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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED February 22, 1996 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-3151
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
PETER J. WHITEMAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KIM M. EPPS,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Monroe County:
JAMES W. RICE, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Eich, C.J.,
Dykman and Vergeront, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Kim M. Epps appeals from a judgment awarding money
damages to Peter J. Whiteman on his malicious prosecution claim. She raises several issues concerning the
proceedings and the verdict. All are
waived, and we therefore affirm.
In October 1990, Epps
alleged that Whiteman had sexually assaulted her nine months previously. As a result, the State charged Whiteman with
first-degree sexual assault. However,
the prosecutor quickly dismissed the complaint when Whiteman established an
airtight alibi. Whiteman later
commenced this action, alleging that Epps falsely and maliciously accused him
of the crime to deprive him of visitation rights with their child.
The matter went to
trial, and the jury found that Epps had maliciously prosecuted Whiteman. He received an award of $70,000 for
humiliation and damage to his reputation, and $1,500 for the attorney fees he
expended in defending himself against the criminal charge. He also received $30,000 in punitive
damages. On appeal, Epps contends that
the trial court should have dismissed the complaint for failing to plead or
prove special damages, that the evidence did not support the verdict and that
the verdict was both perverse and excessive.
Epps did not raise any of these issues in a motion after the verdict.
In a judicially created
exception to the notice pleading rule, § 802.02(1), Stats., the supreme court has held that
to recover for malicious prosecution of a civil claim the plaintiff must plead,
and then prove, special damages. Johnson
v. Calado, 159 Wis.2d 446, 460-61, 464 N.W.2d 647, 653 (1991). "[A]n allegation that plaintiff
incurred expense in defending himself against the prosecution alleged to be
malicious is not an allegation of such special damage ...." Schier v. Denny, 9 Wis.2d 340,
345, 101 N.W.2d 35, 38 (1960).
Here, Whiteman failed to
allege special damages, and at trial, Epps moved to dismiss. Because she did not bring her motion before
the trial commenced, it was untimely under § 802.06(4), Stats. (motion to dismiss complaint
shall be heard and determined before trial unless the court defers the hearing
until trial). The trial court so
concluded.[1]
At the close of
Whiteman's case, the trial court denied Epps's second motion to dismiss based
on Whiteman's failure not only to plead but to prove special damages. Although Epps could argue that proving
special damages is also necessary on a malicious criminal prosecution claim,
she has not properly preserved the issue for appeal because she failed to raise
it on motions after the verdict. Even
where a proper objection is made during the trial, one must raise the issue in
a motion after the verdict in order to preserve the issue for appeal. Ford Motor Co. v. Lyons, 137
Wis.2d 397, 417, 405 N.W.2d 354, 362 (Ct. App. 1987). For the same reason, Epps's remaining issues are also waived.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] Epps brought her motion at the beginning of the trial. That is not, as she argues, before its commencement. Section 802.06(4), Stats., requires a motion before the trial commences. The motion was also defective because it was not made in writing or served in advance. Sections 802.01(2)(a) and 801.15(4), Stats.