PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.: 94-0785
†Petition for
Review filed.
Complete
Title
of
Case:IN THE INTEREST OF
JULIAN C.P.,
A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Petitioner-Respondent, †
v.
JULIAN C.P.,
Respondent-Appellant.
Submitted
on Briefs: October 6, 1994
COURT COURT OF
APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
Opinion
Released: April 4, 1996
Opinion
Filed: April
4, 1996
Source
of APPEAL Appeal from an order
Full
Name JUDGE COURT: Circuit
Lower
Court. COUNTY: Rock
(If
"Special" JUDGE: James
Welker
so
indicate)
JUDGES: Eich,
C.J., Gartzke, P.J., and Sundby, J.
Concurred:
Dissented:
Appellant
ATTORNEYSFor the respondent-appellant the
cause was submitted on the briefs of Jack E. Schairer, first assistant
state public defender.
Respondent
ATTORNEYSFor the petitioner-respondent the
cause was submitted on the brief of Jodi Timmerman, Assistant
Corporation Counsel of Janesville, and Jodi Dabson Bollendorf, Assistant
District Attorney of Beloit.
|
COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED April
4, 1996 |
NOTICE |
|
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-0785
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE
INTEREST OF JULIAN C.P.,
A
PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
JULIAN
C.P.,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Rock County: JAMES WELKER, Judge. Reversed.
Before
Eich, C.J., Gartzke, P.J., and Sundby, J.
SUNDBY,
J. Julian C.P. appeals from an order entered February 24,
1994, which requires his mother to reimburse the county for the cost of his
detention in a county facility. The
State argues that the juvenile court had authority to make such an order
pursuant to § 48.275(1), Stats.,
1993-94,[1]
which provides in part:
If the court finds
a child to be delinquent ..., the court shall order the parents ... to
contribute toward the expense of post-adjudication services to the child the
proportion of the total amount which the court finds the parents are able to
pay.
Julian
C.P. has a long history of delinquency and failure to comply with the juvenile
court's dispositional orders. Twice
before, his mother paid the cost of his detention, pursuant to court orders
entered under § 48.275(1), Stats. On September 1, 1993, the juvenile court
placed Julian on intensive supervision, following a determination that he was
delinquent. He violated the terms of
his supervision and the juvenile court placed him in secure detention for ten
days. The court ordered his mother to
pay the costs of this detention in the amount of $1,100. The court found that she had the ability to
pay that amount based on her monthly income from SSI and AFDC grants of
$2,388.82. We conclude that the
juvenile court did not have authority under § 48.275(1) to require
Julian's mother to pay the cost of his detention. We reverse.
Whether
a juvenile court has authority under § 48.275(1), Stats., to require a parent to pay the cost of
post-adjudication detention is a question of law which we decide without
deference to the circuit court, except insofar as the court's reasoning is
persuasive. See State v.
Koch, 195 Wis.2d 801, 811, 537 N.W.2d 39, 43 (Ct. App. 1995)
(interpretation of a statute is a question of law).
We
must determine the meaning of "post-adjudication services to the
child," as used in § 48.275(1), Stats. The State acknowledges that placement in a
secure detention facility is a "sanction," but argues that such a
sanction is "intended to further the objectives of the Dispositional Order
designed for the welfare of the child," citing In Interest of B.S.,
162 Wis.2d 378, 392, 469 N.W.2d 860, 865-66 (Ct. App. 1991). Such acknowledgement begs the question: Does this type of sanction--detention in a
secured facility--constitute a "post-adjudication service" within the
meaning of the statute?
In
this context, a "sanction" is "a restrictive measure used to
punish a specific action or to prevent some future activity ...." Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 2009 (1993). In this sense, any detention or imprisonment
is a "sanction." Placement of
a juvenile at Ethan Allen or Lincoln Hills is a "sanction." Imposing the cost of such placement on the
parent of a delinquent child would impose ruinous costs. A construction of § 48.275(1), Stats., which would require--the
statute reads, "shall"--this result would be unreasonable. We are not to construe statutes to require
an unreasonable result. See Falk
v. Falk, 158 Wis.2d 184, 189, 462 N.W.2d 547, 548 (Ct. App. 1990). We cannot ignore, however, that in certain
contexts, confinement and administrative sanctions are not considered
punishment. See State v.
