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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED June 13, 1995 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-3156-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BRYAN LONGWORTH,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
DANIEL L. KONKOL, Judge. Affirmed.
WEDEMEYER, P.J.[1] Bryan Longworth appeals from a judgment of
conviction, after a jury trial, for two counts of contempt, contrary to
§§ 785.031(b) and 939.62, Stats. Longworth claims that the contempt
conviction should be dismissed because he was not subject to the underlying
injunction, which formed the basis of the contempt charges. He also claims the trial court erred in
excluding evidence relevant to whether he was subject to the underlying
injunction. Because Longworth is
precluded from collaterally attacking the underlying injunction and because the
evidence was properly excluded, this court affirms.
I. BACKGROUND
During the summer of
1992, the State of Wisconsin and the City of Milwaukee filed a civil action
against various persons and organizations, including an organization known as
“Youth for America,” seeking an injunction limiting the conduct at
anti-abortion demonstrations. In this
civil injunction suit, Youth for America was served with a summons and
complaint via one of its officers/directors, Matthew Trewhella. Trewhella moved to dismiss the complaint
based on lack of jurisdiction.
Specifically, with respect to jurisdiction over Youth for America,
Trewhella argued that he was not an officer/director and, therefore, Youth for
America was never properly served. The
trial court in that case, however, denied the motion, finding that Trewhella
was in fact an officer/director of the organization. On December 10, 1992, a permanent injunction was issued
restricting the named defendants in the lawsuit, and anyone acting in concert
with a named defendant, from demonstrating within certain distances from clinic
entrances. Youth for America was a
named defendant and, therefore, subject to the injunction. There was no further challenge to the
court's jurisdiction over Youth for America.
Longworth, although not
a specifically named defendant in that lawsuit, is an officer/director of Youth
for America. On July 15, 1993,
Longworth was charged with two counts of contempt for violating the underlying
injunction while acting on behalf of Youth for America. During the trial, Longworth attempted to
introduce evidence challenging the jurisdiction over Youth for America in the
injunction action. The trial court
excluded this evidence. The jury convicted
Longworth. He now appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Collateral
Attack.
Longworth claims that
his conviction should be dismissed because Youth for America was never properly
served in the underlying injunction action.
He explains that he is the organization's only officer/director and, therefore,
serving Trewhella was ineffective to confer jurisdiction. As a result, Longworth contends that the
underlying injunction does not apply to Youth for America or to him. The State responds that Longworth cannot
collaterally attack the jurisdiction determination of the injunction
court. The trial court in the instant
case agreed.
This court is not
persuaded by Longworth's argument. The
issue of jurisdiction over Youth for America was raised and decided by the
injunction court. The injunction court
specifically found that “[a]ll the evidence of record establishes that Matthew
Trewhella does constitute the director, manager or officer of ... Youth for
America.” As a result, the injunction
court determined that service upon Trewhella as an officer/director of Youth
for America was sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the organization. That determination was not challenged
further, and therefore, the validity of the decision is assumed. See generally, Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd. v. Mews, 29 Wis.2d 44, 138 N.W.2d 147 (1965).
Accordingly, Longworth
is precluded from collaterally attacking that determination in the instant
action. State v. Madison,
120 Wis.2d 150, 154, 353 N.W.2d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Bouzek,
168 Wis.2d 642, 644-45, 484 N.W.2d 362, 363 (Ct. App. 1992); R.B. General
Trucking, Inc. v. Auto Parts & Service, Inc., 3 Wis.2d 91, 97, 87
N.W.2d 863, 866 (1958) (court's findings of jurisdictional facts after
objection to jurisdiction are conclusive against collateral attack). Therefore, this court rejects his argument
that the underlying injunction does not apply to him because Youth for America
was never properly served.
B. Exclusion
of Evidence.
The evidence that
Longworth asserts was erroneously excluded was testimony from an attorney who
represented certain named defendants in the underlying injunction action. Longworth intended to have the attorney
testify that he in fact did not represent Youth for America in the underlying
injunction action.
An appellate court
reviews a trial court's evidentiary rulings according to the erroneous exercise
of discretion standard. See State
v. Pharr, 115 Wis.2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498, 501 (1983); State
v. Alsteen, 108 Wis.2d 723, 727, 324 N.W.2d 426, 428 (1982). If a trial court applies the proper law to
the established facts, we will not find a misuse of discretion if there is any
reasonable basis for the trial court's ruling.
Alsteen, 108 Wis.2d at 727, 324 N.W.2d at 428; Village
of Shorewood v. Steinberg, 174 Wis.2d 191, 204, 496 N.W.2d 57, 62
(1993); Steinbach v. Gustafson, 177 Wis.2d 178, 185-86, 502
N.W.2d 156, 159 (Ct. App. 1993).
Appellate courts generally look for reasons to sustain discretionary
determinations. Steinbach,
177 Wis.2d at 185-86, 502 N.W.2d at 159.
In the instant case, the
trial court properly determined that Longworth could not collaterally attack
the determination by the injunction court that Youth for America was properly
served. The testimony excluded was
pertinent solely to an attack on whether the underlying injunction applied to
Youth for America. As noted above, this
jurisdictional issue was previously determined by the injunction court and not
subject to attack. Further, testimony
on jurisdictional issues are for the court and not the jury. State ex rel. V.J.H. v. C.A.B.,
163 Wis.2d 833, 840, 472 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Ct. App. 1991); see also 21
C.J.S. Courts § 87 (1990).
Accordingly, it was not an erroneous exercise of discretion to exclude
this testimony.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.