|
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED August 3, 1995 |
NOTICE |
|
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-0524
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
PAUL F. RAMSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ROBERT P. ELLIS, III,
and FF INVESTMENT
SERVICES,
INC., f/k/a ROBERT P.
ELLIS
INVESTMENT REAL
ESTATE, INC.,
Defendants-Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Dane County:
MARK A. FRANKEL, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Eich, C.J.,
Gartzke, P.J., and Dykman, J.
PER CURIAM. Paul F. Ramsey appeals from a judgment
dismissing his claims against Robert P. Ellis, III, and Robert P. Ellis
Investment Real Estate, Inc. This is a
continuation of Ramsey's quantum meruit claim, as described in Ramsey v.
Ellis, 168 Wis.2d 779, 484 N.W.2d 331 (1992). We affirm.
Ramsey argues that the
trial court erroneously exercised its discretion by denying his motion for a
continuance. The motion was filed
shortly before trial and was based on the inability of an out-of-state expert
witness to appear because of personal business obligations. The court acknowledged that the witness was
important to Ramsey's case, but noted that the case had been pending for a long
time, that the trial had recently been postponed at Ramsey's request, and that
the court was unable to schedule another case to fill the trial dates. The court examined the relevant facts,
applied a proper standard of law and, using a demonstrated rational process,
reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach. See State v. Gudenschwager,
191 Wis.2d 432, 441, 529 N.W.2d 225, 229 (1995). Therefore, we affirm.
Ramsey also argues that
the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion by quashing his subpoenas
of Dean Retzlaff, an accountant who worked with the defendants. A court may quash a subpoena if it is
unreasonable and oppressive. Section
805.07(3), Stats. The court quashed the subpoenas
because it thought there was an inadequate showing to reopen the plaintiff's
case and "go fishing" for unknown and unreviewed documents. We conclude the court did not erroneously
exercise its discretion.
Ramsey also argues that
the trial court erred in dismissing his claim for insufficient evidence at the
close of his case. The test is whether
there was credible evidence to sustain a finding in Ramsey's favor, considering
all credible evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to Ramsey. Section 805.14(1)
and (3), Stats.
The supreme court
remanded this case for the trial court to determine the reasonable value of
Ramsey's services to the defendants and what, if any, damages he is entitled to
recover. Ramsey, 168
Wis.2d at 790, 484 N.W.2d at 336.
Ramsey attempted to prove that the value of his services should be
measured as a percentage of the revenue raised by the real estate projects at
issue. This approach is contrary to the
law of quantum meruit.
While recovery for
unjust enrichment is based upon the inequity of allowing the defendant to
retain a benefit without paying for it, recovery in quantum meruit is based
upon an implied contract to pay reasonable compensation for services
rendered.... Accordingly, damages in an
unjust enrichment claim are measured by the benefit conferred upon the
defendant, while damages in a quantum meruit claim are measured by the
reasonable value of the plaintiff's services.
Id. at
785, 484 N.W.2d at 333-34.
Because Ramsey's attempt
to use percentage of revenue is more a measure of the benefit conferred upon
the defendant than a measure of the value of Ramsey's services, we conclude it
is not the appropriate method to calculate that value. Ramsey did not submit evidence in support of
any other theory of valuation.
Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed Ramsey's complaint at the
close of his case.
Finally, Ramsey argues
that he was entitled to a jury trial.
However, because we have concluded that the trial court properly granted
the defendants' motion to dismiss, any error regarding the lack of a jury trial
is harmless. The jury never would have
rendered a verdict.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.