PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.: 94-2174
†Petition for
review filed
Complete Title
of Case:
JEFFREY J. SCHAUB, and
CATHY K. SCHAUB, MICHAEL
SCHAUB and DANIEL SCHAUB,
by their Guardian Ad Litem,
WILLIAM FARRELL,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WEST BEND MUTUAL,
Defendant,
OSCAR J. BOLDT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY
COMPANY,
Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs-
Appellants,
v.
N. J. SCHAUB & SONS, INC.,
a Wisconsin corporation, and
WEST BEND INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
a domestic insurance company,
Third Party Defendants-Respondents.†
Submitted on Briefs: May 10, 1995
COURT COURT
OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
Opinion Released: June 7, 1995
Opinion Filed: June 7, 1995
Source of APPEAL Appeal
from an order
Full Name JUDGE COURT: Circuit
Lower Court. COUNTY: Waukesha
(If "Special", JUDGE: Mark S. Gempeler
so indicate)
JUDGES: Anderson,
P.J., Brown and Nettesheim, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented:
Appellant
ATTORNEYSOn
behalf of the defendants-third party plaintiffs-appellants, the cause was
submitted on the briefs of Edward A. Hannan, M. Susan Maloney,
and Jeffrey L. Janik of Godfrey, Braun & Hayes of Milwaukee.
Respondent
ATTORNEYSOn
behalf of the third party defendants-respondents, the cause was submitted on
the brief of Patrick W. Brennan and Jill M. Munson of Crivello,
Carlson, Mentkowski & Steeves of Milwaukee.
|
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED June 7, 1995 |
NOTICE |
|
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to
review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will
appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-2174
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
JEFFREY J. SCHAUB, and
CATHY K. SCHAUB, MICHAEL
SCHAUB and DANIEL SCHAUB,
by their Guardian Ad Litem,
WILLIAM FARRELL,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WEST BEND MUTUAL,
Defendant,
OSCAR J. BOLDT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY
COMPANY,
Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs-
Appellants,
v.
N. J. SCHAUB & SONS, INC.,
a Wisconsin corporation, and
WEST BEND INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
a domestic insurance company,
Third Party Defendants-Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Waukesha County:
MARK S. GEMPELER, Judge. Reversed.
Before Anderson, P.J.,
Brown and Nettesheim, JJ.
BROWN, J. The
law in Wisconsin is clear that the immunity from suit enjoyed by employers
pursuant to our Worker's Compensation Act may be waived.[1] The issue in this case is whether a
comprehensive indemnification agreement whereby a company agreed to accept
responsibility for injuries to persons on a jobsite must expressly waive
worker's compensation immunity before that company can be exposed to liability
when the person injured is an employee of the company. We hold that Wisconsin law does not require
the use of specific phrases such as an agreement to be “liable to one's own
employees” or to “waive worker's compensation” in order to give up
immunity. We reverse the trial court's
decision to the contrary.
This action arises out
of injuries sustained by Jeffrey J. Schaub in the course of his employment with
N.J. Schaub & Sons, Inc. The injury
occurred on a construction project in which N.J. Schaub was a subcontractor. Jeffrey received worker's compensation
benefits and then started a negligence action against the general contractor,
Oscar J. Boldt Construction Company.
Discovery conducted to date shows that Jeffrey was in the process of
attempting to rock a “scissors lift” free from a hole he had driven it into in
the construction area when the scissors lift was propelled into an empty
swimming pool guarded by a wooden railing.
Boldt brought a third-party action against
N.J. Schaub based on the indemnification and insurance paragraph of the
subcontract between Boldt and N.J. Schaub which provided in pertinent part:
Indemnification
and Insurance.
a.
Subcontractor [N.J. Schaub] agrees to save harmless and defend Owner and
Contractor [Boldt] from any and all claims, demands, judgments and costs
of suit or defense, including attorneys' fees, and indemnify and
reimburse Owner and Contractor [Boldt] for any expense, damage or liability incurred
by Owner and Contractor [Boldt] ¼ for personal injury ¼ arising or alleged to have arisen, whether directly or
indirectly, on account of or in connection with any work done by
Subcontractor [N.J. Schaub] under this Subcontract ¼.
¼.
c. Subcontractor [N.J. Schaub] shall submit to
Contractor, within three (3) calendar days of the occurrence of any accident,
copies of all reports arising out of any injuries to its employees ¼
arising or alleged to have arisen on account of any work done by Subcontractor
[N.J. Schaub] under the Contract Documents.
[Emphasis added.]
The
trial court held that because the above agreement did not specifically waive
N.J. Schaub's immunity from suit under the Worker's Compensation Act, the
agreement had no force and effect in the action by Jeffrey. The court dismissed the third-party
complaint by Boldt against N.J. Schaub for that reason and Boldt appeals.
Boldt contends that the indemnification
agreement is clearly written to protect it from liability based on N.J.