Killebrew, 115 Wis.2d 243, 247, 340 N.W.2d 470, 473 (1983) (confinement
and other administrative penalties imposed by prison officials are not
considered punishment for double jeopardy purposes). The State's argument that placement in a secure detention
facility is intended to further the objectives of dispositional orders is not
wholly unreasonable if "post-adjudication services" are limited to
court-connected services. Because
§ 48.275(1) may be read as having more than one meaning, we conclude that
the statute is ambiguous. See Ervin
v. City of Kenosha, 159 Wis.2d 464, 472, 464 N.W.2d 654, 657-58 (1991)
(a statute is ambiguous if it may be read by reasonably well-informed persons
to have more than one meaning).
The
title of § 48.275, Stats.,
is: "Parents' contribution to cost
of court and legal services."
Court-connected services could conceivably include such measures as the
court may have to take to enforce its dispositional orders. The title of a statute is not part of the
law but may be resorted to in order to determine the legislature's intent. Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc.,
192 Wis.2d 450, 458, 531 N.W.2d 412, 415 (Ct. App. 1995), rev'd on other
grounds, No. 94-1523-FT, slip op. (Wis. May 23, 1996).
In
construing ch. 48, Stats., we have
previously held that it is appropriate to read together the provisions of the
law to determine the legislature's intent as to a provision thereof. In Interest of Antonio M.C.,
182 Wis.2d 301, 308-09, 513 N.W.2d 662, 665 (Ct. App. 1994). These statutes are in pari materia
and should be read together. See
Riley v. Doe, 152 Wis.2d 766, 771, 449 N.W.2d 83, 84 (Ct. App.
1989). However, we read cost statutes
strictly. See, e.g., State
v. Evans, 181 Wis.2d 978, 512 N.W.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1994).
The
word "services" appears often in ch. 48, Stats. Section
48.02(17m), Stats., defines
"[s]pecial treatment or care" to mean "professional services
which need to be provided to a child or his or her family .... This term includes, but is not limited to,
medical, psychological or psychiatric treatment, alcohol or other drug abuse
treatment or other services which the court finds to be necessary and
appropriate." (Emphasis
added.) Each intake worker whose duties
include investigation of child abuse and neglect must successfully complete
training in "child abuse and neglect protective services." Section 48.06(1)(am)3, Stats. (emphasis added). State aid is provided to the counties for
"court services."
Section 48.06(4) (emphasis added).
The staff of the department and the court shall "[m]ake an
affirmative effort to obtain necessary or desired services for the child
and the child's family ...."
Section 48.069(1)(c), Stats. (emphasis
added). The juvenile court in
determining whether to waive its jurisdiction over a child charged with a
delinquent act must consider, "[t]he adequacy and suitability of
facilities, services and procedures available for treatment of the child
and protection of the public ...."
Section 48.18(5)(c), Stats.
(emphasis added). If needed, the
services which the court and the department must provide a child determined to
be delinquent include post-disposition individual or group counseling,
homemaker or parent aide services, respite care, housing assistance, day care
and parent skills training. Section
48.34(2m), Stats. The juvenile court may order that the child
be provided and participate in alcohol or drug treatment or education. Section 48.34(13). The dispositional order shall contain "[t]he specific
services or continuum of services to be provided to the child and family
...." Section 48.355(2)(b)1, Stats.
We
conclude that § 48.275(1), Stats.,
is the "catch-all" provision which allows the juvenile court to
require parents to contribute within their means to the cost of the rehabilitative
services the court and the department provide the delinquent juvenile and
his or her family; this provision does not include detention and placement
costs at county facilities.[2] We therefore reverse the order from which
Julian C.P. appeals.
By
the Court.—Order reversed.