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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED OCTOBER 17, 1995 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
Nos. 94-3426-CR
94-3427-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RICKY L. AMRINE,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from judgments of
the circuit court for Brown County:
N. PATRICK CROOKS, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Ricky Amrine appeals the sentence he received for his
conviction of two counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child and one
count of second-degree sexual assault, both as a repeater, having pleaded no
contest. The victims were two and six
years old. The trial court departed
from the sentencing guidelines, imposing maximum, consecutive sentences on each
count, for a total of seventy-six years.
Amrine argues that the trial court overlooked and underweighted
mitigating factors, such as his remorse, his high level of cooperation with the
State, and the presentence investigation report's recommendation of two
thirty-year consecutive sentences and a stayed, sixteen-year consecutive
sentence. He also argues that the trial
court overweighted and misconcerned itself with the potential timetable for
Amrine's parole release, thereby essentially interfering in matters that the
legislature has entrusted to the parole commission. We reject these arguments and therefore affirm Amrine's sentence.
The
trial court's sentencing decision was discretionary. State v. Macemon, 113 Wis.2d 662, 667-68, 335
N.W.2d 402, 405-06 (1983). Sentencing
courts abuse their discretion whenever they give too much weight to one factor
without regard to contravening considerations.
Harris v. State, 75 Wis.2d 513, 518, 250 N.W.2d 7, 10
(1977). However, sentencing courts have
discretion to determine the weight to give to each of these factors. Ocanas v. State, 70 Wis.2d
179, 185, 233 N.W.2d 457, 461 (1975).
Sentencing courts may base their sentences on any of the factors after
all have been reviewed. Anderson
v. State, 76 Wis.2d 361, 366-67, 251 N.W.2d 768, 771 (1977). Relevant sentencing factors include the
gravity of the offense, the protection of the public, the rehabilitative needs
of the defendant, and the interests of deterrence. State v. Sarabia, 118 Wis.2d 655, 673-74, 348
N.W.2d 527, 537 (1984). Like other
discretionary decisions, sentences must have a reasonable basis in the record
and demonstrate a logical process of reasoning based on the facts of record and
proper legal standards. McCleary
v. State, 49 Wis.2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512, 519-20 (1971).
Among other factors, the
trial court mentioned the danger Amrine posed to the community, the
vulnerability of the victims, and the permanent, venereal disease that the
two-year-old victim had contracted. We
agree with the trial court that these and other factors the trial court
surveyed put Amrine's case outside the sentencing guidelines. The trial court quoted substantial material
from the PSI, thereby finding the information significant. This information included statements by the
victims' parents. As a parent of the
two-year-old victim noted, every day that Amrine spends in the Wisconsin State
Prisons the victim will spend with venereal disease. The trial court also quoted a letter from a doctor, who stated
that the victims will suffer lifelong emotional harm and that the two-year-old
victim's disease requires medical treatment that exposes her to serious
additional health risks. This
information demonstrated the substantial danger Amrine poses to children; it
also helped to indicate his degree of culpability. The trial court noted that Amrine had grown progressively more
assaultive and that the State had dropped additional sexual assault charges
against him pertaining to his daughter.
Near the end of its findings, the trial court concluded that the
public's protection was the overriding consideration.
These and other factors
furnished the trial court substantial discretionary grounds for imposing a
seventy-six year sentence. The sentence
was proportionate to Amrine's criminal record, his past violent behavior, his
dangerousness to children, his need for treatment, the interests of deterrence,
the public's need for protection, the interests of punishment, and Amrine's
level of culpability in these crimes.
Last, we see nothing in Amrine's remorse, his cooperation with
prosecutors, the PSI recommendation, or the trial court's analysis of potential
parole dates that requires resentencing.
The trial court gave a well balanced analysis of the PSI and potential
parole dates that was fair to Amrine.
The trial court also could reasonably conclude that Amrine's remorse and
cooperation did not atone for his crimes in a material way. In sum, the trial court properly exercised
its discretion.
By the Court.—Judgments
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.