court granted summary judgment against Summer Haven and Burkart because they were in default and against the Gierons on grounds that (1) Wis. Stat. § 706.11(1)(d) (2007-08)[1] gives priority to the bank’s mortgage because it was recorded first and (2) even if the Gierons’ mortgage was recorded first, the Gierons and Summer Haven contractually agreed that the Gierons’ mortgage was second to the bank’s. The court denied the Gierons’ motion for reconsideration. Only the Gierons appeal.
¶7 We review a grant of summary judgment independently, applying
the same methodology as the circuit court.
Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136
¶8 The main issue, as we see it, is whether the Gierons’ or the
bank’s mortgage is in the superior position.
Any duly recorded mortgage executed to a state or national bank “shall
have priority over all liens upon the mortgaged premises and the buildings and
improvements thereon, except tax and special assessment liens filed after the
recording of such mortgage and except liens under [Wis. Stat. §§ 292.31(8)(i) and 292.81].” Wis.
Stat. § 706.11(1)(d). The
Gierons insist, however, that the bank, chartered in
¶9 This court recently put that identical argument to rest in
regard to a bank chartered in
¶10 The register of deeds received and recorded both the bank’s and the Gierons’ mortgages at 9:24 a.m. on August 5, 2005. The bank’s mortgage was assigned number 650029, the Gierons’ number 650031. The circuit court concluded that the bank’s mortgage was recorded first, a determination the Gierons challenge as “unknowable.” We disagree with the Gierons.
¶11 A mortgage delivered to the register of deeds is not perfected until it is filed, accepted, recorded and endorsed in accordance with the applicable statutes. See Wis. Stat. §§ 706.05, 706.08 and 59.43. If properly submitted, the register shall “cause [it] to be recorded”; then must endorse upon it a certificate of the date and time it was received, “specifying the day, hour and minute of reception”; and then shall record the instrument in the order in which it was received. Sec. 59.43(1)(a), (e). Finally, the register of deeds must:
Endorse plainly on each instrument a number consecutive to the number assigned to the immediately previously recorded or filed instrument, such that all numbers are unique for each instrument within a group of public records that are kept together as a unit and relate to a particular subject.
Sec. 59.43(1)(f).
¶12 “The obvious intent of this statute is to ensure that documents
relating to a particular piece of property, in this case real estate, are
recorded in the precise order in which they are received, thereby maintaining
the priority of interests in the chain of title.” George v. Argent Mortgage Co., LLC,
364 B.R. 355, 360 (E.D. Wis. 2007). The
purpose of the recording statute is to render record title authoritative. Kordecki v. Rizzo, 106
¶13 The Gierons next argue that, under Northern State Bank v. Toal,
69
¶14 The issue in Toal was whether Toal’s purchase
money mortgage on real estate took precedence over a judgment a creditor held
against Toal before he acquired the real estate covered by the mortgage. Toal, 69
¶15 The Gierons also assert that their mortgage has priority
because it was given in satisfaction of an October 15, 2004 land contract
between them and Summer Haven, and thus “relates back” to the land contract’s
2004 recording date. The bank argues
that this issue is raised for the first time on appeal. For that reason, and because the Gierons do
not dispute that assertion in their reply brief, we do not address the issue
further. See Apex Elecs. Corp. v. Gee, 217
¶16 We also conclude, as the circuit court did, that even if the
bank’s mortgage was not recorded first, it still is superior. Both the closing and settlement statements
plainly stated that the Gierons’ mortgage was second and they acknowledged by
their signatures that the documents were accurate. The Gierons’ signatures constitute admissions
against interest under Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(b)1.
and 2. and are competent evidence of the matters admitted. See
Marek
v. Knab Co., 10
¶17 The Gierons nevertheless seek to avoid the effects of the contract behind the shield of being “unschooled [and] unrepresented.”[2] “It is the ‘firmly fixed’ law in this state that, absent fraud, a person may not avoid the clear terms of a signed contract by claiming that he or she did not read or understand the contract.” Raasch v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI App 54, ¶11, 310 Wis. 2d 230, 750 N.W.2d 492 (citation omitted), review denied, 2008 WI 115, 310 Wis. 2d 707, 754 N.W.2d 850. The “firmly fixed law” does not make an exception for parties who freely chose to represent themselves.
¶18 The Gierons next claim that the circuit court “egregiously”
erred by not permitting them to present at the summary judgment hearing oral
argument and supporting exhibits they sought to produce for the first
time. A court has considerable
discretion in directing the proceedings before it. See Wengerd v. Rinehart, 114
¶19 We also reject the Gierons’ claim that the grant of summary
judgment was premature because discovery was underway to possibly establish a
conspiracy between Summer Haven and the bank.
Under Wis. Stat. § 802.08(4),
the circuit court’s authority to delay ruling on a summary judgment motion to
give an opposing party additional time for discovery is “highly discretionary.”
See
Kinnick
v. Schierl, Inc., 197
¶20 The circuit court observed that the Gierons’ discovery requests
were filed only after the bank moved for summary judgment. It also noted that their claim of conspiracy
not only set forth no factual basis but “defie[d] the laws of common
sense.” The court concluded that the
requests—such as those essentially demanding that the bank supply documents
proving it is a bank—struck it as a “fishing expedition” that “look[ed] like
harassment.” These findings are not
clearly erroneous. See Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2). It was within the court’s discretion to limit
such discovery. See Cruz v. All Saints Healthcare Sys., Inc., 2001 WI App 67, ¶20,
242
¶21 Finally, we address the Gierons’ claim that the court erred in summarily denying their motion for reconsideration brought pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07. They assert that, although their “rehearing petition was so compelling,” the circuit court denied it “out of hand, without “even read[ing] it, let alone consider[ing] it.”
¶22 We do not reverse a circuit court’s order denying such relief
unless the court erroneously exercised its discretion. Hottenroth v. Hetsko, 2006 WI App
249, ¶33, 298
By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.
Recommended for publication in the official reports.
[1] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version.
[2]
Incongruously, here the Gierons portray themselves as legally unsophisticated
while much of their brief, like their motion for reconsideration, is overtly
disdainful of Judge Kennedy’s interpretation and application of the law. As just a few of many examples, they
castigate him for making “legal errors of egregious magnitude warranting … his
removal from the bench,” and ask this court to reverse and remand “to a
different judge who can follow the simple, straightforward edicts of the
law.” They accuse him of
“pontificating,” “substitut[ing] his arbitrary speculations” for a trial by
jury, delivering “haltingly expressed analyses” and denying their motion for
reconsideration “without … probably, even reading it.” Such commentary displays an astounding
disrespect for the office of the court and to Judge Kennedy in particular. Disagreeing with the outcome is one thing
but, as we have remarked on other occasions, venom, arrogance and ad hominem
attacks are inexcusable and will not be tolerated. See,
e.g., Strook v. Kedinger, 2009 WI App 31, ¶6, 316