Schaub's operations. It argues that
Wisconsin law does not require a clear and specific waiver of worker's
compensation immunity or an express agreement to be liable to the employer's
own employees. It cites Larsen v. J.I. Case Co., 37
Wis.2d 516, 155 N.W.2d 666 (1968), in support.
There, the plaintiff was an employee of a subcontractor which had agreed
to the following:
The
sub-contractor agrees to indemnify and hold the contractor harmless against all
claims against the sub-contractor or the contractor arising out of injuries to
any person by reason of the negligence or violation of applicable safety
regulations by the sub-contractor.
Id. at
518, 155 N.W.2d at 667. The subcontractor's
employee sued the general contractor, who then initiated a third-party action
against the subcontractor for indemnification.
The subcontractor moved for summary judgment, arguing that worker's
compensation provided the exclusive remedy against it. The general contractor relied upon the
indemnification agreement and argued that if the subcontractor's negligence was
a causal factor in the injury, the subcontractor was exposed to liability under
the suit. The trial court ruled for the
subcontractor. Our supreme court
reversed. It held that “the rule of no
liability of the employer over and above that imposed by the Workmen's
Compensation Act does not apply in the case of an express agreement for
indemnification.” Id. at
520, 155 N.W.2d at 668. Based upon Larsen,
Boldt asserts that the indemnification agreement in this case passes muster as
a waiver of N.J. Schaub's immunity under the Worker's Compensation Act.
In response, N.J. Schaub
basically asks this court to ignore Larsen. It cites other cases from our supreme court
which it claims shows a requirement that the words “employee” or “worker's
compensation” be contained in the agreement.
N.J. Schaub also belittles the reasoning of the Larsen
case, contending that it was based on two earlier Wisconsin cases where the
referenced words were contained in the agreement.
We acknowledge the cases
cited by N.J. Schaub. It is true that
in Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis.2d 173, 177-78, 290
N.W.2d 276, 278 (1980), our supreme court wrote that an employer's waiver of
immunity from worker's compensation suits must be by “specific and express”
agreement. We further acknowledge the
cases cited by N.J. Schaub, all of which contained either express references to
“employees,” or “work[er's] compensation” and “employees.”[2]
Still, Mulder
does not prohibit the kind of contract employed in Larsen from
passing as a “specific and express” agreement. See Mulder, 95 Wis.2d at 177-78, 290 N.W.2d at
278. And Mulder does not
overrule Larsen or refer to it.
In fact, the Mulder court was not even addressing specific
contract language, but a constitutional challenge to the exclusive remedy
provisions. Mulder, 95
Wis.2d at 176, 290 N.W.2d at 277-78. As
pointed out by Boldt, there was no controversy concerning the elements of an
express agreement. Mulder
is of little help in answering whether Larsen is still the
law. The other cases cited by N.J.
Schaub do not help either. While the
agreements in those cases may have expressly indemnified suits by an “employee”
or specifically waived “work[er's] compensation,” the supreme court did not say
that such wording must be in an indemnification agreement as a condition
precedent to waiver of immunity from suit.[3] We conclude that the cases cited by N.J.
Schaub are unpersuasive.
Finally, we acknowledge
that the Larsen case is twenty-seven years old. We further acknowledge that there are other
jurisdictions in the United States which require specific words as a condition
precedent to waiver of worker's compensation immunity by an employer. However, as an error-correcting court, we
are bound by the case law written by our supreme court. We have no authority to overrule Larsen,
which we hold is on “all fours” with this case. If N.J. Schaub believes that the Larsen case should
no longer be the law in Wisconsin, it is for our supreme court to say whether
N.J. Schaub is right. For now, Larsen
controls.[4]
By the Court.—Order
reversed.
[2] The cases are: Young, 43 Wis.2d at 53, 168 N.W.2d at 121-22; Hintz v. Darling Freight, Inc., 17 Wis.2d 376, 377-78, 117 N.W.2d 271, 272 (1962); Huck v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry., 5 Wis.2d 124, 127, 92 N.W.2d 349, 351 (1958); and Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., 238 Wis. 124, 127, 297 N.W. 436, 438 (1941). These cases refer to “employees.” The agreement in Barrons v. J.H. Findorff & Sons, Inc., 89 Wis.2d 444, 449-50, 278 N.W.2d 827, 829-30 (1979), refers to both “work[er's] compensation” and “employees.”
[3] We observe that the indemnification agreement in this case requires the subcontractor to report all injuries of N.J. Schaub's employees to Boldt. Boldt argues that even if specific wording must be in the indemnification agreement, the reference to “employees” satisfies the condition. Even though we concede that the issue has merit, we will not reach it in this case since we decide the case on different grounds.
[4] Boldt also argues that the Honorable Mark S. Gempeler, as successor judge to the Honorable Howard Latton, Reserve Judge, had no authority to reconsider Judge Latton's earlier decision agreeing with Boldt's position. Because we decide this case on other grounds, we need not reach this issue. Even if we were to reach the issue, we would hold that Boldt is wrong. See Dietrich v. Elliott, 190 Wis.2d 817, 823-24, 528 N.W.2d 17, 19-20 (Ct. App. 1995).